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Abstract
This thesis deals with dynamic, load-adaptive rerouting policies in game
theoretic settings. In the Wardrop model, which forms the basis of our
dynamic population model, each of an infinite number of agents injects an
infinitesimal amount of flow into a network, which in turn induces latency
on the edges. Each agent may choose from a set of paths and strives to
minimise its sustained latency selfishly. Population states which are stable
in that no agent can improve its latency by switching to another path are
referred to asWardrop equilibria.
A variety of results in this model have been obtained recently. Most
of these revolve around the price of anarchy, which measures the degrada-
tion of performance due to the selfish behaviour of the agents as compared
to a centrally optimised solution. Most of these analyses consider the no-
tion of Wardrop equilibria as a solution concept of selfish routing games,
but disregard the question of how such an equilibrium can be attained in
the first place. In fact, common game theoretic assumptions needed for the
motivation of equilibria in general strategic games are not satisfied for rout-
ing games in large networks, the Internet being the prime example. These
assumptions comprise accurate knowledge of the network and its latency
functions as well as unbounded rationality and reasoning capabilities. The
question of howWardrop equilibria can be attained by a population of self-
ish agents is the central topic of this thesis.
Our first approach is inspired by evolutionary game theory. We show
that Wardrop equilibria actually satisfy a stronger stability criterion, called
evolutionary stability, which can be motivated by milder assumptions. We
model a population of agents following some very simple randomised self-
ish rules allowing them to exchange their path for a better one from time
to time. An agent samples another path according to some probability dis-
tribution and possibly exchanges its current path for the new one with a
probability that increases with the latency gain. The behaviour of such a
population over time can be described in terms of a system of differential
equations. For a concrete choice of probability distributions involved in
the above rules, these differential equations take the form of the so-called
v
replicator dynamics. As a first result, we show that a population following
this dynamics converges towards the set of Wardrop equilibria.
This convergence result implicitly assumes perfect information in that
rerouting decisions made by other agents are observable by other agents
immediately. In communication networks, however, such rerouting deci-
sions may be observed only with a delay. In both theory and practise, it
is known that rerouting decisions based on stale information may lead to
undesirable oscillation effects which seriously harm performance. We con-
sider an extension of our dynamic population model in which information
is updated only at intervals of a given length. We show that, despite of this,
convergence to Wardrop equilibria is still possible. For any class of latency
functions with bounded slope and any finite update period length, policies
from a large class converge towards Wardrop equilibria provided that they
satisfy a certain smoothness condition. This condition requires the migra-
tion rate to be reduced by a factor that is reciprocal to the maximum slope
and the update period length.
Finally, we show that Wardrop equilibria can be approached quickly.
This is an issue of particular importance if the network or the flow demands
themselves may change over time. To measure the speed of convergence,
we consider the time to reach approximate Wardrop equilibria. We show
that by applying a clever sampling technique it is possible to reach an ap-
proximate Wardrop equilibrium in time polynomial in the approximation
quality and the representation length of the network, e. g., for positive poly-
nomial latency functions in coefficient representation. In particular, our
bounds depend on the maximum slope of the latency functions only log-
arithmically, which improves over earlier results in similar models which
depend linearly on this parameter. We show that the crucial parameter that
limits the speed of convergence is not the slope, but rather the elasticity of
the latency functions. This parameter is closely related to the degree of
polynomials.
Based on these positive theoretical results, we design a dynamic traf-
fic engineering protocol which we evaluate by simulations. Our protocol
splits traffic bound for the same destination among alternative next-hop
routers and continuously adjusts the splitting ratios. The simulation frame-
work involves significantly more details than theWardropmodel does. For
example, our simulations feature a full TCP implementation at packet level
and include realistic HTTP workload generated on the basis of realistic sta-
tistical properties of Web users. The simulation results are in good corre-
spondence with theory. We see that our protocol in fact converges quickly
and significantly improves the throughput of an autonomous system.
vi
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Notation
C the set of commodities, where commodity Ci = (si, ti, ri)
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∆n the n-dimensional simplex ∆n =
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x ∈ Rn≥0 | ∑i∈[n] xi = 1
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ek the unit vector in dimension k
FΓ the set of feasible flow vectors; FNEΓ is the set of Wardrop equilibria
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x˙ time derivative of x(t), x˙(t) = ddtx(t)
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Notation
Throughout this thesis, we use the following notation. The real, non-
negative real, and positive real numbers are denoted R, R≥0, and R+, re-
spectively. The set {1, . . . , n} is written as [n], and for any set S, 2S denotes
the power set 2S = {T | T ⊆ S}. In n-dimensional space, the unit vector in
dimension k is denoted ek. The dimension n will be clear from the context.
By x|I we denote the vector x restricted to the index set I.
An affine function is the sum of a linear function and a constant. The
natural logarithm is denoted ln(·), and the logarithmwith base 2 is denoted
log(·).
Mathematical Preliminaries
For two functions f , g : R≥0 7→ R≥0 we say that f (x) = O (g(x)) as x → ∞
if and only if there exist x0, c > 0 such that f (x) ≤ c · g(x) for all x ≥ x0. We
say that f (x) = O (g(x)) as x → 0 if and only if there exist x0, c > 0 such
that f (x) ≤ c · g(x) for all x ≤ x0. We will omit the phrases “as x → ∞”
and “as x → 0” since it will be clear from context. If f (x1, . . . , xn) is a
multivariate function, we require the above to hold for xi ≥ xi,0 (xi ≤ xi,0)
for all i ∈ [n] and positive constants xi,0, i ∈ [n]. Correspondingly, we say
f (x) = Ω (g(x)) if and only if the above holds where the condition f (x) ≤
c · g(x) is replaced with f (x) ≥ c · g(x). If f satisfies f (x) = O (g(x)) and
f (x) = Ω (g(x)), then f (x) = Θ(g(x)). Finally, f (x) = o(g(x)) as x → a,
a ∈ {0,∞} if and only if limx→a f (x)/g(x) = 0.
A function f (·) is Lipschitz-continuous at x0 if there exist constants e >
0 and α > 0 such that for all x < e, | f (x)− f (x0)| ≤ α · |x− x0|.
We will frequently make use of Jensen’s inequality in its following form:
Theorem 0.1. For a convex function f : R≥0 7→ R≥0, numbers xi ∈ R≥0 and
weights wi ∈ R≥0 it holds that
∑
i
wi · f (xi) ≥ f
(
∑i wi xi
∑i wi
)
·∑
i
wi .
In particular, we will consider the case that f (x) = x2 and the wi are
probabilities, i. e., ∑i wi = 1. Then,
∑
i
wi · x2i ≥
(
∑
i
wi xi
)2
.
xvi
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The rise of the Internet as today’s predominant communication medium
has opened up new perspectives to computer science. The aspect in which
the Internet differs most profoundly from many classical models studied
in theoretical computer science is its lack of central coordination: Internet
traffic does not lie in the hands of a single authority but is rather controlled
by a large number of users acting, at the very best, selfishly, and possi-
bly even maliciously, randomly, or faulty. This fact brings networking into
the focus of game theory. In an influential paper, Roughgarden and Tar-
dos [70] analyse routing problems in Internet-like networks using a model
originally introduced by Wardrop in 1952 [83] as a model of road traffic. In
this model, fixed flow demands are to be routed between source-sink-pairs,
thus inducing load-dependent latencies on the links.
A classical objective in this scenario is to find a flow that optimises the
overall performance of the network, e. g., by minimising the average la-
tency. In the game theoretic setting, however, we assume that the flow
is composed of infinitesimal contributions of an infinite number of selfish
agents each of which strives for minimising its own sustained latency. We
ask for an allocation of routes that is stable in that no agent has an incentive
for deviating from this allocation. Such an allocation is called a Nash equi-
librium. Compared to a centrally optimised flow, the overall performance
of such an equilibrium may be worse. This degradation of performance is
measured by the price of anarchy which has been studied extensively, e. g.,
in [6, 19, 21, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71]. Several approaches to reduce the price of
anarchy have been studied, e. g., by introducing taxes [20, 35] or by con-
trolling a subset of the agents centrally [65].
All of the above studies focus on static properties of Nash equilibria
and are based on the prerequisite that selfish behaviour in network routing
games results in such an equilibrium. Whereas for all reasonable models
of selfish behaviour a population of agents should be stable once it has
1
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reached a Nash equilibrium, it is not clear how a population of agents can
attain an equilibrium in the first place. Game theory uses several strong as-
sumptions to motivate Nash equilibria for general strategic games, includ-
ing complete and accurate knowledge about the payoff function (in our
case given by the latency dependence of the links) as well as unbounded
rationality and reasoning capabilities of the agents. Arguably, none of these
assumptions are realistic in real-world applications, the Internet being the
prime example.
The aim of this thesis is to circumvent these assumptions and to shed
some light on processes by which a population of selfish agents is capable
of attaining a Nash equilibrium in a simple and distributed fashion relying
on verymild assumptions only. We believe that analyses of static properties
of Nash equilibria are meaningful only if the limit behaviour of some nat-
ural process of the above kind results in a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,
it is desirable that the Nash equilibrium is approached quickly.
To a large extent, our dynamic population model is inspired by evo-
lutionary game theory. Before presenting an outline of our results in Sec-
tion 1.4, wewill formally introduce themodels. After a brief introduction to
game theoretic concepts and notation in Section 1.1 we present the dynamic
extensions and refinements of evolutionary game theory in Section 1.2. The
Wardrop model is formally introduced in Section 1.3.
1.1 Foundations of Game Theory
In the following, we assume a basic knowledge of (classical) game theory.
To establish notation, we will briefly introduce the basic concepts. For a
more elaborate introduction, we refer to standard text books [53, 56, 80].
A strategic symmetric two-player game can be described by an n × n-
payoff-matrix A = (aij)i,j∈[n]. The set of pure strategies of both players is
given by the set [n] = {1, . . . , n}. The term symmetric refers to the fact that
both players have the same strategy space and payoff matrix A as opposed
to the general case where we have an individual strategy space and payoff
matrix for each player. Since only symmetric games qualify for our subse-
quent considerations, we restrict ourselves to the symmetric case here.
Suppose that the two players decide for strategy i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [n],
respectively. The payoff earned by player 1 when playing pure strategy
i ∈ [n] against the opponent’s pure strategy j ∈ [n] is given by aij and
the opponent’s payoff is given by aji. A mixed strategy x = (xi)i∈[n] is a
probability distribution over the strategy space [n]. The set of all mixed
2
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strategies is the simplex
∆n =
{
x ∈ Rn≥0 | ∑
i∈[n]
xi = 1
}
.
The expected payoff of player 1 playing the pure strategy i against a mixed
strategy x is then (Ax)i = ∑j∈[n] aij · xj. Finally, the expected payoff of
player 1 playing the mixed strategy y against the mixed strategy x is y>Ax.
Let ek denote the k-th unit vector in n-dimensional space. For any mixed
strategy x which assigns positive probability only to the pure strategy k,
i. e., x = ek, we identify x with the pure strategy k.
The central question of game theory is: How should two strategic play-
ers involved in the game behave, given a payoff matrix A? Clearly, a ratio-
nal player knowing the payoff matrix should never decide for a strategy x if
there exists another strategy yx such that for every strategy of the opponent
z, yx>Az > x>Az. We say that such a strategy yx strictly dominates strategy x.
Hence, under this rationality assumption we may remove any pure dom-
inated strategy from the game without affecting the outcome. Once this
is done, other pure strategies may become dominated. Iterating this pro-
cess, we can remove all iteratively strictly dominated strategies from the game.
Note that the first iteration of this process merely requires the first player
to know her own preferences. For subsequent iterations, every player must
assume that the payoff matrix truly reflects the preferences of the other
player and that the other player also acts rational in this sense. Whereas
some games are strictly dominance solvable in that this process leaves just
a single strategy to each player, no dominated strategies have to exist in
general.
Now, let us assume that player 1 knows the strategy y chosen by player
2. Then, player 1 will choose a strategy x that maximises her payoff x>Ay.
Any such strategy x that maximises the payoff x>Ay against a fixed strategy
y is called a best response to y. The set of best responses to y is denoted by
β(y). If, in turn, player 2 knows the first player’s strategy x in advance,
player 2 will choose a best reply to x. Consequently, a pair of strategies
(x, y) will be stable only if x and y are mutual best responses. This is one
way to define Nash equilibria, the predominant solution concept for strate-
gic games.
Definition 1.1 (Nash equilibrium). Given a symmetric two-player game A, a
(mixed) strategy pair (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium for A if x ∈ β(y) and y ∈
β(x). The (mixed) strategy x is a symmetric Nash equilibrium for A if x ∈
β(x). The set of symmetric Nash equilibria is denoted by ∆NE.
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Thus, a Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies, such that no player has
an incentive to deviate from her strategy unilaterally. Note that symmetric
games may possess Nash equilibria that are not symmetric themselves. For
example, the symmetric game (
0 1
1 0
)
possesses the pure Nash equilibria (e1, e2) and (e2, e1) which are not sym-
metric.
It is not obvious that Nash equilibria always exist, and, in fact, it is easy
to check that pure equilibria do not always exist. Consider the children’s
game Rock-Scissors-Paper in which each of the two players simultaneously
shows one out of three symbols (rock, scissors, and paper) where rock beats
scissors, scissors beat paper, and paper beats rock. The winner earns one
point from the loser, and two equal symbols are a draw, giving zero payoff
to both. The payoff matrix of this game is
APRS =
 0 1 −1−1 0 1
1 −1 0
 .
It is easy to check that for any pure strategy, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the best reply
is uniquely determined, i. e., β(i) is a singleton. Furthermore, i /∈ β(β(i)).
Consequently, no pair of pure strategies can be a Nash equilibrium. A sim-
ilar argument holds for any biased mixed strategy. Hence, the unbiased
strategy (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is the only Nash equilibrium of this game. It can
be shown that, if we allow the players to randomise their strategic choices,
a Nash equilibrium always exists.
Theorem 1.1. For any strategic game, a Nash equilibrium exists. For any sym-
metric two-player game, ∆NE 6= ∅.
Wehave introducedNash equilibria as strategy pairs which are stable in
the sense that no player has an incentive to deviate from her strategy given
a belief about the opponent’s strategy. Thus, if we assume that strategies
are proposed to the players by some external entity like society, tradition,
or a coordinator, then Nash equilibria are those strategies which are com-
patible with the players’ incentives. This motivation, however, does not
explain how players can attain such a Nash equilibrium by themselves.
For another motivation assume that players have complete and accu-
rate knowledge about the game, i. e., the payoff matrix. Furthermore, as-
sume that
1. both players are rational,
4
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2. both players know (1),
3. both players know (2),
. . .
i. both players know (i− 1), etc.
. . .
The latter chain of statements is referred to as common knowledge of un-
bounded rationality. If the players’ capabilities of reasoning are unlimited,
Nash equilibria are the only strategies that players can identify as coherent
with the above assumptions. Still, this does not answer the question which
Nash equilibrium players should agree upon in case of the coexistence of
several. Consider the game (
1 0
0 1
)
with its two symmetric Nash equilibria e1 and e2. Any argument (that is
independent of the numbering of the strategies) that would favour one of
the Nash equilibria over the other could also be used to favour the other
due to the symmetry of the game.
We consider a third approach for the motivation of Nash equilibria. We
view equilibria as the limit outcome of a process in which players can learn
how to performwell in a game over time. It will turn out that under certain
conditions, such processes lead to Nash equilibria (with particular proper-
ties) in the long run. We will elaborate on this approach in the next section.
1.2 Evolutionary Game Theory: A Guided Tour
In the preceding section we have used three major assumptions for the mo-
tivation of Nash equilibria. These assumptions include complete and ac-
curate knowledge of the payoff matrix, common knowledge of unbounded
rationality, and unlimited reasoning capabilities. In many settings in which
strategic decisions have to be made, the impact of the own and other par-
ticipants’ decisions on the payoff can hardly be predicted. The objective,
and hence the payoff of the other participants may not even be publicly
known. Furthermore, participants in such a setting may not make the ef-
fort to make any such predictions at all, and if they do, they may even fail.
This rules out most of the knowledge and rationality assumptions. Evolu-
tionary approaches offer solution concepts of strategic games that rely on
assumptions that are significantly milder than the ones presented above.
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In the following two sections we will discuss two approaches to evo-
lutionary game theory which are largely independent of each other. The
first approach describes dynamic processes by which populations of indi-
viduals can come to an equilibrium. The second focuses on equilibrium
refinements based on the resistance of populations to mutant population
entrants. Finally, in Section 1.2.3 we will see how these approaches relate
to each other. For a comprehensive introduction to evolutionary game the-
ory, see, e. g., [84] or [42].
1.2.1 The First Approach: Evolutionary Game Dynamics
A large part of the inspiration for evolutionary game theory comes from
biology. We consider a large population of individuals of the same type.
Each individual exhibits a certain behaviour, corresponding to a pure strat-
egy of the underlying game (to which it may be genetically or otherwise
programmed). The individuals are repeatedly paired at random to play a
symmetric game against each other. The expected payoff is then interpreted
as the individual’s fitnesswithin the population.
We model the dynamic behaviour of such a population in a continuous
fashion. We assume that the number of individuals is infinite and denote
the population share programmed to play pure strategy i by xi. Then, the
vector x = (xi)i∈[n] is formally equivalent to a mixed strategy. Also, the
expected payoff of playing against an agent randomly chosen from x is
equal to the expected payoff playing against the mixed strategy x.
We consider the population vector x as a function of time x : R≥0 7→ ∆
where x(t) is the population state at time t. Although our motivation for
the population dynamics to be derived below will be a discrete stochastic
process, we can describe the population dynamics as a dynamical system in
terms of differential equations. To that end, by the law of large numbers, we
consider the limit behaviour of this process as the number of individuals
approaches infinity, the so-called fluid limit.
We denote the time derivative of a population share xi(t) by x˙i(t) =
d
dtxi(t) and suppress the argument t. For simplicity, we normalise the pay-
off matrix such that mini,j∈[n] aij = 0 and maxi,j∈[n] aij = 1. Nash equilibria
are invariant under this transformation.
1. Fitness-proportional replication. Suppose that individuals reproduce at
a certain rate which is proportional to their fitness (Ax)i. Then, the
probability that an individual programmed to play strategy i is cho-
sen for replication is
xi · (Ax)i
∑j∈[n] xj · (Ax)j
=
xi · (Ax)i
x>Ax
.
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If individuals breed true, i. e., the offspring of an individual is pro-
grammed to play the same strategy as the parent, and the reproduc-
tion and birth rates are 1, then the rate at which the population share
using strategy i ∈ [n] increases or decreases is
x˙i =
xi · (Ax)i
x>Ax
− xi = 1x>Ax · xi · ((Ax)i − x
>Ax) .
2. Imitation of successful players. In economic settings we do not consider
individuals that reproduce, but rather individuals that change their
strategy over time, continuously adapting their behaviour to the cur-
rent population state. Suppose that players review their strategy at
certain time steps and assume that these time steps are the arrival
times of a Poisson process with arrival rate 1. Whenever activated, a
player samples another player at random and observes this player’s
average payoff. It then imitates this player’s strategy with a proba-
bility that is proportional to the payoff difference (and stays with her
old strategy if this difference is negative). For simplicity, assume that
the constant of proportionality is 1. Summing up inflow and outflow,
x˙i = − ∑
j:(Ax)j≥(Ax)i
xi xj((Ax)j − (Ax)i)
+ ∑
j:(Ax)j<(Ax)i
xj xi((Ax)i − (Ax)j)
= xi · ((Ax)i − x>Ax) .
Alternatively, we may assume that an individual imitates her oppo-
nent with probability 1 whenever the opponent’s fitness is higher
than her own, but the expected payoffs are observed with uncer-
tainty or noise. The observed expected payoff for strategy j is then
(Ax)j + X where X is some random variable. If X is uniformly dis-
tributed over [0, 1], we obtain the above expression for x˙i again.
3. Imitation driven by dissatisfaction. Note that in order to execute the pre-
vious imitation process, individuals need to observe other individu-
als’ payoffs. In cases where this is not possible, one may consider the
following process. Again, assume that agents are activated at Poisson
rates. Whenever activated, an individual picks an aspiration level
from the range [0, 1] uniformly at random. Whenever a player falls
short of this aspiration level, it decides to try another strategy by im-
itating another individual chosen uniformly at random. Then,
x˙i = −xi · (1− (Ax)i) + ∑
j∈[n]
xj · (1− (Ax)j) · xi
= xi · ((Ax)i − x>Ax) .
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The above processes rely on different assumptions: For the first process,
we assume that payoff correlates to a reproduction or survival rate due to
an evolutionary selection mechanism that is not made explicit. The indi-
viduals themselves remain passive in this setting. For the second two, the
individuals actively engage in the process. We assume that the payoff truly
represents the individuals preferences, and we assume that players can ob-
serve this payoff. For the second process, individuals need to be able to ob-
serve the expected payoff of all strategies whereas for the third they need
to observe only their own. The reasoning involved in the imitation process
is limited to simple comparisons and a randomised decision and sampling
step. In particular, it does not involve common knowledge of unbounded
rationality, or of any rationality at all.
For various similar dynamics see, e. g. [2, 43, 84]. Remarkably, all of
the three expressions for x˙i derived above differ merely in a scalar factor
(x>Ax) that is independent of the strategy i. The thus obtained system of
differential equations is referred to as the replicator dynamics.
Definition 1.2 (replicator dynamics). For any given payoff matrixA and a pos-
itive Lipschitz-continuous scalar function λ : ∆ 7→ R+, the replicator dynamics
is given by the system of differential equations
x˙i = λ(x) · xi · ((Ax)i − x>Ax) (1.1)
x(0) = x0 ,
for all i ∈ [n].
The direction of the underlying vector field is independent of the scalar
λ(x), and so are the solution orbits. The function λ has an influence only
on the speed at which this orbit is traversed. The most common choice for
λ(x) is the constant function λ = 1. Let us remark that even for this simple
case, the system contains cubic terms and no analytical solution is known.
Let us mention some basic properties of the replicator dynamics:
1. Existence of a unique solution. The right hand side of Equation (1.1) is
Lipschitz-continuous if λ(·) is Lipschitz-continuous. Hence, by the
Picard-Lindelo¨f-Theorem (see, e. g. [16]) it possesses a unique solu-
tion for any boundary condition x0. For any x0 ∈ ∆, this solution is
denoted by the function ξ(x0, t). We suppress the argument x0 when
it is clear from context or irrelevant.
2. Invariance of the simplex. It is intuitive that solutions ξ(t) of Equa-
tion (1.1) stay inside the simplex for all t ≥ 0. This can be verified by
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showing that ∑i∈[n] x˙i = 0:
∑
i∈[n]
x˙i = λ(x) · ∑
i∈[n]
xi · ((Ax)i − x>Ax)
= λ(x) · (x>Ax− x>Ax)
= 0 .
Furthermore, ξi(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. If ξi(0) ≥ 0 and ξi(t) < 0 for
some t > 0, then ξi(u) = 0 for some u ∈ [0, t) since ξi is continuous
in t. Let t0 = inf{u | ξi(u) = 0}. Then, ξi(t0) = 0 since the set
over which the infimum is taken is closed and ξi(u) is continuous in
u which in turn implies that ξi(u) = 0 for all u ≥ t0.
3. Invariance of the interior and the boundary. Wehave just seen that ξi(t0) =
0 for some t0 implies ξi(t) = 0 for all t > t0. Similarly, ξi(t0) > 0 for
some t0 implies ξi(t) > 0 for all t > t0. This implies that starting in
the interior of the simplex, the solution orbit will stay inside the inte-
rior for all time. The same holds for the boundary. If a pure strategy
is initially unused, the replicator dynamics will not detect it. We say
that the replicator dynamics is not innovative.
4. Dominated strategies vanish. Consider a dominated strategy i ∈ [n].
Then there exists a strategy y dominating i, and by continuity of the
payoff function and compactness of ∆ there exists a constant δ > 0
such that for every strategy x ∈ ∆, y>Ax − (Ax)i ≥ δ. To see that
xi(t) → 0, define vi(x) = ln(xi)− ∑nj=1 yj ln(xj) for x ∈ int(∆). Ob-
serve that every term in the sum is negative and hence the contribu-
tion of the sum is positive. Now,
v˙i(x) =
x˙i
xi
−
n
∑
j=1
yj x˙j
xj
= ((Ax)i − x>Ax)−
n
∑
j=1
yj · ((Ax)j − x>Ax)
= (Ax)i − y>Ax
≤ −δ .
Consequently for x0 ∈ int(∆), vi(x) → −∞ implying xi(t) → 0 as
t → ∞. Once xi has dropped beneath a threshold, other strategies
may become dominated. Thus, iteratively dominated strategies are
eliminated subsequently, i. e., xi → 0 as t→ ∞ if i is iteratively strictly
dominated and x0 ∈ int(∆). For a formal argument, see [72].
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5. Payoff monotonicity. For any pure strategy i, it is easy to see that higher
payoff implies a larger growth rate. More formally, let gi(x) = x˙i/xi
denote the growth rate of the population share programmed to play
the pure strategy i. Then, gi(x) > gj(x) if and only if (Ax)i > (Ax)j,
we say that g(·) is payoff monotonic. We can generalise this definition
from pure strategies to (sub-)populations composed of individuals
playing different pure strategies. We say that g(·) is aggregate payoff
monotonic if for any x, y, z ∈ Rn≥0, y · g(x) > z · g(x) if and only if
y>Ax > z>Ax. Aggregate payoff monotonicity requires successful
subpopulations to grow faster than less successful ones. In [72] it is
shown that any dynamics satisfying this property has the form of the
replicator dynamics for some function λ(x).
How can such a dynamical system help us in the study of equilibria of
games? A natural stability concept of a dynamical system is the notion of a
fixed point. A point x is a fixed pointwith respect to the replicator dynamics
if x˙i = 0 for all i ∈ [n], i. e., the right hand side of Equation (1.1) vanishes.
It is easy to check that Nash equilibria are fixed points of the replicator
dynamics: At a Nash equilibrium x, for every strategy i either (Ax)i =
x>Ax or xi = 0, both implying x˙i = 0. It is also easy to check that there
are fixed points of the replicator dynamics that are not Nash equilibria:
Nash equilibria of subgames obtained by removing some of the strategies
are fixed points of the replicator dynamics, too. These are located on the
boundary of the simplex.
Example 1. Reconsider the Rock-Scissors-Paper Game. This game possesses a
unique Nash equilibrium x = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) in the interior of the simplex. Op-
timistically, one could hope that a population of individuals playing this game
repeatedly should come to this equilibrium in the long run. If we apply the repli-
cator dynamics to this game, this hope is disappointed. Figure 1.1(a) shows that
for any initial condition other than the equilibrium itself, the solution orbit of the
replicator dynamics is a closed loop around x.
Even worse, we may look at the perturbed game
APRS(δ) =
 δ 1 −1−1 δ 1
1 −1 δ

where a draw is rewarded a payoff of δ to both players. In this game, if δ > 0,
not only does the orbit fail to converge, it even approaches the boundary moving
farther and farther away from x (Figure 1.1(b)). Only for δ < 0 does the orbit
converge towards the Nash equilibrium x (Figure 1.1(c)).
We see that a population state does not qualify as a state which can
evolve in the long run just by being a Nash equilibrium alone. We therefore
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(a) The standard case
1  2
3  
 
(b) Draw rewarded, δ > 0
1  2
3  
 
(c) Draw punished, δ < 0
Figure 1.1: Solution orbits of the generalised Paper-Rock-Scissors game for
different values of δ. Orbits are traversed counter-clockwise.
consider fixed points with stronger convergence properties. We introduce
asymptotic stability not only for points, but for sets of points, since this
will be useful later. For now, we may as well assume that the set X in the
following definition is a singleton {x}.
Definition 1.3 ((asymptotic) stability). A closed set X is stable if every neigh-
bourhood U of X contains a neighbourhood U′ such that ξ(x0, t) ∈ U for all
x0 ∈ U′ and t ≥ 0. It is furthermore asymptotically stable if it is stable and
there exists a neighbourhood U′′ of X such that ξ(x0, t)t→∞ → X for all x0 ∈ U′′.
Here, ξ(x0, t)→ X means thatminx∈X ||ξ(x0, t), x|| → 0.
The set of asymptotically stable Nash equilibria can be interpreted as
a set of strategies that can be attained by a population of individuals us-
ing simple selfish steps that require only mild rationality assumptions. We
have seen that this set is a proper subset of ∆NE. However, it is not clear
how a Nash equilibrium can be checked for asymptotic stability easily. To
uphold the tension, we defer the answer to this question to Section 1.2.3
1.2.1.1 Other dynamics
A variety of dynamics is discussed in the literature, among which the repli-
cator dynamics is the one most widely studied. For an overview, see [43].
For the replicator dynamics we have required only very limited reasoning
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capabilities of the agents. If we increase their reasoning capabilities slightly,
assuming that they are able to compute or otherwise determine a best re-
sponse with respect to the current population, we obtain the best response
dynamics. Since the best response may not be unique and there is no ob-
vious way of breaking ties this dynamics is a differential inclusion rather
than a differential equation:
x˙ ∈ β(x)− x . (1.2)
As long as β(x) is unique, it is a pure strategy, say i. Then the differential
inclusion turns into a differential equation and is solved by
x(t) = (1− exp(−t)) ei + exp(−t) x(0) .
Now, for some t0 > 0, β(x(t0)) may not be unique any more. Still, among
all best replies to x(t0) there exists one which is also a best response to itself.
Denote such a strategy by b. Since b is a best response to both x(t0) and
b, it is also a best response to the convex combination (1− e) x(t0) + e b
if e ≥ 0 is small. Thus, we can construct a piecewise linear solution of
Equation (1.2) by iterating this process.
An approximation of the best response dynamics is given by the logit
dynamics, which has a unique solution:
x˙i =
exp((Ax)i/e)
∑j∈[m] exp((Ax)j/e)
− xi
for a parameter e > 0. If e is small, then the first term vanishes for all pure
strategies that are no best replies.
The main advantage of the best response dynamics over the replicator
dynamics is the fact that it is innovative in that it detects strategies that
may be initially unused. We will discuss a drawback of the best response
dynamics for our application in Chapter 3.
Another approach that makes the replicator dynamics innovative is to
add a limited amount of mutation which enables the agents to explore the
strategy space. Such dynamics are, e. g., considered in [38]. We will con-
sider a similar approach in Chapter 4.
1.2.2 The Second Approach: Refined Solution Concepts
In this section we will formulate a refinement of Nash equilibria, so called
evolutionarily stable strategies. Although the motivation for this refinement
is based on a setting similar to the one described in the preceding section,
it does not take into account any model of how the population evolves over
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time. Again, we consider a population of agents, each of which is pro-
grammed to play a certain strategy, which may now also be mixed. The
population does not necessarily consist of an infinite number of agents.
Consider an incumbent strategy x played by all individuals of a popula-
tion. In addition to the requirement of a Nash equilibrium which asks that
an individual programmed to play x does not have an incentive to deviate
from this strategy, we furthermore require that subpopulations playing any
other strategy y have an incentive to return to x, given that this population
share is small enough. Such a strategy is said to be evolutionarily stable.
In economic settings we may consider such an equilibrium a conven-
tion. As an informal example, consider a state using the imperial system
and a small subpopulation using the metric system. As long as communi-
cating only within the subpopulation, the metric system is advantageous.
However, within the entire population, the advantages of themetric system
will outweigh the additional effort of unit conversion only if the subpop-
ulation is large and hence this effort becomes infrequent. Hence, both the
(pure) metric and the (pure) imperial system constitute evolutionarily sta-
ble strategies, where the metric system is robust against a larger portion of
dissenters than the imperial is.
Formally, let x denote an incumbent strategy and let y denote a mutant
strategy. If an e-fraction of mutants invades the population, we obtain the
post-entry population xe = (1− e) x+ e y. We will write this as 〈x|y〉e =
(1− e) x + e y. In order to be evolutionarily stable, we require x to earn
a higher average payoff in the post-entry population xe than the mutant y
does.
Definition 1.4 (evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)). A strategy x ∈ ∆ is said
to be an evolutionarily stable strategy if for any strategy y ∈ ∆ there exists an
ey ∈ (0, 1) such that for every e ∈ (0, ey),
x>Axe > y>Axe (1.3)
with xe = 〈x|y〉e. For any y, the largest ey satisfying the above condition is called
its invasion barrier b(y). The set of evolutionarily stable strategies is denoted by
∆ESS.
One may ask whether it is necessary that the parameter ey in Defini-
tion 1.4 depends on the mutant y. If these mutants could be arbitrarily far
away from the equilibrium x, this would obviously be the case. Since, how-
ever, the number of pure strategies is finite and the distance between y and
x is bounded by the fact that both x and y are contained within ∆, we can
choose ey independent of y. The strategies minimising b(y) for any given
direction from x are those on the boundary of the simplex.
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Definition 1.5 (uniform invasion barrier). A strategy x ∈ ∆ has a uniform
invasion barrier e¯ ∈ (0, 1) if for all y ∈ ∆, b(y) ≥ e¯
Theorem 1.2. A strategy x ∈ ∆ESS if and only if x has a uniform invasion barrier.
For a formal proof, see [84]. The uniform invasion barrier e¯ constitutes
a lower bound on the size of the population that is necessary to make the
population resistant against a single mutant individual. Consider a popu-
lation with N individuals and assume that N− 1 individuals play the strat-
egy x ∈ ∆ESS and a single individual mutates to play y 6= x. If e¯ ≥ 1/N,
then y performs worse in this population than the ESS strategy x does.
Still, this characterisation does not reveal how evolutionarily stable strat-
egies relate to the well-known concept of Nash equilibria. It is easily veri-
fied that evolutionarily stable strategies are in fact Nash equilibria, but not
all Nash equilibria are evolutionarily stable. In addition, evolutionary sta-
bility requires that the incumbent population x performs better against a
mutant than this mutant performs against itself. This is guaranteed by the
following nice characterisation of evolutionarily stable strategies.
Theorem 1.3. A strategy x ∈ ∆ is evolutionarily stable if and only if x ∈ ∆NE
and for all y ∈ β(x), y 6= x, it holds that x>Ay > y>Ay.
Proof. First assume that x is evolutionarily stable. Assume, for the sake of
contradiction, that x is not a Nash equilibrium, i. e., there exists another
strategy y which earns higher payoff against x than x does, y>Ax− x>Ax >
0. Since for xe = 〈x|y〉e the difference y>Axe− x>Axe is linear in e, this term
is positive for e small enough, contradicting evolutionary stability of x.
Second, assume that x is a Nash equilibrium, but there exists some y ∈
β(x), y 6= x with y>Ay ≥ x>Ay. Since y is a best reply to x, also y>Ax ≥
x>Ax. Consequently, for any convex combination xe = 〈x|y〉e it holds that
y>Axe ≥ x>Axe contradicting evolutionary stability of x.
Conversely, consider a Nash equilibrium x such that for any y ∈ β(x),
y 6= xwe have x>Ay > y>Ay. Then, again, for any such y ∈ β(x), e ∈ (0, 1),
and xe = 〈x|y〉e we have x>Axe > y>Axe, since this holds for e = 1 and
with weak inequality for e = 0. For any y /∈ β(x), we have y>Ax < x>Ax
and Inequality (1.3) holds for e > 0 small enough by continuity.
Let us apply this characterisation to an example.
Example 2. Recall that the unique Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Scissors-Paper
game is x = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). This strategy earns zero payoff against any other
pure or mixed strategy, and any strategy is a best reply. Similarly, any other strat-
egy y earns zero payoff against itself, too, since the probability of winning equals
the probability of loosing by symmetry. This implies that the Nash equilibrium is
not evolutionarily stable.
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Consider the generalised Rock-Scissors-Paper game where a draw is rewarded
an additional payoff of δ, APRS(δ) from Example 1. For any δ, x is still the unique
Nash equilibrium and any strategy is a best reply: For any y, x>Ay = y>Ax =
δ/3 since the probability of a draw is 1/3. The expected payoff of y against itself
is
y>Ay = δ · (y21 + y22 + y23) + y1y2 + y2y3 + y3y1 − y1y3 − y2y1 − y3y2
= δ · (1− 2 · (y1 + y2 − y21 − y22 − y1y2))
where we have used that y3 = 1− y1 − y2. Observe that y1 + y2 − y21 − y22 −
y1y2 ≤ 1/3 with equality only for y1 = y2 = y3 = 1/3. Therefore, if δ > 0,
x>Ay < y>Ay for any y 6= x, and if δ < 0, x>Ay > y>Ay for any y 6= x.
Consequently, the Nash equilibrium x is evolutionarily stable only for δ < 0, that
is, if a draw is punished.
The characterisations of evolutionary stability in terms of invasion bar-
riers are slightly cumbersome in that they take into consideration three
strategies: the equilibrium, a mutant, and a continuum of convex combi-
nations of the above. Theorem 1.3 improves upon this, but it still requires
to check for two conditions: the first order condition x>Ax ≥ y>Ax, plus
the second order condition x>Ay > y>Ay in case that the first order con-
dition only holds with equality. The last characterisation we present here
circumvents this by simply requiring x to perform better against all nearby
strategies, we say that x locally superior.
Definition 1.6. A strategy x is locally superior if there exists a neighbourhood
U of x such that x>Ay > y>Ay for all y 6= x in U ∩ ∆.
Theorem 1.4. A strategy x is locally superior if and only if x ∈ ∆ESS.
Proof. First, suppose thatU is a neighbourhood of x such that x>Ay > y>Ay
for all y ∈ U ∩ ∆, y 6= x. Fix an arbitrary mutant y ∈ ∆ and observe that
there exists some ey ∈ (0, 1) such that xe = 〈x|y〉e ∈ U for any e ∈ (0, ey).
Now,
xe>Axe = e y>Axe + (1− e)x>Axe
implying
xe>Axe − x>Axe = e ·
(
y>Axe − x>Axe
)
.
Since xe ∈ U, the left hand side is negative, implying x>Axe > y>Axe and
x ∈ ∆ESS.
Now assume that x ∈ ∆ESS and let e¯ denote its uniform invasion barrier.
Define
Zx = {z ∈ ∆ | zi = 0 for some i ∈ Supp(x)}
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as the union of all boundary faces that do not contain x. Furthermore, de-
fine
V = {y ∈ ∆ | y = 〈x|zy〉e for some zy ∈ Zx and e ∈ [0, e¯)} .
Observe that for any given y, zy in this definition is uniquely defined. Ob-
serve that V is closed and x ∈ V. Hence, there exists a neighbourhood U
of x such that U ∩ ∆ ⊆ V. Fix any point y ∈ U ∩ ∆, y 6= x. Since y ∈ V
and y lies inside the invasion barrier of zy, zy>Ay < x>Ay. Since trivially
x>Ay ≤ x>Ay and y is a convex combination of x and zy, this implies that
y>Ay < x>Ay.
How many evolutionarily stable states can a game possess and how do
they relate to each other? We will see that, if we know one evolutionar-
ily stable state x, we can be sure that certain parts of the simplex, those
that conflict with x in a precise sense, do not contain further evolutionarily
stable states. We can illustrate this with another example.
Example 3. Consider the payoff matrix 1 2 02 1 0
0 0 2
 .
This game possesses three Nash equilibria: x1 = (1/2, 1/2, 0), x2 = e3, and
x3 = (2/7, 2/7, 3/7). The best response regions of these equilibria are depicted in
Figure 1.2. The strategies to which x1 and x2, respectively, are best responses, are
the regions below and above the horizontal line through x3. The two Nash equi-
libria x1 and x2 are superior to the points lying in their respective best response
regions and are therefore evolutionarily stable. For the third, interior, equilibrium
x3, however, no such neighbourhood exists, and hence it is not evolutionarily sta-
ble.
Can we modify this payoff matrix in a way such that this interior equi-
librium becomes evolutionarily stable preserving evolutionary stability of
the other two equilibria? Consider an ESS x and another strategy y with
Supp(y) ⊆ Supp(x). Then, y is a best reply to x since it uses only pure
strategies used by x, and by Theorem 1.3, x>Ay > y>Ay implying that y is
not Nash.
Theorem 1.5. If x ∈ ∆ESS and Supp(y) ⊆ Supp(x) for some y 6= x, then
y /∈ ∆NE.
This implies, that if some ESS is interior, it is unique. Also, since there
is only a finite number of supports, ∆ESS is finite.
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Figure 1.2: Solution orbits of Example 3.
Starting from the characterisation in terms of local superiority, we can
generalise the definition of evolutionarily stable states to sets of strategies.
We require every element of such a set to earn more against nearby strate-
gies outside the set than these earn against themselves.
Definition 1.7. A nonempty and closed set X ⊆ ∆ is evolutionarily stable if
for each x ∈ X there exists a neighbourhood U of x such that x>Ay ≥ y>Ay for all
y ∈ U with strict inequality if y /∈ X.
Observe that all elements of an evolutionarily stable set satisfy a weak
local superiority condition in that the defining inequality x>Ay ≥ y>Ay is
not strict as was required for local superiority. Replacing the inequalities in
the characterisations of evolutionary stability above by weak inequalities, a
respective set of characterisations can be shown. These strategies are then
called neutrally stable and a set of characterisations exists, differing from
those of evolutionary stability only in that inequalities are weak instead of
strict.
1.2.3 Synthesis: Convergence Theorems
In the previous two sections we have seen two refinements of Nash equi-
libria: evolutionarily stable strategies and Nash equilibria that are asymp-
totically stable in the replicator dynamics. For the case of the generalised
Rock-Scissors-Paper game APRS(δ) we have seen that the first implies the
second. We will now see that this is the case in general.
We cannot hope to find analytical solutions to the replicator dynamics
given by Equation (1.1). Still there exists a powerful tool that will enable us
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to prove convergence properties without explicitly knowing the solution
ξ(x0, t). Consider a continuously differentiable vector field v : D 7→ Rk
with D ⊆ Rk and the associated dynamic system
x˙ = v(x) (1.4)
x(0) = x0 .
Again, we denote the solution for an initial value x0 by ξ(x0, t). A natural
way to prove that a fixed point is asymptotically stable in this system is by
showing that the system looses “energy” over time. Suppose we are given
such an energy function E : D 7→ R which is minimised at a fixed point x.
If E decreases along any trajectory, any solution must eventually approach
x. In fact, asymptotically stable sets can be characterised in this way.
Theorem 1.6 (see, e. g., [14]). Consider a dynamic system as given by Equa-
tion (1.4) and a closed set C ⊆ D. The set C is asymptotically stable if and only
if there exists a neighbourhood U of C and a continuous function E : D 7→ R≥0
such that E(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ C, and
E(ξ(x0, t)) < E(x0) if x0 /∈ C, t > 0, and ξ(x0, t′) ∈ U ∀ t′ ∈ [0, t] .
The function E is called a strict Lyapunov function. Since we may not
know the solution ξ(x0, t) it may be hard to check whether E(ξ(x0, t)) <
E(x0). Fortunately, it is often possible to check for this property without
knowing ξ(·, ·) explicitly. The direction of a trajectory at x is given by the
vector field v(x) itself. To check whether E(x) decreases in the direction
v(x) we make use of the gradient of E at x,
∇E(x) =
(
∂E(x)
∂x1
, . . . ,
∂E(x)
∂xk
)
.
If v(x) points in the direction of −∇E(x) this means that E decreases along
the trajectory. If v(x) is orthogonal to∇E(x) the trajectory is tangential to a
level curve of E and hence E does not change at all. In general, E decreases
if and only if v(x) makes an acute angle with −∇E(x), or, equivalently,
∇E(x) · v(x) < 0. This yields the following theorem.
Theorem 1.7 (Lyapunov’s direct method). Consider a dynamic system as given
by Equation (1.4) and a closed set C ⊆ D. If there exists a neighbourhood U of C
and a continuously differentiable function E : D 7→ R≥0 with E(x) = 0 if and
only if x ∈ C and
∇E(x) · v(x) < 0 ∀x /∈ C , (1.5)
then the set C is asymptotically stable.
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The requirement that the set C is closed is trivially met for the simple
case that C = {x} is a singleton. Observe that
∇E(x) · v(x) =
k
∑
i=1
∂E(x)
∂xi
· dxi
dt
= E˙(x)
and hence condition (1.5) is equivalent to E˙(x) < 0.
In order to apply this technique to the replicator dynamics, we must
find a suitable Lyapunov function. Fix a point x and consider the (Kullback-
Leibler) relative-entropy function
Hx(y) = ∑
i∈Supp(x)
xi · ln
(
xi
yi
)
This function is defined for all y with yi 6= 0 for all i ∈ Supp(x), i. e.,
the domain of Hx is a neighbourhood of x relative to ∆. First note that
Hx(x) = 0. Now, let us substitute the replicator dynamics (1.1) into Hx.
H˙x(y) = − ∑
i∈Supp(x)
xi · 1yi · y˙i
= −λ(y) · ∑
i∈Supp(x)
xi · 1yi · yi · ((Ay)i − y
>Ay)
= λ(y) · (y>Ay− x>Ay) .
We have seen that if x is evolutionarily stable, it is also locally superior
(Theorem 1.4) implying that H˙x(y) < 0 for some neighbourhoodU of x and
y ∈ U. The intersection of U with the domain of Hx is again a neighbour-
hood of x (relative to ∆). Furthermore, Hx is continuously differentiable.
Altogether, Hx is a strict Lyapunov function.
Theorem 1.8 ([77]). If x ∈ ∆ESS, x is asymptotically stable in the replicator
dynamics (1.1).
We see that evolutionarily stable strategies attract nearby strategies.
Consider an interior ESS x ∈ ∆ESS ∩ int(∆). For this strategy, all strate-
gies are best replies, and Hx(y), which is defined on the entire interior, is
negative for all y ∈ int(∆). Consequently, the vector field of the replica-
tor dynamics points strictly into every contour set and hence, x attracts the
entire interior.
Theorem 1.9. If x ∈ ∆ESS ∩ int(∆), then ξ(x0, t)t→∞ → x for any x0 ∈ int(∆).
The proof of Theorem 1.8 can be generalised to evolutionarily stable
sets X by defining a new Lyapunov function as the minimum of all Hx(y)
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over all x where it is defined:
H(y) = min
x∈X:Supp(x)⊆Supp(y)
Hx(y) .
Using this Lyapunov function it can be shown that evolutionarily stable
sets S ⊆ ∆ are asymptotically stable.
In the literature, also discrete versions of the replicator dynamics are
discussed. For these dynamics, however, only weaker convergence prop-
erties hold due to overshooting effects. E. g., it is not even guaranteed that
dominated strategies vanish, as is shown by the Dekel-Scotchmer Exam-
ple [23]. We will consider similar effects in Chapter 3.
1.2.4 Related Work
From the perspective of theoretical computer science we are interested in
the complexity of computing evolutionarily stable strategies. By a reduc-
tion from CLIQUE it can be shown that finding an evolutionarily stable
strategy for a given symmetric two player game is both NP-hard and co-
NP-hard [26, 55]. It is even co-NP-hard to determine whether any given
strategy is an evolutionarily stable strategy. In [26] it is furthermore shown,
that counting the number of evolutionarily stable strategies is #P-hard.
1.3 Selfish Routing
In 1952, Wardrop [83] (for a good introduction see also [69]) proposed a
model of selfish traffic in networks. Whereas it was originally introduced
for the study of road traffic, it is also well-suited for the analysis of digital
traffic in communication networks. This model will be the foundation of
all subsequent analyses and modelling. We present it here, along with its
equilibrium concept and a useful potential function characterisation which
we will make frequent use of in the main part of this thesis.
1.3.1 The Wardrop Model
An instance of theWardrop routing game is given by a triple Γ = (G, C, (`e))
composed of a finite directed multi-graph G = (V, E), a family of differen-
tiable, non-decreasing, non-negative latency functions (`e)e∈E, `e : R≥0 7→
R≥0, and a family of k commodities C = (Ci)i∈[k]. Any commodity Ci =
(si, ti, ri) specifies a source node si ∈ V, a target node ti ∈ V, and a flow
demand ri ∈ R+ that is to be routed from si to ti. The total flow demand
is denoted by r = ∑i∈[k] ri. For i ∈ [k], let Pi denote the set of acyclic
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paths in G that start at si and end at ti, and let P = ⋃i∈[k] Pi. We may as-
sume that the source-sink pairs are pairwise disjoint and, hence, so are the
Pi. Then, each path P ∈ P uniquely determines a commodity iP such that
P ∈ PiP . An instance is symmetric or single-commodity if k = 1 and asymmet-
ric or multi-commodity if k > 1. The maximum path length is denoted by
D = maxP∈P |P|. We say that Γ is a singleton instance if D = 1.
A flow vector ( fP)P∈P is feasible for an instance Γ if it is non-negative
and satisfies the flow demands, i. e.,
∑
P∈Pi
fP = ri ∀i ∈ [k] (1.6)
fP ≥ 0 ∀P ∈ P .
Let FΓ denote the polyhedron specified by these constraints. The path flow
vector f uniquely determines edge flows
fe = ∑
P3e
fP and fe,i = ∑
P∈Pi :e∈P
fP
for all edges e ∈ E and all commodities i ∈ [k].
A flow vector f induces latencies on the edges. The latency of edge
e ∈ E is `e( f ) = `e( fe). Latency is additive along a path, i. e., for any path
P ∈ P , `P( f ) = ∑e∈P `e( f ). For each commodity i ∈ [k] this implies an
average latency of
Li( f ) = ∑
P∈Pi
fP
ri
· `P( f ) = ∑
e∈E
fe,i
ri
· `e( f ) .
The average latency of the entire flow is then
L( f ) = ∑
P∈P
fP
r
· `P( f ) = ∑
e∈E
fe
r
· `e( f ) = ∑
i∈[k]
ri
r
· Li( f ) .
Some results presented in the main part of this thesis depend on ex-
tremal values of the latency functions. We define these quantities here,
though we will repeat the definitions when needed. The optimal average
latency for an instance is given by Lmin = min f∈FΓ L( f ), and the maximum
average latency is given by Lmax = max f∈FΓ L( f ). The optimal average
latency of a single commodity is given by L˜min = mini∈[k]min f∈FΓ Li( f ).
Finally, the maximum latency that can be induced on a path is given by
`max = maxP∈P max f∈FΓ `P( f ).
Let us remark that the combinatorial structure of this model can be gen-
eralised easily in the following way. Instead of considering a set E of edges
in a network we can simply assume that E is a set of arbitrary resources.
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Then, any collection of resources is a possible strategy, and the strategy
space of an agent can be an arbitrary subset Pi ⊆ 2E. In this case, we can
specify an instance by the triple Γ = (E, C, (`e)e∈E) where any commodity
Ci = (Pi, ri) specifies the strategy set Pi explicitly rather than implicitly in
terms of si and ti. We will use this generalisation a few times in Chapter 4.
Our analyses are independent of the combinatorial structure of the strategy
space and do not rely on the assumption that it is given by a graph. How-
ever, if we view an instance Γ as an input of an algorithm, the specification
of the strategy spaces by sources and sinks in a graph yields a compact way
to represent an exponentially large strategy space. Throughout this thesis,
we use the terms edges (e ∈ E) and paths (P ∈ P) rather than the terms
resources and strategies.
1.3.2 Wardrop Equilibria
In this setting, two possible objectives come to mind. The classical objective
would be to optimise for the total benefit or social welfare of participants in
the network, e. g., to minimise the total incurred latency:
min
f∈FΓ
L( f ) . (1.7)
The feasible set FΓ is convex, and the objective function L is convex if the
functions x · `e(x) are convex. Thus, we can computeminima in polynomial
time, e. g., using the ellipsoid method [46, 74]. Note that the specification
of the feasible set as specified by Equation (1.6) contains an exponential
number of constraints. This can easily be reduced to a polynomial num-
ber by formulating it in terms of the edge flows and specifying the flow
conservation constraints for each commodity.
Taking the game theoretic perspective we are not interested in minimis-
ing the social welfare, but we are rather interested in finding a balanced, or
fair, allocation. For a finite number of agents competing for resources, the
latency functions can be described by an N-dimensional payoff table where
N is the number of users. Thus, we can model this scenario as a strategic
game. The Wardrop model is the limit of such a game as N approaches
infinity. We envision the flow as composed of an infinite number of agents
each of which carries an infinitesimal amount of flow. Generalising the def-
inition of Nash equilibria to games with an infinite number of players, we
cannot require that no single player can unilaterally improve their situation
by changing their strategy. Instead we require that no arbitrarily small por-
tion of flow can be shifted from its path to another without increasing its
latency. Formally, for any flow vector f let f˜ P1,P2,e denote such a flowwhere
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a flow amount of e is shifted from path P1 to path P2, i. e.,
f˜ P1,P2,eP =

fP − e if P = P1
fP + e if P = P2
fP otherwise.
Definition 1.8 (Nash equilibrium). A flow vector ( fP)P∈P is at a Nash equi-
librium if for every commodity i ∈ [k] and all paths P1, P2 ∈ Pi with fP1 > 0 it
holds that for all e ∈ [0, fP1 ], `P1( f ) ≤ `P2( f˜ P1,P2,e). The set of Nash equilibria in
the Wardrop model is denoted FNEΓ .
Letting e tend to zero we obtain a characterisation of Nash equilibria in
the Wardrop model that is more comfortable.
Theorem 1.10 (Wardrop equilibrium [40]). A flow vector f is at a Nash equi-
librium if for all commodities i ∈ [k] and all P1, P2 ∈ Pi with fP1 > 0 it holds that
`P1( f ) ≤ `P2( f ).
This characterisation is also referred to as a Wardrop equilibrium or as
Wardrop’s principle [40].
From the definition it follows that at a Wardrop equilibrium each path
P is either unused or it has minimal, and therefore also average, latency
LiP . This fact discloses a connection between Wardrop equilibria and flows
optimising L( f ). A flow is (locally and globally) optimal if shifting flow
from one path to another can only increase L. In other words, on all used
paths the marginal cost specifying the infinitesimal contribution that addi-
tional flow causes on such a path, is minimal. This similarity between the
characterisation of Nash and optimal flows is formalised in the following
theorem. For any function `(x) let `∗(x) = (x · `(x))′ = `(x) + x · `′(x)
denote its marginal cost function.
Theorem 1.11 ([83, 70]). Consider an instance Γ = (G, (`e)e∈E, C) such that for
all e ∈ E, `e(x) · x is convex. Then, a feasible flow f is optimal for Γ if and only if
it is at a Wardrop equilibrium for the instance (G, (`∗e )e∈E, C) with marginal cost
latency functions.
1.3.3 The Beckmann-McGuire-Winsten Potential
We can reverse Theorem 1.11 to obtain a characterisation of Wardrop equi-
libria in terms of a potential function due to Beckmann, McGuire, andWin-
sten [11]. Consider the function he(x) = 1/x ·
∫ x
0 `e(u) du and observe that
the marginal cost function of he is the function `e again. The total cost with
respect to the functions (he)e∈E is
Φ( f ) = ∑
e∈E
fe · he( fe) = ∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
`e(u) du . (1.8)
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Consequently, a flow is at a Wardrop equilibrium with respect to (`e)e∈E if
and only if it minimises Φ, i. e., it solves the convex program
min
f∈FΓ
Φ( f ) . (1.9)
We denote the minimum potential by Φ∗ = min f∈FΓ Φ( f ). Since the feasi-
ble set is convex and non-empty, we obtain:
Theorem 1.12. For any instance Γ = (G, (`e)e∈E, C) there exists a flow f at
Wardrop equilibrium. Furthermore for any two Wardrop equilibria f and f ′ and
every edge e ∈ E, `e( f ) = `e( f ′).
The second statement follows from the fact that fe · he must be linear in
between fe and f ′e since otherwise a convex combination of f and f ′ would
achieve a smaller objective function value. Consequently, `e is constant
within this interval.
The potential Φ also has an intuitive interpretation which will guide
many of our analyses in the main part. Consider any flow f and assume
that an infinitesimal flow dx is inserted on path P. This increases the poten-
tial by `P( f ) dx. A similar statement holds for removing flow. This observa-
tion is useful for computing the potential gain that is achieved by shifting
flow from one path to another. If a flow of dx is moved from path P to path
Q, the potential changes by (`Q − `P) dx.
1.3.4 Related Work
A natural question concerning theWardropmodel asks for the degradation
of performance due to the selfishness of the agents. To that end, one con-
siders the price of anarchy defined as the ratio between the total latency of a
worst Wardrop equilibrium and the minimum total latency
ρ(Γ) =
max f∈FNEΓ L( f )
min f∈FΓ L( f )
.
For affine latency functions, Roughgarden and Tardos [70] show that ρ(Γ) ≤
4/3. For polynomial latency functions with degree d, ρ(Γ) ≤ O (d/(log d)).
These upper bounds are tight and instances with two nodes and two edges
exist that achieve these values [67]. Whereas in [70] and [67] it is assumed
that the strategy space is the set of paths in a network, many of the results
also hold in the general case [71].
One can consider the price of anarchy also with respect to objective
functions other than the average latency L. In [68] it is shown that un-
der the objective of minimising the maximum latency rather than the aver-
age, the price of anarchy is at most |V| − 1 for single-commodity instances.
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Cominetti et al. [21] consider network games with users which control a
non-negligible amount of traffic which may be split among several paths.
For these games, the price of anarchy is 3/2 for affine latency functions. For
a finite number of users that are not allowed to split their flow, bounds on
the price of anarchy are presented in [6, 19]. In [41] the authors consider
games in which groups of users may collaborate and introduce the price
of collusion which measures the degradation of performance due to this
behaviour.
A notion converse to the price of anarchy is discussed in [66]. Therein,
bounds on the unfairness of optimal routing, measured as the maximal ra-
tio between a path latency at optimum and at Nash equilibrium, are given.
Knowing that that price of anarchy may be large, a natural question
is how this ratio can be decreased by external intervention. Several ap-
proaches have been proposed. In [20] and [35] a scenario is considered in
which taxes are imposed on the users such that Nash equilibria coincide
with Wardrop equilibria, and bounds on the magnitude of such taxes are
presented. Another possibility to decrease the price of anarchy is to control
a fraction of the individuals centrally. The tradeoff between the amount of
centrally controlled individuals and the price of anarchy is studied in [65].
Rosenthal [63] uses a discrete version of the potential function Φ to
show existence of pure Nash equilibria in discrete congestion games. Fab-
rikant et al. [29] consider the complexity of computing Nash equilibria in a
discretemodel. They show that computingNash equilibria is PLS-complete
in general whereas there exists a polynomial time algorithm for the case of
symmetric network congestion games. The first is reproved in [1], which
also gives a nice characterisation of congestion games that allow conver-
gence towards Nash equilibria by a polynomial length sequence of best
response moves.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
As has been discussed above, we believe that equilibria in the Wardrop
model are meaningful only if they are motivated by a simple operational
model of the agents’ behaviour. This model should rely on assumptions
that are significantly milder than the ones needed for the motivation of
Nash equilibria for general strategic games. As a first step we apply evo-
lutionary population dynamics to the Wardrop model. In Chapter 2 we see
that Wardrop equilibria are evolutionarily stable. In the single-commodity
case we can thus show that a population following the replicator dynamics
actually approaches the set of Wardrop equilibria. In the multi-commodity
case, we generalise the replicator dynamics accordingly, taking an approach
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that slightly differs from the standard approach of evolutionary game the-
ory for asymmetric games. Thus we are able to prove convergence to-
wards Wardrop equilibria also in the multi-commodity case. In addition,
we present bounds on the time to reach approximate Wardrop equilib-
ria. The continuous-time model of the replicator dynamics idealistically
assumes that the effect of the agents’ decisions can be observed immedi-
ately. Since this is not the case in computer communication networks, the
time bounds presented in this chapter must be considered preliminary.
Subsequently, we consider a model in which information is observed
with a delay [52] to resolve this shortcoming. It is well-known in both
practise and theory that decisions based on stale latency information may
cause oscillation effects and harm network performance seriously. In Chap-
ter 3 we consider a fairly general class of dynamics. We identify sufficient
properties of the dynamics and the latency functions that guarantee con-
vergence towards Wardrop equilibria. It is not surprising that this condi-
tion depends on the steepness of the latency functions: The more sensitive
the latency functions are to minor shifts of flow, the more vulnerable the
dynamics becomes to overshooting. We will see that if our dynamics is
slowed down by a factor that is reciprocal to the maximum slope of the la-
tency functions, it converges towards the set of Wardrop equilibria. Thus,
any bound on the time to reach approximate equilibria based on this crite-
rion has a pseudopolynomial flavour.
In Chapter 4 we introduce a particular rerouting policy which applies a
clever sampling technique in order to avoid the dependence on the maxi-
mum slope. This policy approaches approximate Wardrop equilibria much
quicker than policies from the large class considered in Chapter 3 do. To
measure the convergence time, we study two kinds of approximate equilib-
ria. First, we consider allocations in which all but a small fraction of agents
deviate from the average latency of their commodity by no more than a
small fraction of the overall average latency. Remarkably, the time to reach
bicriterial approximate equilibria of this kind is largely independent of the
network size. However, these approximate equilibria are transient. Ap-
proximate equilibria that are persistent with respect to our dynamics can
be defined in terms of the Beckmann-McGuire-Winsten potential. For sym-
metric instances, we show that our dynamics reaches a flowwhich is within
(1+ e) of the optimal potential in polynomial time. The time bounds pre-
sented in this chapter show that the critical parameter is not the maximum
slope of the latency functions, but rather their elasticity.
In the final chapter of this thesis we exchange the theorist’s perspec-
tive for a more applied one. In Chapter 5 we present a traffic engineer-
ing scheme, REPLEX, inspired by the population dynamics discussed so
26
1.4. Outline of the Thesis
far. This protocol was implemented and evaluated in a simulation frame-
work with realistic traffic properties including a full TCP implementation
at packet level andHTTPworkload that is generated on the basis of realistic
statistical properties. Simulation results on both artificial and real network
topologies indicate that the protocol converges quickly and significantly
improves network performance.
1.4.1 Bibliographical Notes
Many of the results presented in the main part of this thesis have been pre-
sented as joint work in preliminary form at various conferences. Results
about evolutionary stability of and convergence towards Wardrop equilib-
ria (Chapter 2) have been presented in [33]. A convergence analyses in a
model of stale information (Chapter 3) was presented in [34]. The results of
Chapter 4 regarding the speed of convergence have been sketched in [32].
Our traffic engineering protocol REPLEX (Chapter 5) has been introduced
in [31].
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CHAPTER 2
Evolution of Selfish Routing
In the previous chapter we have seen how the notion of Wardrop equilib-
ria captures the effect of selfishness in communication networks that lack
central coordination. Though Wardrop equilibria are stable once they are
reached, the assumptions made to attain them cannot be justified for real-
world applications, the prime example being the Internet. Recall these as-
sumptions:
1. Complete and accurate information about the payoff functions. In our sce-
nario, payoff corresponds to (inverse) latency. Latency functions, how-
ever, are not known to the agents in real-world networks. Neither are
the necessary parameters of the links publicly available, nor can they
be measured easily by the agents. Furthermore, agents don’t have
perfect information, since they cannot directly observe the actions of
the other agents.
2. Common knowledge of unbounded rationality. Agents cannot make re-
liable assumptions on the rationality of other agents. Other agents
may be rational, but they may also act faulty, randomly, or even ma-
liciously.
3. Unlimited reasoning capabilities. Computational power is a scarce re-
source, in particular for Internet routers which are responsible for the
path selection. Even if agents had the necessary information, we can-
not expect them to compute a Wardrop equilibrium off-line and then
route their flow according to the result of this computation.
To avoid these unrealistic assumptions we apply techniques from evo-
lutionary game theory to the Wardrop model. We start by modelling a
dynamic population of selfish agents executing simple adaption rules re-
sulting in a dynamical system similar to the replicator dynamics. These
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rules rely on very mild assumptions only, which we will discuss below.
Subsequently, we will derive stability and convergence properties of this
dynamics.
2.1 The Replicator Dynamics in the Wardrop Model
In this section we show how the replicator dynamics as presented in the
previous section translates naturally into the model of selfish routing. We
start with the single-commodity case, i. e., k = 1. We consider an infinite
population of agents each of which chooses a particular path P ∈ P . The
fraction of agents choosing path P is denoted by fP. Since all agents carry
the same infinitesimal amount of flow, the vector ( fP)P∈P can be inter-
preted both as a population vector and as a flow vector induced by this
population.
We devise a rerouting policy (and subsequently, a differential equation)
that specifies the behaviour of f over time. We assume that agents become
active at certain Poisson rates. Consider an agent that is activated and cur-
rently uses path P ∈ P . It performs two steps:
1. Sampling: Sample another agent uniformly at random. This agent
uses path Q ∈ P with probability fQ/r.
2. Migration: Migrate from path P to path Q if `P( f ) > `Q( f )with prob-
ability proportional to the latency improvement `P( f )− `Q( f ).
Since the total volume of agents utilising path P ∈ P is fP and all of these
agents act according to the above rules, the total rate at which agents mi-
grate from path P to Q is
λ( f ) · fP · fQ
r
· (`P( f )− `Q( f )) ,
where the scalar function λ( f ) accounts for the constant of proportionality
in the migration probability (step 2) and the Poisson rate at which agents
are activated. Note that this expression holds for both `P( f ) > `Q( f ) and
`P( f ) < `Q( f ). Hence, the rate at which the population share utilising path
P changes is
f˙P = λ( f ) · fP ∑
Q∈P
fQ
r
· (`Q( f )− `P( f )) .
Using the definition of the average latency L( f ) and ∑Q∈P fQ = r, we ob-
tain the following characterisation of our dynamic system:
f˙P = λ( f ) · fP · (L( f )− `P( f )) for all P ∈ P (2.1)
f (0) = f0 .
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Comparing Equations (1.1) and (2.1), we see that this is a variant of the
replicator dynamics where latency corresponds to negative payoff. The
expected payoff, however, is not linear in f unless all `e have the form
`e(x) = ae · x for some ae ∈ R. Let us remark that our simple rerouting
policy presented above is, again, only one out ofmany possiblemotivations
for this dynamics. The imitation rules described in Section 1.2.1 can also be
applied to selfish routing and lead to the same kind of dynamics differing
only in the scaling factor λ( f ).
The choice of λ does not have any influence on the solution orbit as
long as it is Lipschitz continuous and strictly positive. It merely influences
the speed at which the orbit is traversed, and, consequently, the time of
convergence, which we will discuss in Section 2.3.
Multi-commodity networks correspond to asymmetric games. Gener-
alisations of the replicator dynamics for asymmetric games proposed in the
literature do not work well with the Wardrop model. In general strategic
games, the expected payoff of a pure strategy for a player of a given type
depends on the population mixture of the subpopulations of other player
types, but not on the population mixture of its own type. In the Wardrop
model, where player types correspond to commodities, this is different.
Here, the latency of a player does also depend on the routing decisions
made by other players of the same commodity.
Despite of this, Equation (2.1) can be generalised to multi-commodity
networks. Consider an agent of commodity i ∈ [k] currently using path
P ∈ Pi. If we apply the same rules as above, the probability to sample path
Q is fQ/ri. Again, using the definition of the average latency Li( f ) and
∑Q∈Pi fQ = ri, we get:
f˙P = λi( f ) · fP · (Li( f )− `P( f )) for all P ∈ P (2.2)
f (0) = f0 ,
where we use a different scaling factor λi( f ) for every commodity.
We believe that this is a reasonable model of communication and selfish
behaviour for several reasons.
1. Simplicity. The reasoning involved in this process is limited to few
and simple comparison and sampling steps.
2. Locality. The necessary information, namely the flow and latency val-
ues of paths of the same commodity, is available at the source node.
Agents need to communicate with agents sharing the same source
and destination nodes only.
3. Selfish steps. The steps made by the agents are selfish and myopic in
that they exchange a path only for a better one.
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4. Statelessness. The process does not require the agents to maintain any
state information. The agents’ decisions depend merely on the cur-
rent situation and not on history.
This policy does not depend on accurate knowledge of the network and
its latency functions as well as unbounded rationality and reasoning capa-
bilities. Note, however, that our population model still assumes perfect in-
formation in that actions made by other agents become visible to the other
agents immediately. In subsequent chapters we will see how we can aban-
don this assumption as well.
2.1.1 Preliminaries
We can easily show that with respect to the dynamic system given by Equa-
tion (2.2), the feasible set FΓ is invariant. Consider a commodity i ∈ [k]. We
show that ∑P∈Pi f˙P = 0 implying ∑P∈Pi fP = ri if f0 ∈ FΓ.
∑
P∈Pi
f˙P = ∑
P∈Pi
λi( f ) · fP · (Li( f )− `P( f ))
= λi( f ) ·
(
ri · Li( f )− ri ∑
P∈Pi
fP
ri
· `P( f )
)
= λi( f ) · (ri · Li( f )− ri · Li( f ))
= 0 .
Furthermore, clearly fP(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Hence f (t) ∈ FΓ for all t ≥ 0 if
f0 ∈ FΓ.
We adapt the definition of evolutionary stability to the Wardrop model.
As we have seen, Wardrop equilibria are not necessarily unique. Due to
our characterisation in terms of a convex program, we know that the set
of Wardrop equilibria is closed. We use a definition similar to our setwise
generalisation of evolutionary stability from Section 1.2.2 which is based
on local superiority.
Definition 2.1 (evolutionarily stable). For an instance Γ, a nonempty and closed
set X ⊆ FΓ is evolutionarily stable if for all f ∈ X there exists a neighbourhood
U of f such that f · `( f ′) < f ′ · `( f ′) for all f ′ ∈ U \X and f · `( f ′) ≤ f ′ · `( f ′)
for f ′ ∈ X.
We will see that this adaption of the notion of evolutionary stability is
suitable for our purposes as it implies convergence of the replicator dynam-
ics to the set of Wardrop equilibria in symmetric instances of the Wardrop
routing game.
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2.2 Evolutionary Stability and Convergence
In this section, we study stability and robustness aspects of Wardrop equi-
libria. We prove that the set of Wardrop equilibria is evolutionarily stable.
Based on this property, we can then prove that solutions of the replicator
dynamics converge towards Wardrop equilibria.
2.2.1 Evolutionary Stability
Lemma 2.1. The set of Wardrop equilibria FNEΓ is evolutionarily stable. The
neighbourhood U in Definition 2.1 can be chosen to be U = FΓ.
Proof. Fix a Wardrop equilibrium f ∈ FNEΓ for instance Γ. We show that
for any population f˜ ∈ FΓ, it holds that f · `( f˜ ) ≤ f˜ · `( f˜ ). Furthermore, if
f˜ /∈ FNEΓ , the inequality is strict.
Fix any commodity i ∈ [k]. By definition of Wardrop equilibria, the
latency induced by f on all paths in Pi may be equal or greater, but not less
than the latency of any used path in Pi. Hence, for every population f˜ ,
f · `( f ) = ∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈Pi
fP `P( f )
= ∑
i∈[k]
ri Li( f )
= ∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈Pi
f˜P Li( f )
≤ ∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈Pi
f˜P `P( f )
= f˜ · `( f ) .
The inequality holds because for any path P ∈ Pi we have `P( f ) ≥ Li( f )
as discussed above. As a consequence,
f˜ · `( f˜ ) ≥ f · `( f ) + f˜ · `( f˜ )− f˜ · `( f )
= f · `( f ) + ∑
P∈P
f˜P(`P( f˜ )− `P( f ))
= f · `( f ) +∑
e∈E
f˜e(`e( f˜ )− `e( f )) . (2.3)
Consider an edge e ∈ E. There are three cases:
1. f˜e > fe. Because of monotonicity of `e, it holds that `e( f˜e) ≥ `e( fe).
Therefore also f˜e · (`e( f˜ )− `e( f )) ≥ fe · (`e( f˜ )− `e( f )).
2. f˜e < fe. Because of monotonicity of `e, it holds that `e( f˜e) ≤ `e( fe).
Again, f˜e · (`e( f˜ )− `e( f )) ≥ fe · (`e( f˜ )− `e( f )).
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3. f˜e = fe. Then, f˜e · (`e( f˜ )− `e( f )) = fe · (`e( f˜ )− `e( f )).
In all cases we have f˜e · (`e( f˜ )− `e( f )) ≥ fe · (`e( f˜ )− `e( f )). Altogether,
starting from Equation (2.3),
f˜ · `( f˜ ) ≥ f · `( f ) +∑
e∈E
f˜e · (`e( f˜ )− `e( f ))
≥ f · `( f ) +∑
e∈E
fe · (`e( f˜ )− `e( f ))
= f · `( f ) + f · `( f˜ )− f · `( f ) ,
= f · `( f˜ ) ,
which is our claim.
It remains to show that the inequality is strict if f˜ is not a Wardrop
equilibrium. There are two cases.
1. `( f ) = `( f˜ ), i. e., for all P ∈ P , `P( f ) = `P( f˜ ). Since within any com-
modity i ∈ [k] all paths used by f have the same latency Li( f ), and
since f˜ is not a Wardrop equilibrium, there must exist a commodity
i ∈ [k] and path P ∈ Pi with f˜P > 0 and `P( f˜ ) = `P( f ) > Li( f ).
Since there does not exist a path P with `P( f ) < Li( f ), this implies
f · `( f˜ ) < f˜ · `( f˜ ).
2. `( f ) 6= `( f˜ ), i. e., there exists a path P ∈ P such that `P( f ) 6= `P( f˜ ).
Then there exists an edge e ∈ Ewith `e( fe) 6= `e( f˜e) and consequently
fe 6= f˜e. Then, we are in case 1 or 2 of the above case differentiation
for this edge, and the respective inequality is strict, i. e., f˜e · (`e( f˜ )−
`e( f )) > fe · (`e( f˜ )− `e( f )).
In both cases, f · `( f˜ ) < f˜ · `( f˜ ).
2.2.2 Convergence for Single-Commodity Instances
Using Lyapunov’s direct method in conjunction with Lemma 2.1 we can
show that solutions of the replicator dynamics converge towards a War-
drop equilibrium if the initial population f0 lies in the interior of the sim-
plex, i. e., there are no unused strategies. As a Lyapunov function we use
the well-known (Kullback-Leibler) relative entropy measure.
Theorem 2.2. Consider a single-commodity instance Γ. Let λ be a continuous,
positive function. Let ξ( f0, t) be a solution to the replicator dynamics (2.1) for
some initial population f0 ∈ int(FΓ). Then, ξ( f0, t)t→∞ → FNEΓ .
34
2.2. Evolutionary Stability and Convergence
Proof. We use the relative-entropy measure H f : int(FΓ) → R≥0 as a Lya-
punov function:
H f (ξ) = ∑
P∈Supp( f )
fP · ln fP
ξP
.
Note that H f (ξ) is well-defined for all ξ ∈ int(FΓ) since ξP > 0 and fP > 0
for all P ∈ Supp( f ). Since we can write H f (ξ) = ∑P∈Supp( f )( fP · ln( fP)−
fP · ln(ξP)), we have
H˙ f (ξ) = − ∑
P∈Supp( f )
fP · ξ˙P
ξP
.
Substituting the replicator dynamics (2.2) for ξ˙P, we get
H˙ f (ξ) = λ(ξ) ∑
P∈Supp( f )
fP (`P(ξ)− L(ξ))
= λ(ξ)
 ∑
P∈Supp( f )
fP `P(ξ)− r L(ξ)

= λ(ξ)
 ∑
P∈Supp( f )
fP `P(ξ)− ∑
P∈P
ξP `P(ξ)

= λ(ξ) ∑
P∈Supp( f )
( fP − ξP) · `P(ξ)
= λ(ξ) · ( f − ξ) · `(ξ) . (2.4)
By Lemma 2.1, every term of this equation is non-positive and is zero only
if ξ is a Wardrop equilibrium.
If the Wardrop equilibrium is unique, the proof of convergence is a di-
rect application of Lyapunov’s direct method (Theorem 1.7) with C = { f }
where f is the unique Wardrop equilibrium. Since Wardrop equilibria are
not necessarily unique in our case, we consider the function
H(ξ) = min
f∈FNEΓ
H f (ξ) .
Note that H(ξ) is continuous in ξ and H(ξ) ≥ 0 with equality only for
ξ ∈ FNEΓ . From the above, we know that for all f0 ∈ int(FΓ), H(ξ( f0, t)) <
H( f0) for all t > 0. Hence, H and ξ( f0, ·) satisfy the conditions of Theo-
rem 1.6. Since ξ( f0, t) ∈ int(FΓ) for all t ≥ 0, the vector field of the repli-
cator dynamics (2.1) points strictly into every contour set of H and hence
ξ( f0, t)t→∞ → FNEΓ .
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2.2.3 Convergence of Multi-Commodity Instances
Note that Lemma 2.1 immediately covers the multi-commodity case. De-
spite of this, this does not suffice to prove convergence in the multi-com-
modity case. Proving convergence for any choice of the scalar functions
λi(·) using the conditional entropy as a Lyapunov function we would need
the property f|Pi · `( f˜ )|Pi ≤ f˜|Pi · `( f˜ )|Pi for every commodity i ∈ [k] inde-
pendently. This, however, does not hold. In order to prove convergence
in the multi-commodity case we will use the Beckmann-McGuire-Winsten
potential [11] as defined in Equation (1.8):
Φ( f ) = ∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
`e(u) du .
We have seen that Wardrop equilibria minimise this potential function [11].
We start by computing the derivative with respect to time of Φ.
Lemma 2.3. For the replicator dynamics (2.2), the time derivative of the potential
is given by
Φ˙( f ) = ∑
i∈[k]
λi( f )
(
Li( f )2 − ∑
P∈Pi
fP
ri
(`P( fe))2
)
≤ 0 .
Proof. The derivative of Φ with respect to time is
Φ˙( f ) = ∑
e∈E
f˙e · `e( fe) = ∑
e∈E
∑
P3e
f˙P · `e( fe) .
Substituting the replicator dynamics (2.2) into this we obtain
Φ˙( f ) = ∑
e∈E
∑
P3e
(λiP( f ) · fP · (LiP( f )− `P( f ))) · `e( fe)
= ∑
i∈[k]
λi( f ) ∑
P∈Pi
∑
e∈P
fP · (Li( f )− `P( f )) · `e( fe)
= ∑
i∈[k]
λi( f ) ∑
P∈Pi
fP · (Li( f )− `P( f )) · `P( f )
= ∑
i∈[k]
λi( f )
(
Li( f ) ∑
P∈Pi
fP · `P( f )− ∑
P∈Pi
fP · `P( f )2
)
= ∑
i∈[k]
λi( f )
(
ri · Li( f )2 − ∑
P∈Pi
fP · (`P( f ))2
)
= ∑
i∈[k]
λi( f ) · ri ·
(
Li( f )2 − ∑
P∈Pi
fP
ri
(`P( f ))2
)
.
By Jensen’s inequality, each term of this sum is non-positive.
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Convergence follows directly from this lemma.
Theorem 2.4. Consider a multi-commodity instance Γ. For i ∈ [k], let λi(·) be
a continuous, positive function. Let ξ( f0, t) be a solution to the replicator dynam-
ics (2.2) for some initial population f0 ∈ int(FΓ). Then, ξ( f0, t)t→∞ → FNEΓ .
Proof. We use the potential Φ as a Lyapunov function. By Jensen’s inequal-
ity, every term of the sum
Φ˙(ξ) = ∑
i∈[k]
λi(ξ) · ri ·
(
Li(ξ)2 − ∑
P∈Pi
ξP
ri
(`P(ξ))2
)
is non-positive and zero if ξ is at a Wardrop equilibrium. Furthermore, for
any ξ ∈ int(∆), Φ˙(ξ) can be zero only if for all i ∈ [k] and all paths P ∈ Pi
we have `P(ξ) = Li(ξ). Hence, Φ( f ) − Φ∗ is a Lyapunov function satis-
fying the conditions of Theorem 1.7, and furthermore, in int(∆) the vector
field of the replicator dynamics (2.1) points strictly into every contour set
of Φ and hence ξ( f0, t)t→∞ → FNEΓ .
2.3 Approximate Equilibria and Convergence Time
In the previous section we have established convergence towards Wardrop
equilibria in the long run. An interesting question is now: How long does
it take for the population to reach an equilibrium? We believe that this is an
issue of particular importance since equilibria are only meaningful if they
can be reached within reasonable time.
Since the population cannot reach an exact equilibrium (unless starting
at an equilibrium), we consider approximate equilibria. We can define ap-
proximate equilibria as population states in which the latencies sustained
by the agents are close to the respective average latencies Li rather than
equal to Li. Note, however, that we cannot require this property for all
agents since the population on a path with constant large latency will never
vanish completely. Furthermore, we cannot expect the replicator dynam-
ics to come close to the global Wardrop equilibrium in terms of Euclidean
distance or in terms of the potential Φ since we can make the time to come
close to the global Wardrop equilibrium arbitrarily large by making the ini-
tial flow on a path that is used in theWardrop equilibrium arbitrarily small.
The idea behind the following definition of approximate equilibria is not to
wait for such minorities.
Definition 2.2 (e-equilibrium). For a single-commodity instance Γ and a flow
f ∈ FΓ, let Pe denote the set of paths with latency above (1 + e) · L( f ), i. e.,
Pe = {P ∈ P | `P( f ) > (1 + e)L( f )}. Furthermore, let fe = ∑P∈Pe fP
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be the total volume of agents utilising such paths. Then, the flow f is at an e-
equilibrium if and only if fe ≤ e · r.
Approximate equilibria in this sense can be interpreted informally as
populations where almost all agents are almost satisfied. In the following,
we give bounds on the time until the replicator dynamics reaches an e-
equilibrium for the first time. Let us point out, however, that the dynam-
ics does not necessarily stay at an e-equilibrium once an e-equilibrium is
reached. A population may leave an e-equilibrium after an arbitrarily long
period of time. This may happen, e. g., if an initially small population share
utilising a high-latency path starts to grow to above e. The opposite may
also happen. Population shares on paths with low latency may grow, thus
lowering the average and making agents on other paths become dissatis-
fied again. In this sense, e-equilibria are transient.
Recall that in order for time bounds to be meaningful, we must now
make a choice for the scalar functions λi(·) in Equation (2.2) which deter-
mine the speed at which the solution orbit is traversed. This choice should
make the speed independent of the scale by which we measure latency.
In Section 1.2.1 we have seen that λi( f ) = 1/Li( f ) arises naturally from
the motivation by fitness-proportional replication. Therefore, throughout this
section, we will fix λi( f ) = 1/Li( f ).
We can now prove bounds on the convergence time. For single-com-
modity instances, our bounds indicate that the replicator dynamics con-
verges towards approximate equilibria quickly. This bound is essentially
tight as is shown by a corresponding lower bound. For multi-commodity
instances the upper bound is slightly weaker.
2.3.1 Upper Bound for Single-Commodity Instances
Our bounds is in terms of the ratio between maximal and optimal latency.
Recall that Lmax = max f∈FΓ L( f ) and Lmin = min f∈FΓ L( f ) denote the max-
imum and minimum total latency, respectively.
Theorem 2.5. For any solution of the replicator dynamics (2.1) for a single-
commodity instance Γ and any initial population f0 ∈ FΓ, the total amount of
time that the population is not at an e-equilibrium is bounded by
O
(
1
e3
· ln
(
Lmax
Lmin
))
.
Proof. We derive a lower bound on the rate by which the potential Φ de-
creases as long as we are not at an e-equilibrium. In order to obtain a posi-
tive lower bound on the potential, we consider the shifted potential
Φ′( f ) = Φ( f ) + Lmin · r
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instead. Since Lmin · r is constant, we have Φ˙′( f ) = Φ˙( f ). As we know
from Lemma 2.3,
Φ˙′( f ) = Φ˙( f ) = λ( f ) · r ·
(
L( f )2 − ∑
P∈P
fP
r
(`P( f ))2
)
. (2.5)
When is the absolute value of this termminimal given that at least a volume
of e · r agents utilises paths with latency at least (1+ e) · L( f )? As a con-
sequence of Jensen’s inequality, for any fixed L( f ), the term ∑P∈P ( fP/r) ·
`P( f )2 is minimised when the remaining volume of r · (1− e) agents utilise
paths with equal latency which we denote by ˜`. Then, L( f ) ≥ e · (1+ e) ·
L( f ) + (1− e) · ˜` and hence
˜` ≤ 1− e− e
2
1− e · L( f ) =
(
1− e
2
1− e
)
· L( f ) (2.6)
Combining this with Equation (2.5) we obtain
Φ˙′( f ) ≤ λ( f ) · r · (L( f )2 − (e · ((1+ e) · L( f ))2 + (1− e) · ˜`2)) .
Substituting ˜` according to Equation (2.6) we get
Φ˙′( f ) ≤ −λ( f ) · r · L( f )2 · e
3
1− e
≤ −e3 · r · L( f ) , (2.7)
where we have used λ( f ) = 1/L( f ). Now observe that
L( f ) = ∑
e∈E
fe
r
`e( fe)
≥ 1
r
·∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
`e(u) du
=
Φ( f )
r
by monotonicity of the `e. Hence, by definition of Lmin we have 2 L( f ) ≥
Lmin +Φ( f )/r = Φ′( f )/r. Finally, substituting this into Equation (2.7) we
obtain the differential inequality
Φ˙′( f ) ≤ −e
3
2
Φ′( f )
which implies that any solution that is not at an e-equilibrium during the
interval (t, t+ τ) satisfies
Φ′( f (t+ τ)) ≤ Φ′( f (t)) · exp
(
−e
3
2
· τ
)
.
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For i ≥ 1 let (ti, ti + τi) denote the intervals at which the population is not
at an e-equilibrium. (These intervals are open due to the requirement that
fe > r · e. The sole exception may be the first interval [0, τ1) if t1 = 0.) By
induction on i,
Φ′( f (ti + τi)) ≤ Φ′( f (t1)) · exp
(
−e
3
2
·
i
∑
j=1
τj
)
.
Let T = ∑∞j=1 τi denote the total amount of time that the population is not at
an e-equilibrium. SinceΦ′ is, by definition, bounded from below by Lmin · r,
this implies that
Φ′( f0) · exp
(
−e
3
2
· T
)
≥ Lmin · r ,
or, equivalently
T ≤ 2
e3
· ln
(
Φ′( f0)
Lmin · r
)
.
Since Φ′( f0) ≤ 2 · r · Lmax, this establishes our assertion.
2.3.2 Upper Bound for Multi-Commodity Instances
In the asymmetric case our bounds on the convergence time are weaker.
Our definition of approximate equilibria can be generalised to multi-com-
modity instances in the following way.
Definition 2.3 (e-equilibrium). For a multi-commodity instance Γ and a popu-
lation f ∈ FΓ, let Pe = ⋃i∈[k]{P ∈ Pi | `P( f ) > (1+ e)Li( f )}. Furthermore,
let fe = ∑P∈Pe fP be the total volume of agents utilising such paths. Then, a flow
f is at an e-equilibrium if and only if fe ≤ r · e.
Our bound is in terms of the ratio between maximum average latency
andminimum average latency of a commodity. Recall that we have defined
L˜min = mini∈[k]min f∈FΓ Li( f ).
Theorem 2.6. The replicator dynamics (2.2) for a multi-commodity instance Γ
and any initial population f0 ∈ FΓ the total amount of time that the population is
not at an e-equilibrium is bounded by
O
(
1
e3
· Lmax
L˜min
)
.
Proof. The proof goes along the lines of the proof of Theorem 2.5. In the
multi-commodity case, by Lemma 2.3,
Φ˙( f ) = ∑
i∈[k]
λi( f ) · ri ·
(
Li( f )− ∑
P∈Pi
fP
ri
`P( f )2
)
.
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Let ei denote the volume of agents in commodity i that utilise paths with
latency above (1+ e)Li and note that ∑i∈[k] ei > e · r as long as we are not
at an e-equilibrium. With the same argument that led to Equation (2.6), the
contribution of commodity i to the above expression for the potential gain
is minimal if the remaining agents utilise paths with equal latency ˜` i. Since
Li( f ) ≥ (ri − ei)/ri · (1+ e) Li + ei/ri · ˜` i,
˜` i ≤ Li( f ) ·
(
1− ei · e
r− ei
)
.
Substituting this into our expression for Φ˙( f ), the contribution of commod-
ity i to the potential gain is then
Φ˙i( f ) = −λi( f ) · ri · Li( f )2 · e
2 · ei
ri − ei ≤ −Li( f ) · e
2 · ei .
Summing over all commodities and using the pessimistic estimate Li( f ) ≥
L˜min, we obtain
Φ˙( f ) ≤ − ∑
i∈[k]
Li( f ) · e2 · ei ≤ −L˜min · e3 · r
implying that for any interval (t, t+ τ) during which the population is not
at a e-equilibrium,
Φ( f (t+ τ)) ≤ Φ( f (t))− τ · r · e3 · L˜min .
Let T denote the total amount of time at which the population is not at an
e-equilibrium. Since Φ is bounded from below by 0, it holds that Φ( f0)−
T r e3 L˜min ≥ 0 or, equivalently,
T ≤ Φ( f0)
e3 · r · L˜min
≤ Lmax
e3 · L˜min
which is our claim.
2.3.3 Lower Bound for Single-Commodity Instances
In this section we give a lower bound on the time to reach an e-equilibrium
for the single-commodity case. Our bound is tight with respect to Theo-
rem 2.6 up to a factor of O (e · ln(e−1)).
Theorem 2.7. For every r, e > 0 there exists a single-commodity singleton in-
stance Γ with `max/`min = r and an initial flow vector f0 ∈ FΓ such that for the
solution ξ( f0, t) of the replicator dynamics (2.1), f (t) is not at an e-equilibrium
for any t ∈ [0, τ] with
τ = Ω
(
1
e2
· ln
(
1
e
)
· ln
(
`max
`min
))
.
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fi−1
fi+1 = 13
fi
fi+1 ≤ O
(
e1/4
)
fi−2 ≤ O (e)
fi−1 = O
(√
e
)fi−2 ≤ O
(√
e
)
fi = 13
Figure 2.1: Flow conditions at the beginning (left) and at the end (right) of
phase i. Agents on link i− 1 are unsatisfied.
Proof. We construct a network of n+ 1 parallel links 0, . . . , n with constant
latency functions
`i(x) =
1
(1+ 4 e)i
Since `i(·) is constant we simply write `i rather than `i(x). We consider n
phases 1, . . . , n of length
T =
ln(1/(3 e))
8 e
,
and ti = (i − 1) · T denotes the start of phase i. We construct an initial
flow vector f0 such that the flow cascades down from link 0 to n where in
phase i, the agents on link i − 1 are unsatisfied (in that `i−1 > (1 + e)L)
and fi−1 ≥ e. Throughout the phase the majority of the agents utilises links
i− 1, i, and i+ 1 whereas the flow on other links is negligible. We have
r =
`max
`min
= (1+ 4 e)n
and hence for any given value of r, our construction has
n = log(1+4e)(r) ≥
1
4 e
ln(r)
phases. Since the length of each phase is Θ(ln(e−1)/e), the total time to
reach an e-equilibrium is Ω(e−2 ln(e−1) ln(r)), our desired bound.
We start with two observations:
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(O1) For constant latency functions, L˙( f ) < 0 for all f ∈ FΓ.
(O2) As long as L( f ) > `i, we have f˙i > 0, and as soon as L( f ) < `i, we
have f˙i < 0.
We construct our initial population such that for phase i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the
following properties hold (see Figure 2.1):
(P1) For every link j ≤ i− 2, f j(ti) ≤ e(i−j−1)/2.
(P2) For every link j ≥ i+ 1, f j(ti) ≤ (3 e)(j−i)/4.
(P3) fi(ti) ≥ 13 .
(P4) fi(ti) ≤ 13 .
Claim 2.8. Consider a phase i ∈ [n] and a flow vector fˆ ∈ FΓ that satisfies
fˆ j ≤ (3 e)(j−i)/4 for j ≥ i + 2. Then, there exists an initial flow vector f0 such
that properties (P1) – (P4) are satisfied in phases 1, . . . , i and f j(ti) = fˆ j for any
j ≥ i+ 1. Furthermore, in any phase j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, the agents on link i− 1 are
unsatisfied, and fi−1(t) ≥ e for any t ∈ [ti, ti+1). Thus, the population is never
at an e-equilibrium throughout phases 1, . . . , i.
Note that the requirements for fˆ are compatible with (P2) in phase i + 1.
For i = n, this claim implies the assertion of the theorem.
Proof. The proof is by induction on i. The properties can clearly be satisfied
for the first phase i = 1. We will see below that satisfying the four proper-
ties implies that the population is not at an e-equilibrium throughout phase
i.
For the induction step, fix a flow vector fˆ that satisfies the conditions
of Claim 2.8 for round i+ 1. First note that in round i+ 1 properties (P2),
(P4) as well as f j(ti+1) ≤ fˆ j for j ≥ i+ 2 can be satisfied by choosing f j(ti)
sufficiently small for j ≥ i + 1. We will see that they can also be chosen
large enough respecting property (P2) in round i such that f j(ti+1) ≥ fˆ j for
j ≥ i+ 2 and fi+1(ti+1) ≥ 1/3.
We start with upper and lower bounds on L to deduce bounds on the
growth rates of the population shares. Consider a flow f (ti) at the begin-
ning of phase i and assume that all properties are satisfied.
Let f (ti) denote the flow at the beginning of phase i and let f˜ denote
the flow obtained from f (ti) by shifting agents from links i + 1, . . . , n to
link i− 1. Then, L( f (ti)) ≤ L( f˜ ). By (P3) there is a flow volume of 1/3 on
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link i and hence, f˜i−1 ≤ 2/3−∑i−2j=0 f j(ti).
L( f (ti)) ≤ L( f˜ )
≤ 1
3
`i +
(
2
3
−
i−2
∑
j=0
f j(ti)
)
`i−1 +
i−2
∑
j=0
f j(ti) `j
= `i−1
(
1
3
· 1
1+ 4e
+
2
3
−
i−2
∑
j=0
f j(ti) +
i−2
∑
j=0
f j(ti)
`j
`i−1
)
.
Using the bounds on f j for j ≤ i− 2 specified by (P1) we obtain
L( f (ti)) ≤ `i−1
(
1
3
· 1
1+ 4e
+
2
3
−
∞
∑
j=1
√
e
j +
∞
∑
j=1
(√
e(1+ 4e)
)j)
Since ∑∞i=1 X
j = X/(1− X) for X < 1, we have
L( f (ti)) = `i−1
(
1− 4e
3(1+ 4e)
−
√
e
1−√e +
√
e(1+ 4e)
1−√e(1+ 4e)
)
= `i−1
(
1− 4e
3(1+ 4e)
+O
(
e3/2
))
≤ `i−1 (1− e) (2.8)
if e is small. This holds at the beginning of phase i and by observation (O1)
also throughout the entire phase.
For the lower bound we consider the value of L( f (ti+1)) which by ob-
servation (O1) is also a lower bound on L throughout phase i. Note that
the amount of flow we have to assign to the links i+ 2, . . . , n due to the re-
quirement that f (ti+1) matches fˆ on these links still respects property (P2)
in phase i+ 1. Fix such a flow vector and consider the modified flow vec-
tor f˜ obtained by shifting all agents on links 0, . . . , i − 1 to link i. Then,
L( f˜ ) ≤ L( f (t)) for t ∈ [ti, ti+1]. Consequently,
L( f (t)) ≥ L( f˜ )
≥ 1
3
`i+1 +
(
2
3
−
n
∑
j=i+2
(3 e)(j−(i+1))/4
)
`i +
n
∑
j=i+2
(3 e)(j−(i+1))/4`j
≥ 1
3
`i+1 +
(
2
3
−
∞
∑
j=1
(3 e)j/4
)
`i + `i+1
∞
∑
j=1
(
(3 e)j/4
1+ 4e
)j
= `i+1
(
1+
8
3
e− (1+ 4e)(3 e)
1/4
1− (3 e)1/4 +
(3 e)1/4/(1+ 4e)
1− (3 e)1/4/(1+ 4e)
)
= `i+1
(
1+
8
3
e−O
(
e5/4
))
≥ `i+1 (1+ 2 e) (2.9)
44
2.3. Approximate Equilibria and Convergence Time
if e is small. This holds at the end of phase i and consequently by observa-
tion (O1) throughout the entire phase i.
Equation (2.8) implies that `i−1 > L · (1+ e) and hence the agents on
link i− 1 are unsatisfied in the entire phase i. We show that there are at least
e such agents on link i− 1 throughout the phase by using Equation (2.9):
`i−1 = (1+ 4e)2`i+1
≤ L · (1+ 4e)
2
1+ 2 e
= L ·
(
1+
6e+ 16e2
1+ 2 e
)
≤ L · (1+ 8e)
if e is small. Substituting this into the replicator dynamics (2.1), we see that
f˙i−1 ≥ −8 e fi−1. Due to the upper bounds imposed by our properties on
f j(ti) for j 6= i− 1 and since the total flow is 1, the remaining flow volume
is on link i− 1, i. e., fi−1(ti) ≥ 1/3. Then,
fi−1(ti + t) ≥ 13 · exp(−8 e t)
which in turn implies fi−1(ti + t) ≥ e as long as
t ≤ ln
( 1
3 e
)
8 e
= T .
Consequently, a volume of at least e agents utilises link i − 1 in phase i,
and these agents are unsatisfied. Hence, the population is not at an e-
equilibrium throughout phase i.
We now show that property (P1) is satisfied at the beginning of the next
phase i + 1. Consider the upper links 0, . . . , i − 2. From Equation (2.8) it
follows that
L( f (ti)) ≤ `i−1 (1− e)
= `i−2 · 1− e1+ 4 e
≤ `i−2 ·
(
1− 9
2
e
)
.
if e is small. Hence, for all links j ≤ i − 2 we have f˙ j ≤ − 92 e f j implying
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that at the end of the phase,
f j(ti+1) = f j(ti + T) ≤ f j(ti) · exp
(
−9
2
e T
)
= f j(ti) · exp
(
− 9
16
ln(1/(3 e))
)
= f j(ti) · (3 e) 916
≤ f j(ti) ·
√
e
if e is small. This implies that these links satisfy property (P1) for the phase
i+ 1.
For the bottom links j ≥ i + 1, Equation (2.9) implies that we have a
growth rate of f˙ j ≥ 2 e f j in phase i. Hence, for j ≥ i+ 1,
f j(ti+1) ≥ f j(ti) · exp(2 e T)
= f j(ti) · exp
(
2 e · ln
( 1
3 e
)
8 e
)
= f j(ti) ·
(
1
3 e
) 1
4
. (2.10)
We can now show that we can satisfy property (P3) in phase i+ 1 and en-
sure that f j(ti+1) matches fˆ on links j ≥ i+ 2. First note that due to Equa-
tion (2.10), fi+1(ti) ≥ (3 e)1/4 implies fi+1(ti+1) ≥ 1/3. Second, consider
a flow vector fˆ that satisfies the condition of Claim 2.8, fˆ j ≤ (3 e)(j−i−1)/4
for j ≥ i+ 2. Then, due to Equation (2.10), f j(ti) ≥ (3 e)(j−i)/4 implies that
f j(ti+1) ≥ fˆ j.
Altogether, since for j ≥ i+ 1, f j(ti+1) is continuous and strictly increas-
ing in f j(ti)we can satisfy the above inequalities with equality by choosing
the values of the f j(ti) appropriately. More precisely, there exists a flow
vector fˆ ′ satisfying f ′j ≤ (3 e)(j−i)/4 for j ≥ i + 1 such that f j(ti) = fˆ ′j for
j ≥ i+ 1 implies that fi+1(ti+1) = 1/3 and f j(ti+1) = fˆ j for j ≥ i+ 2. Since
fˆ ′ is compatible with the requirements of the induction hypothesis, we can
ensure that f j(ti) = fˆ ′j for j ≥ i+ 1.
The proof of the claim concludes the proof of the theorem.
2.4 Summary
We have seen that Wardrop equilibria satisfy a stronger stability criterion
than being at a Nash equilibrium alone: They are evolutionarily stable.
Whereas this is an appealing property in itself, it also enables us to show
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that Wardrop equilibria are asymptotically stable in the replicator dynam-
ics. Moreover, the set of Wardrop equilibria attracts the entire interior of
the set of feasible flows. In addition, we have given bounds on the time to
reach approximate Wardrop equilibria.
Our results show that a population of selfish agents is able to attain an
equilibrium state in the long run by following simple rules requiring min-
imal rationality and knowledge assumptions only. This is particularly im-
portant for scenarios that are typically modelled as selfish routing games,
since these scenarios often fail to satisfy stronger assumptions. These re-
sults strengthen the concept of Wardrop equilibria as solutions of selfish
routing games.
The single assumption that could not be abandoned to obtain the stabil-
ity and convergence properties presented in this chapter is the assumption
of perfect information. Our analyses require that all rerouting decisions
made by other agents become visible immediately. In the next chapter we
consider a model in which this is not the case and show how convergence
can be guaranteed nevertheless.
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CHAPTER 3
Coping with Stale Information
In the previous chapter we have seen that, in the long run, a population
of selfish agents is able to attain a Wardrop equilibrium in a distributed
way. However, our dynamic population model treats the aspect of concur-
rency in an idealistic fashion. It is implicitly assumed that any effect that
the migration of population shares has on latency can be observed with-
out a delay. In this sense, we have still assumed perfect information. A
reasonable model of concurrency, however, should take into account the
possibility that information may be stale: In practise, e. g., a rerouted flow
may unfold its full volume only after a re-initialisation phase, and “ob-
serving” the latency of a path may actually comprise measurements taken
over a certain period of time. In such a scenario, naive policies like the
best response dynamics may lead to overshooting and oscillation effects.
These effects are well-known in practise and may seriously harm perfor-
mance [47, 49, 62, 73]. In fact, oscillation effects are a major obstacle in de-
signing real-time dynamic traffic engineering protocols. Similar negative
results have been obtained in theory [17, 52].
The strength of these oscillation effects chiefly depends on three quan-
tities: the maximum age of the information, the sensitivity of the latency
functions to small changes of the flow, and the speed at which the rerou-
ting policy shifts flow. Whereas the first two parameters are determined by
the system, the third is controlled by the rerouting policy, e. g., in case of
the replicator dynamics, by the scalar function λi( f ) in Equation (2.2).
In this chapter, we ask the question of how agents should behave in
order to guarantee convergence to Wardrop equilibria despite the fact that
information may be stale. As a model of stale information we consider
the bulletin board model introduced by Mitzenmacher [52] in the context
of dynamic load balancing. In this model, all information relevant to the
routing process is posted on a bulletin board and updated at regular inter-
vals of length T. The information on the bulletin board is accessible to all
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agents. Again, agents may reroute their traffic at points in time that are the
arrival dates of a Poisson process. We will see that in the bulletin board
model, naive rerouting policies like the best response policy oscillate and
fail to converge.
We consider a class of simple, stateless rerouting policies which also
contains the replicator dynamics discussed in the preceding chapter and
devise sufficient properties for dynamics from this class to converge. More
precisely, we show that for any class of latency functions with bounded
slope and any finite update period length T there exist policies that con-
verge towards the set of Wardrop equilibria. We also give bounds on the
time to converge towards approximate equilibria.
3.1 Related Work
The bulletin board model of stale information was introduced by Mitzen-
macher [52] in a different context. In Mitzenmacher’s model, jobs (agents)
enter the system at Poisson rates, are assigned to machines (resources) and
are removed from the system after being processed. Both the number of
agents and the number of resources go to infinitywhereas the ratio between
the number of jobs and the number of machines is fixed. In our model the
number of resources (the edges of the considered network) is fixed whereas
the number of agents is infinite. Agents are not removed from the sys-
tem but merely reassign their load at intervals. Mitzenmacher’s results are
mainly negative: Decisions based on stale information can degrade perfor-
mance even in comparison with a fully random assignment of jobs. For
some naive strategies this is the case in our model as well. However, as
a positive result we can show that the system can come to an equilibrium
solely based on old information.
Knowing that information may be stale, it is natural to take the age of
the information into account for the decision process. In fact, in [22] it is
shown that this increased computational effort can improve network per-
formance. For the task of job scheduling, a natural approach is to assign a
job to the machine with expected shortest queue. Such a strategy is anal-
ysed by Cao and Nyberg [17]. They show that this does not always min-
imise the average waiting time. In our scenario, the age of the information
is not known to the agents.
In classical optimisation one considers the minimisation of a global cost
function rather than the computation of a Wardrop equilibrium. As we
have seen, the two problems can be cast into one another by usingmarginal
cost latency functions [70, 83]. For example, Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [13]
consider a distributed algorithm for optimising a global cost function with
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asynchronous agents. In game theoretic terminology, their algorithm is
comparable to a careful best response policy. The computational effort re-
quired by this algorithm is greater than the negligible computational effort
of our sampling policies. In the model of Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, traffic is
rerouted at discrete time steps whereas our model is continuous. Further-
more, we also give bounds on the time of convergence based on network
parameters.
In evolutionary game theory, similar problems are faced when consid-
ering discretisations of the replicator dynamics. E. g., the Dekel-Scotchmer
Example [23] shows that in discrete versions of the replicator dynamics, it
is not even guaranteed that dominated strategies vanish.
The problem of oscillation due to stale information is also well-known
in practise. We refer to the respective section of Chapter 5 for a discussion
of the literature.
Our model of stale information will lead to a system of differential
equations which depend on retarded time. Generalisations of Lyapunov’s
method for dynamical systems of a similar kind can be found in [24].
3.2 Smooth Rerouting Policies and Stale Informa-
tion
The traffic model considered in this chapter is again the Wardrop model
presented in Section 1.3. As has been mentioned, our main result depends
on the maximum slope of the latency functions, which in turn depends on
the scale by which we measure latency and the scale by which we measure
flow. For the sake of simplicity, throughout this chapter, we normalise the
total flow demand to be r = 1. Under this normalisation, we can express
our results in terms of the maximum slope and the maximum path latency
`max = maxP∈P ∑e∈P `e(1)
3.2.1 Smooth Rerouting Policies
In this chapter we consider a very broad class of adaptive routing policies.
These policies can be described in the following way. Each agent becomes
active at discrete points in time generated at fixed Poisson rates for each
agent independently. Whenever an agent is activated, she revises her rout-
ing strategy (i. e. the selected path) by performing the following two steps.
Consider an agent of commodity i ∈ [k] currently using path P ∈ Pi.
1. Sampling: The agent samples a path Q ∈ Pi according to some prob-
ability distribution. Let σPQ( f ) denote the probability that an agent
currently using path P samples path Q.
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2. Migration: The agent switches to the sampled path Qwith probability
µ(`P, `Q).
We illustrate the class of policies in this framework by giving some exam-
ples for possible sampling and migration rules.
Typically, σPQ( f ) will be independent of the originating path P. The
simplest sampling rule is the uniform sampling rule which assigns uniform
probabilities to all paths, i. e., σPQ( f ) = 1/|Pi| for all i ∈ [k] and P,Q ∈
Pi. Instead of choosing paths uniformly at random, one can also imagine
that agents sample other agents from the same commodity uniformly at
random as we have done for the replicator dynamics. We call this approach
proportional sampling since the probability to sample path Q is proportional
to the fraction of agents using it, i. e. σPQ( f ) = fQ/ri.
In order to guarantee that unique solutions of the dynamic system de-
scribed by the above rules exist, we assume that σPQ( f ) is a Lipschitz-
continuous function of f . Also note that a population cannot converge to-
wards aWardrop equilibrium if σPQ( f )may be zero for some path Q that is
used in every Wardrop equilibrium. Hence, we also require σPQ( f ) > 0 for
all P,Q ∈ P and every f that can be reached from an initial state f0. Note
that the proportional sampling rule satisfies this condition if f0 ∈ int(FΓ).
Let us now give two examples for the migration rule µ. A natural, but,
as we will see, deceptive, migration rule is the better response policy defined
by
µ(`P, `Q) =
{
1 if `Q < `P
0 otherwise .
Another natural migration rule is to switch from P to Q with a probability
proportional to the latency difference:
µ(`P, `Q) =
{
`P−`Q
`max
if `Q < `P
0 otherwise .
This corresponds to the migration rule of the replicator dynamics. We call
this migration rule linear migration policy.
Again, we require that the migration rule is Lipschitz-continuous. All
migration rules µ(·, ·) we consider here satisfy µ(`P, `Q) > 0 if and only
if `Q > `P and are non-decreasing in `P and non-increasing in `Q. By re-
quiring the migration probability to be positive if the sampled path offers a
strict improvement we can guarantee convergence towards Wardrop equi-
libria.
As discussed above we need to assume that the migration rule is not
too greedy. We formalise this requirement in the following way:
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Definition 3.1 (α-smoothness). We say that a migration-rule µ : R≥0×R≥0 7→
[0, 1] is α-smooth for some α > 0 if for all `P ≥ `Q ≥ 0 the migration probability
satisfies µ(`P, `Q) ≤ α · (`P − `Q).
Note that if µ can be written as a function of `P − `Q then α-smoothness
corresponds to Lipschitz-continuity at 0 with Lipschitz parameter α. The
better responsemigration rule is not α-smooth for any α and therefore is not
smooth at all. The linear migration policy is (1/`max)-smooth. The combi-
nation of proportional sampling and linear migration policy corresponds
to the replicator dynamics considered in Chapter 2 with λi( f ) = 1/`max.
Assuming that each agent’s amount of traffic is infinitesimally small we
can now describe the evolution of the population shares over time in terms
of the fluid limit. Given the sampling and migration rule and normalising
the Poisson activation rate of the agents to be 1, we can compute the rate
ρPQ( f ) at which agents migrate from path P to path Q:
ρPQ( f ) = fP · σPQ( f ) · µ(`P( f ), `Q( f )) .
Summing up over all paths Q we we obtain a system of ordinary differ-
ential equations describing the growth rates (or derivatives with respect to
time) of the population share utilising path P:
f˙P(t) = ∑
Q∈Pi
(ρQP( f (t))− ρPQ( f (t))) (3.1)
f (0) = f0 .
Due to our definition of µ(·, ·), only one of the terms ρQP( f ) and ρPQ( f )
is positive. If the policy satisfies the properties discussed above, the right-
hand-side of this equation is Lipschitz-continuous which, for any initial
population f0, guarantees the existence of a unique solution ξ( f0, t), t ≥ 0,
to Equation (3.1).
Let us also consider the best response policywhich has already been men-
tioned in the introduction (Section 1.2.1.1). This policy is not based on sam-
pling but shortest-path computations. Here, each agent reconsidering her
strategy chooses a best response, i. e., a shortest path with respect to latency,
belonging to her own commodity. Again, denote the set of all best replies
by β( f ). Since the shortest path need not be unique, this leads to a differ-
ential inclusion rather than a differential equation.
f˙ ∈ β( f )− f (3.2)
f (0) = f0 .
Observe that the best response policy can be approximated by a policy in
the form of Equation (3.1). To that end, let bi denote the number of best
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response paths of commodity i and choose the sampling rate σPQ( f ) =
1/bi for any best response path Q. Furthermore use the migration rule
µ(`1, `2) = 1 for `1 > `2 and µ(`1, `2) = 0 otherwise. These discontin-
uous functions can be approximated arbitrarily well by continuous func-
tions such that the overall system approximates the best response policy.
One way to do this is, e. g., by using the logit dynamics has been presented
in Section 1.2.1.1.
Under stale information we will show that this dynamics does not con-
verge towards an equilibrium even for simple networks with two links
only.
3.2.2 Stale Information
The model of stale information we use in this chapter was originally in-
troduced by Mitzenmacher [52]. In this model, agents do not observe la-
tency and flow values in the network directly, but rather consult a bulletin
board on which this information is posted. The bulletin board is updated
only infrequently, at intervals of length T. Systems that may exhibit sim-
ilar behaviour include networks in which latency information is gathered
centrally and broadcast at regular intervals or uploaded to a server from
which it may be polled by the agents whenever needed.
The information on the bulletin board includes at least the path laten-
cies (`P)P∈P which may be given also implicitly as edge latencies (`e)e∈E.
We assume that the migration rule µ(·, ·) is based on the values on the bul-
letin board. In addition, the sampling rule σPQ( f ) may depend on the cur-
rent flow. In this case, we assume that the value of ( fP)P∈P is available on
the bulletin board, too.
Using the information on the bulletin board for the evaluation of the
sampling andmigration rule, our expression for f˙ (t) now depends not only
on f (t) but also on f (tˆ) where tˆ marks the beginning of the respective up-
date period. Fix an update period length T and let tˆ = bt/Tc · T denote the
beginning of a phase containing t. Then, the migration rate becomes
ρˆPQ( f (t)) = fP · σPQ( f (tˆ)) · µ(`P( f (tˆ)), `Q( f (tˆ)))
and our dynamic system becomes
f˙P(t) = ∑
Q∈Pi
(ρˆQP( f (t))− ρˆPQ( f (t))) (3.3)
f (0) = f0 .
Note that the right hand side of this differential equation may now have
discontinuities whenever the bulletin board is updated. However, since it
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is Lipschitz-continuous within every phase, there exists a unique solution
for each update period and, hence, on all of R≥0.
Correspondingly, the best response policy under stale information is
then
f˙ (t) ∈ β( f (tˆ))− f (t) (3.4)
f (0) = f0 .
As a convention, whenever the value of t is clear from context, all symbols
marked with a hat (ˆ) will refer to time tˆ, e. g., we may write f instead of
f (t) and fˆ instead of f (tˆ). Similarly, we write ˆ`e = `e( f (tˆ)), etc.
3.3 Stale Information Makes Convergence Hard
We start by showing that any of our rerouting policies converges towards
the set of Wardrop equilibria when information is always up-to-date. On
the contrary, we show that the best response policy fails to converge how-
ever small the update period is chosen.
3.3.1 Convergence Under Up-To-Date Information
Assuming that information is always up-to-date, convergence towardsWar-
drop equilibria can easily be shown using the Beckmann-McGuire-Winsten
potential [11] Φ as defined in Equation (1.8). Again, Lipschitz-continuity
of σPQ(·) and µ(·, ·) ensures existence and uniqueness of a solution to the
dynamical system given by Equation (3.1) due to the Picard-Lindelo¨f-The-
orem [16].
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that σPQ( f ) is Lipschitz continuous in f and positive for
all i ∈ [k] and all P,Q ∈ Pi, and µ(`P, `Q) is Lipschitz continuous, non-negative,
and zero only if `P ≤ `Q. Then, for any f0 ∈ FΓ, the solution ξ( f0, t) of the
dynamical system given by Equation (3.1) converges towards the set of Wardrop
equilibria, i. e., ξ( f0, t)t→∞ → FNEΓ .
Proof. Again, the proof of convergence is an application of Lyapunov’s di-
rect method (Theorem 1.7). Consider the derivative with respect to time of
Φ along a solution of Equation (3.1).
Φ˙( f ) = ∑
e∈E
f˙e · `e( fe) = ∑
P∈P
f˙P · `P( f ) = ∑
P,Q∈P
ρPQ · (`Q − `P) .
By definition of µ(·, ·) and σPQ(·)we know that ρPQ is positive if `Q − `P <
0 and zero otherwise. Hence, Φ˙( f ) ≤ 0. The inequality is strict if f is not at
a Wardrop equilibrium. Consequently, Φ(·)− Φ∗ is a Lyapunov function
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and the solution orbit points strictly into every contour set of Φ implying
that the solution approaches the set of Wardrop equilibria.
3.3.2 Oscillation of Best-Response
Similarly, the best response-dynamics converges towards a Wardrop equi-
librium under up-to-date information. However, under stale information,
the best response dynamics oscillates, no matter how small we choose the
update period length T.
We consider an instance with two parallel links with continuous latency
functions `1(x) = `2(x) = max{0, β · (x − 12 )} for a parameter β > 0 and
demand r = 1. Note that the latency functions have maximum slope β. At
a Wardrop equilibrium we have f1 = f2 = 1/2 and `1( f1) = `2( f2) = 0.
First observe that the solution orbit of the best response dynamics (3.4)
is unique within any update period and therefore on all of R≥0. Consider
an update period starting at time t0 such that f1 6= 1/2 6= f2. Then, for
t ≤ T, the best reply is uniquely defined and the population on the other
link decreases exponentially fast, i. e.,
f1(t0 + t) =
{
f1(t0) · exp(−t) if `1( f1(t0)) > `2( f2(t0))
1− (1− f1(t0)) · exp(−t) if `1( f1(t0)) < `2( f2(t0))
and f2(t) = 1− f1(t). Note that for our instance, the condition `1( f1(t)) >
`2( f2(t)) is equivalent to f1(t) > 1/2. As an initial condition, we choose
f1(0) =
1
exp(−T) + 1 and f2(0) =
exp(−T)
exp(−T) + 1 .
Since f1(0) > 1/2 we have f1(T) = f1(0) · exp(−T) < 1/2 and
f1(2 T) = 1− (1− f1(T)) · exp(−T)
= 1−
(
1− 1
exp(−T) + 1 · exp(−T)
)
· exp(−T)
= f1(0) .
The solution oscillates coming back to its initial configuration every other
round. How small do we have to make T in order to guarantee that the
maximum latency does not exceed theWardrop latency (which, in this case,
is zero) by more than e? At the beginning of every round i the deviation
from the Wardrop latency is
X = max{`1( f1(i · T)), `2( f2(i · T))}
= β ·
(
1
exp(−T) + 1 −
1
2
)
=
β · (1− exp(−T))
2 · exp(−T) + 2 .
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Observe that this latency is sustained by more than one half of the agents.
In order to guarantee that X ≤ e we must have
T ≤ ln
(
1+ 2 e/β
1− 2 e/β
)
= ln
(
1+ 2
e
β
)
− ln
(
1− 2 e
β
)
= O
(
e
β
)
.
In particular, we can avoid oscillation of the best response policy only for
T = 0, i. e., in the case of current information.
3.4 Convergence Under Stale Information
We have seen that under up-to-date information the potential decreases.
More precisely, if agents migrate from path P to path Q at rate ρPQ, they
cause an infinitesimal potential gain of ρPQ · (`Q − `P) which is negative
for selfish policies. Consider a phase in the bulletin board model starting
with a population fˆ ∈ FΓ and ending with a population f ∈ FΓ. Let ∆ fPQ
denote the fraction of agents migrating from path P to path Q within this
phase. Since throughout the phase the latency values on the bulletin board
are fixed to the values they had at the beginning of the phase, agents “see”
a virtual potential gain of
VPQ = ∆ fPQ · (`Q − `P) . (3.5)
Unfortunately, summing up over all pairs of paths, this does not yield the
true potential gain in one round since the latency values do actually change
during the phase. The error terms
Ue =
∫ fe
fˆe
(`e(u)− `e( fˆe)) du (3.6)
account for this difference. The following lemma shows that the virtual
potential gain terms and the error terms sum up to the true potential gain.
Lemma 3.2. Let fˆ , f ∈ FΓ and VPQ and Ue be defined as in Equations (3.5)
and (3.6), respectively. Then,
Φ( f )−Φ( fˆ ) = ∑
e∈E
Ue + ∑
P,Q∈P
VPQ .
The virtual potential gain of one round inwhich the flow vector changes
from fˆ to f is denoted by
V( fˆ , f ) = ∑
P,Q
VPQ = ∑
e∈E
`e( fˆ ) · ( fe − fˆe) . (3.7)
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For the class of policies under consideration, every termVPQ is non-negative
and at least one is negative. The following lemma shows that if the rerou-
ting policy is smooth enough, the real potential gain is still at least half of
the virtual potential gain and is thus, in particular, negative. Recall that D
denotes an upper bound on the length of any path P ∈ P .
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that there exist constants α, β > 0 such that
1. the migration rule µ(·, ·) is α-smooth,
2. the slope of the latency functions is bounded from above by β, i. e., for all
e ∈ E, u ∈ [0, 1], `′e(u) ≤ β.
Define T = 1/(4D α β) and consider a phase beginning at time tˆ with an update
of the bulletin board and ending at time t = tˆ+ τ, τ ≤ T. For any solution of a
routing policy of the form of Equation (3.3) it holds that
∆Φ = Φ(t)−Φ(tˆ) ≤ 1
2
· V( f (tˆ), f (t)) ≤ 0 .
To avoid unnecessary confusion, let us remark that this upper bound
on ∆Φ, which is negative, is actually a lower bound on its absolute value.
We can now proof both lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We write ˆ`e = `e( fˆe). By definition of Φ,
Φ( f )−Φ( fˆ ) = ∑
e∈E
∫ fe
fˆe
`e(u) du
= ∑
e∈E
(∫ fe
fˆe
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du+ ( fe − fˆe) · ˆ`e
)
= ∑
e∈E
(
Ue + ∑
P∈P
∑
Q3e
(∆ fPQ − ∆ fQP) · ˆ`e
)
.
Now observe, that the term ∆ fPQ · ˆ`e occurs positively for all e ∈ Q and
negatively for all e ∈ P. Hence,
Φ( f )−Φ( fˆ ) = ∑
e∈E
Ue + ∑
P,Q∈P
∆ fPQ
(
∑
e∈Q
ˆ`e − ∑
e′∈P
ˆ`e′
)
= ∑
e∈E
Ue + ∑
P,Q∈P
∆ fPQ · ( ˆ`Q − ˆ`P)
= ∑
e∈E
Ue + ∑
P,Q∈P
VPQ ,
our claim.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3. We consider a phase starting at time tˆ and ending at
time t = tˆ+ τ. For brevity, we will omit the arguments tˆ and t, respectively,
and write fˆ = f (tˆ) and f = f (t). In the following, a hat (ˆ) indicates
symbols referring to values at time tˆ whereas symbols without a hat refer
to values at time t. The difference between two values between time tˆ and
t is indicated by a preceding ∆, e. g., ∆ fe = fe − fˆe.
By Lemma 3.2, the potential change in one round is
∆Φ = Φ− Φˆ = ∑
e∈E
Ue + ∑
P,Q∈P
VPQ . (3.8)
We know that the virtual potential gain is negative. The error terms may
be positive, but we will see that their absolute value is at most half of the
absolute value of the virtual potential gain. To that end, we partition the
virtual potential gain terms into chunks
VePQ =
{
VPQ
4D if e ∈ P ∪Q
0 otherwise ,
which we will set against the error terms. Since the paths P,Q 3 e contain
at most 2D edges altogether and since VPQ ≤ 0, we have
∑
e∈E
VePQ ≥ 2D ·
VPQ
4D
=
1
2
·VPQ .
Substituting this into Equation (3.8) yields
∆Φ ≤ ∑
e∈E
Ue + ∑
P,Q∈P
(
∑
e∈E
VePQ +
1
2
VPQ
)
= ∑
e∈E
(
Ue + ∑
P,Q∈P
VePQ
)
+
1
2 ∑P,Q∈P
VPQ
= ∑
e∈E
(
Ue + ∑
P,Q∈P
VePQ
)
+
1
2
· V( fˆ , f ) .
To obtain the assertion of the lemma it remains to show that the first sum
is non-positive. We show that this holds termwise, i. e., for all e ∈ E,
Ue ≤ − ∑
P,Q∈P
VePQ . (3.9)
We prove this inequality by writing Ue as an upper sum and using an in-
ductive argument on the number of terms in this sum. Fix an edge e ∈ E
and, for the time being, suppose that e is a “growing” edge, i. e., fe > fˆe.
We consider pairs of paths (Pi,Qi) with e ∈ Qi and ˆ`Pi > ˆ`Qi in ascending
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.ℓe(x)
x
ℓˆe
ℓe
ℓe(fˆ
i
e)
fˆe f
i−1
e f
i
e fe
−V ePiQi
∆fPiQi
ℓPi−ℓQi
4D
Figure 3.1: Bounding the error termUe piecewise. The area under the func-
tion `e between fˆe and fe is the true contribution to the potential difference.
The area between ˆ`e and `e(·) is the error term Ue. The rectangular areas
are the virtual potential gain terms VePQ seen by the respective pair of paths
P,Q. Each such area contains the respective section of Ue.
order of ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi for i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, p ≤ |P|2 being the number of pairs of
paths. Let
f 0e = fˆe and f
i
e = f
i−1
e + ∆ fPiQi for i > 0
and observe that fe ≤ f pe . We show that
∫ f ie
fˆe
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du ≤ −
i
∑
j=1
VePjQj
which, for i = p, implies Inequality (3.9) and concludes the proof. The
situation is depicted in Figure 3.1.
The claim certainly holds for i = 0. For the induction step, we derive an
upper bound on the growth of the flow and the latency on resource e due
to the first i path pairs. By the dynamics given in Equation (3.3), we can
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upper bound the increase of the flow:
f ie − fˆe =
∫ t
tˆ
i
∑
j=1
fPj(u) · σPjQj( fˆ ) · µ( ˆ`Pj , ˆ`Qj) du
≤
∫ t
tˆ
i
∑
j=1
fPj(u) · σPjQj( fˆ ) · α · ( ˆ`Pj − ˆ`Qj) du
≤ α · ( ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi) ·
∫ t
tˆ
i
∑
j=1
fPj(u) · σPjQj( fˆ ) du
≤ T · α · ( ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi) . (3.10)
In the first inequality we have used α-smoothness of µ(·, ·). The second
inequality is due to the fact that ˆ`Pj − ˆ`Qj ≤ ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi by our ordering of
the (Pj,Qj). For the last step we have used σPQ ≤ 1, ∑P∈P fP = 1, and
t− tˆ ≤ T. Furthermore, since the slope of `e is bounded from above by β,
using Equation (3.10) we have
`e( f ie)− `e( fˆe) ≤ ( f ie − fˆe) · β
≤ T · α · β · ( ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi) . (3.11)
Using this upper bound, we can now prove our claim:
∫ f ie
fˆe
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du =
∫ f i−1e
fˆe
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du+
∫ f ie
f i−1e
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du
≤ −
i−1
∑
j=1
VePjQj + ( f
i
e − f i−1e ) · (`e( f ie)− ˆ`e)
= −
i−1
∑
j=1
VePjQj + ∆ fPiQi · (`e( f ie)− ˆ`e)
≤ −
i−1
∑
j=1
VePjQj + ∆ fPiQi · T · α · β · ( ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi)
where the first inequality uses the induction hypothesis and monotonicity
of `e and the second uses Inequality (3.11). Finally, by definition of VePiQi =
( ˆ`Qi − ˆ`Pi) · ∆ fPiQi/(4D) and the definition of T = 1/(4D α β),∫ f ie
fˆe
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du ≤ −
i−1
∑
j=1
VePjQj −VePiQi · 4 · D · T · α · β
= −
i
∑
j=1
VePjQj ,
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which concludes our inductive argument. To see that the same argument
holds for edges e ∈ E with fe < fˆe, we consider pairs of paths Pi,Qi with
e ∈ Pi. In this case, for Equation (3.10) we obtain f ie − fˆe ≥ T · α · ( ˆ`Qi − ˆ`Pi).
Analogously, for Equation (3.11) we obtain `e( f ie)− `e( fˆe) ≥ T · α · β · ( ˆ`Qi −
ˆ`Pi). The remainder of the proof is unchanged.
Convergence is a direct consequence of this lemma.
Corollary 3.4. Suppose that there exist constants α, β > 0 such that
1. the migration rule µ(·, ·) is α-smooth,
2. the slope of the latency functions is bounded from above by β, i. e., for all
e ∈ E, u ∈ [0, 1], `′e(u) ≤ β,
and the bulletin board is updated at intervals of length T ≤ 1/(4D α β). Further-
more, suppose that σPQ( f ) is Lipschitz continuous in f and positive for all i ∈ [k]
and all P,Q ∈ Pi, and µ(`P, `Q) is Lipschitz continuous, non-negative, and zero
only if `P ≤ `Q. Then, for any f0 ∈ FΓ, the solution ξ( f0, t) of the dynamical
system given by Equation (3.3) in the bulletin board model converges towards the
set of Wardrop equilibria, i. e., ξ( f0, t)t→∞ → FNEΓ .
Proof. Let Φ∗ = min f Φ( f ) denote the optimal potential. It is sufficient to
show that for any Φ˜ > Φ∗ there exists a phase starting with a flow f such
that Φ( f ) ≤ Φ˜. Consider the convex set CΦ˜ containing all points f with
Φ( f ) ≤ Φ˜. Note that CΦ˜ contains all Wardrop equilibria. Let V( f ) denote
the virtual potential gain in one update period starting with population
f . Note that V(·) is non-positive, continuous in f , and zero only if f is a
Wardrop equilibrium. Furthermore, CΦ˜ is compact. Hence, there exists an
eΦ˜ > 0 such that
inf
f /∈CΦ˜
{−V( f )} ≥ eΦ˜ .
Let ∆Φ( f ) denote the true potential gain of an update period starting with
population f . Lemma 3.3 asserts that
inf
f /∈CΦ˜
{−∆Φ( f )} ≥ eΦ˜
2
.
Now, consider a sequence of flows ( f (i T))i∈{0,...,k} with f (i T) /∈ CΦ˜. Then,
the potential is at most
Φ( f (k T)) ≤ Φ( f (0))− k · eΦ˜
2
,
and, since Φ( f (k T)) ≥ Φ˜ by assumption, any such sequence must be of
finite length.
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3.5 Convergence Time
Although we have seen that our smooth adaptive rerouting policies con-
verge towards Wardrop equilibria in the long run, none of them will nec-
essarily reach an exact equilibrium. In order to give bounds on the conver-
gence time we consider approximate equilibria similar to the ones defined
in Chapter 2. We consider both the uniform and the proportional sam-
pling policy in combination with the linear migration policy. Recall that for
the linear migration policy µ(`P, `Q) = max{(`P − `Q)/`max, 0} we have
α = 1/`max. Again, let β be an upper bound on the slope of the latency
functions.
Our definition of approximate equilibria differs slightly from the one
used in Chapter 2. As for our definition of e-equilibria (Definition 2.2), we
again require almost all of the agents to sustain latency that is not much
greater than the latency sustained by other agents of the same commodity.
Note that for the linear migration rule the migration probability is propor-
tional to the absolute latency difference between two paths rather than the
ratio between the difference and the average latency as was the case for
the replicator dynamics considered in Chapter 2. This is reflected by our
definition of approximate equilibria in that it allows for an additive (rather
than a relative) deviation.
Our analyses will disclose a fundamental difference between the pro-
portional and the uniform sampling rule. We will see that for the uniform
sampling rule we can prove convergence towards a stricter definition of ap-
proximate equilibria at the cost of a factor |P| in the time of convergence.
3.5.1 Uniform Sampling
Recall that the uniform sampling rule is defined as σPQ = 1/|Pi| for P,Q ∈
Pi and any commodity i ∈ [k].
Definition 3.2 (additive (δ, e)-equilibrium). For a flow f ∈ FΓ, let `imin =
min{`P( f ) | P ∈ Pi} denote the minimum latency of commodity i ∈ [k]. For
every commodity i and every path P ∈ Pi the agents on path P are said to be
δ-unsatisfied iff `P( f ) > `imin + δ. The flow f is said to be at an additive (δ, e)-
equilibrium iff the total volume of δ-unsatisfied agents is at most e.
For the uniform sampling policy the growth rate of the flow on every
path is bounded by the inverse of the number of paths. Hence, our time
bounds must also depend on this parameter.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that the bulletin board is updated at intervals of length
T ≤ 1
4D α β
.
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For the uniform sampling policy combined with the linear migration policy, the
number of update periods not starting at an additive (δ, e)-equilibrium is bounded
from above by
O
(
maxi∈[k]{|Pi|}
e · T ·
(
`max
δ
)2)
.
Proof. Let m = maxi∈[k]{|Pi}. We consider a phase that does not start at
an additive (δ, e)-equilibrium and compute the virtual potential gain of the
phase. First note that the population shares cannot decrease much within
one round. Since for every P ∈ P , f˙P ≥ − fP, at the end of the update
period fP(t+ T) ≥ fP(t) · exp(−T). In particular, we know that the volume
of δ-unsatisfied agents is at least e at the beginning of the phase and hence
at least e · exp(−1) throughout the phase if T ≤ 1.
We now consider the total contribution of δ-unsatisfied agents to the
virtual potential gain. Let P δi denote the set of expensive paths of com-
modity i, i. e., P δi = {P ∈ Pi | `P(t) > `imin + δ} and let P δ =
⋃
i∈[k] P δi .
Furthermore, let P∗i denote a path with minimal latency in commodity i.
First note that the contributions of all agents to the virtual potential gain is
non-positive since agents only migrate if this decreases their latency. From
this fact and Lemma 3.3 it follows that the true potential gain in one round
is at least
∆Φ ≤ −1
2 ∑P∈Pδ
VPP∗i .
For every commodity i ∈ [k] and every path P ∈ Pi the probability for an
agent on path P to sample path P∗i is at least
σPP∗i =
1
|Pi| ≥
1
m
.
If P ∈ P δi , then the migration probability is
µ(`P, `imin) =
`P − `imin
`max
≥ δ
`max
.
The total virtual potential gain over a phase of length T is hence at least
∑
P∈P δ
VPP∗i ≤ T ∑
P∈P δ
inf
u∈[t,t+T)
fP(u) ·
δ · (`P∗i (t)− `P(t))
m · `max
≤ −T ∑
P∈P δ
fP(t) · exp(−1) · δ
2
m · `max
≤ −T e · δ
2 · exp(−1)
m · `max
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where the last inequality holds because the flow is not at an additive (δ, e)-
equilibrium at time t and hence ∑P∈P δ fP(t) ≥ e. By Lemma 3.3, the poten-
tial decreases by at least half of this in every round, i. e.,
∆Φ ≤ −T e · δ
2 · exp(−1)
2 ·m · `max
as long as we are not at an additive (δ, e)-equilibrium. Suppose that we are
not at an additive (δ, e)-equilibrium for n rounds. Then, since Φ( f ) ≤ `max
for every f ∈ FΓ and in particular for f = f0, after these n rounds it holds
that
Φ ≤ `max − n · T e · δ
2 · exp(−1)
2 ·m · `max .
Since furthermore Φ ≥ 0, it follows that
n ≤ O
(
m
T · e
(
`max
δ
)2)
,
which is our claim.
3.5.2 Proportional Sampling
Using proportional instead of uniform sampling we can get rid of the fac-
tor maxi∈[k]{|Pi|} at the cost of a slightly weaker definition of approxi-
mate equilibria. Recall that the proportional sampling rule is defined as
σPQ( f ) = fQ/ri for all paths P,Q ∈ Pi and any commodity i ∈ [k].
Definition 3.3 (weak additive (δ, e)-equilibrium). Consider a flow f ∈ FΓ.
For every commodity i ∈ [k] and every path P ∈ Pi the agents on path P are said
to be weakly δ-unsatisfied iff `P( f ) > Li( f ) + δ. The flow f is said to be at
a weak additive (δ, e)-equilibrium iff the total volume of weakly δ-unsatisfied
agents is at most e.
Note that every additive (δ, e)-equilibrium is also aweak additive (δ, e)-
equilibrium.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose that the bulletin board is updated at intervals of length
T ≤ 1
4D α β
.
For the proportional sampling policy combined with the linear migration policy,
the number of update periods not starting at an additive weak (δ, e)-equilibrium
is bounded from above by
O
(
1
e · T ·
(
`max
δ
)2)
.
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Proof. We use a similar argument here. Again, consider a phase starting at
time t such that f (t) is not at a weak additive (δ, e)-equilibrium. Define
P δi = {P ∈ Pi | `P(t) > Li(t) + δ} and let P δ =
⋃
i∈[k] P δi . Consider the
potential gain of agents using paths in P δ throughout a phase of length T.
By Lemma 3.3,
∆Φ ≤ 1
2 ∑P,Q∈P
VPQ
≤ exp(−1) · T
2 ∑i∈[k]
∑
P∈P δi
∑
Q∈Pi
fP(t) · fQ(t) · (`P − `Q)
ri · `max · (`Q − `P)
= −exp(−1) · T
2 · `max ∑i∈[k]
∑
P∈P δi
fP(t) ∑
Q∈Pi
fP(t) · fQ(t) · (`P − `Q)2
ri
.
Using Jensen’s inequality,
∆Φ ≤ −exp(−1) · T
2 · `max ∑i∈[k]
∑
P∈P δi
fP(t)
(
∑
Q∈Pi
fQ(t) · (`P − `Q)
ri
)2
= −exp(−1) · T
2 · `max ∑i∈[k]
∑
P∈P δi
fP(t)(`P − Li( f (t)))2
≤ −exp(−1) · e · δ
2 · T
2 · `max ,
where for the equality we have used ∑P∈Pi fQ = ri and the definition of Li,
and for the last inequality we have used ∑P∈Pδ fP ≥ e. Given a bound on
the potential gain per round, the remainder of the proof is analogous to the
proof of Theorem 3.5.
3.6 Summary
We have analysed selfish rerouting policies in a model of time that is more
realistic than the one used in Chapter 2 by taking into account the fact that
informationmay be stale. Our analyses use a bulletin boardmodel inwhich
information is updated at regular intervals. We have introduced the class of
α-smooth adaption policies that can copewith the issue of stale information
if parametrised correctly. For any class of latency functions with bounded
slope and any non-zero update interval length we have shown that for
some α small enough, α-smooth adaption policies converge towards the
set of Wardrop equilibria.
These positive results complement earlier negative ones in similar mod-
els showing that stale information may lead to oscillation which in turn
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decreases performance. The fact that these analyses yield negative results,
however, is a consequence of the greediness of the considered policies. E. g.,
Mitzenmacher [52] considers a policy in which each agent assigns its job to
a machine with minimum load. Negative results for greedy policies are
confirmed by our analyses. We have seen that the best response dynamics
oscillates in our model as well.
For two representatives of our class of smooth adaption policies we
have derived bounds on the time to reach approximate equilibria in a bi-
criterial sense similar to the one used in Chapter 2. The convergence speed
of smooth adaption policies is coupled linearly to the smoothness param-
eter α. Our results on the convergence time reflect this fact in two aspects.
First, since the smoothness parameter α must be chosen proportionally to
the reciprocal of the maximum slope and the length of the update period,
our time bounds also depend on these parameters. Thus, they have a pseu-
dopolynomial character.
Second, our smoothness condition requires the migration probability
to be small for small latency improvements, even if this improvement is
huge in relation to the latency of the originating path. For this reason, the
progress made by our policies is large only if agents make large absolute
improvements. Correspondingly, we have to define approximate equilib-
ria in terms of additive deviations as opposed to the relative deviations
allowed for approximate equilibria in the sense of Chapter 2.
Whereas the dependence of the convergence speed on the length of the
update period is evidently unavoidable, the dependence on the maximum
slope is a consequence of the generality of the framework of this chapter.
The next chapter will reveal how this dependence can be avoided if one
considers a more specific class of policies.
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68
CHAPTER 4
Fast Convergence by
Exploration and Replication
4.1 Introduction
We have seen that convergence towards Wardrop equilibria is, in princi-
ple, possible even if information used by the agents is stale. However, our
analysis is not yet satisfactory with respect to the speed of convergence.
We have slowed down the dynamics by a factor that is proportional to the
maximum slope of the latency functions. Unfortunately, this quantity is
unbounded for some natural classes of latency functions, e. g., for affine
functions or polynomials, as well as for any class that is closed under scal-
ing. Even for any fixed instance the maximum slope may be large. Let us
evaluate the convergence time from an algorithmic point of view. We con-
sider the rerouting policy as a distributed algorithm and an instance Γ as
its input. Then we can interpret the time to reach approximate equilibria
as a function of the encoding length of Γ. Such an encoding encompasses
also a representation of the latency functions. For example, a natural rep-
resentation of polynomial functions is the coefficient representation which
lists the coefficients of all monomials. Any bound that is polynomial in the
maximum slope (as is the case in Theorems 3.5 and 3.6) is then pseudopoly-
nomial in the representation length of Γ.
The goal of this chapter is to derive bounds on the time of convergence
that are polynomial in the representation length of Γ and are thus much
stronger than the ones presented in the preceding chapter. To that end,
we analyse a very specific rerouting policy, rather than the large class of
smooth adaption policies considered in Chapter 3. Why does our proof of
the convergence theorem (Lemma 3.3) require to slow down the dynamics
by the reciprocal of the maximum slope? The reason for this is a pessimistic
assumption we had to make for bounding the volume of agents migrating
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towards a particular edge. We have assumed that all agents might sam-
ple a particular edge. In this chapter, we will introduce a rerouting policy
that partially resembles the replicator dynamics from Chapter 2 in that it
samples agents rather than paths. For such a policy, the probability to sam-
ple an edge is bounded by the flow on this edge itself. Consequently, the
growth rate of an edge flow is always relative to the current flow. Analyses
depending on the maximum slope of the latency functions cannot take this
into account. A more appropriate parameter precisely capturing the rela-
tive increase of a function value due to a relative increase of its argument is
its elasticity. In contrast to the maximum slope, this is a very good-natured
parameter which, for instance, coincides with the degree of positive poly-
nomials. In this chapter, we identify elasticity as the crucial parameter de-
termining the speed of convergence rather than the maximum slope. Thus,
we obtain bounds on the convergence time that are polynomial rather than
pseudopolynomial.
4.1.1 Our Results
We study policies consisting of a sampling step and a migration step. As a
first approach we consider a policy resembling the replicator dynamics. In
the sampling step an agent currently using path P chooses another agent
at random and then migrates to this agent’s path Q with a probability pro-
portional to the relative latency improvement (`P − `Q)/`P. We show that
if the activation rate of the agents is bounded by the reciprocal of the elas-
ticity of the latency functions, then this policy converges towards the set of
Wardrop equilibria.
To analyse the time of convergence we consider a bicriterial definition
of approximate equilibria which now allows for a deviation from Li that is
relative to L. More precisely, we require all but an e-fraction of the agents
to deviate by no more than δL in both directions from the average latency
of their commodity. In the single-commodity case, this can be interpreted
as an allocation where almost all agents are almost satisfied. This improves
upon the definition of approximate equilibria used in Chapter 3 which al-
lowed for additive deviations which could be by any factor larger than the
average latency. We show that the time to reach an approximate equilib-
rium in this relative sense is bounded from above by
O
(
d
δ2 e2
log
(
Φ( f0)
Φ∗
))
where d is the elasticity of the latency functions. Remarkably, this bound is
almost independent of the size of the network. It is proven in Section 4.4.1
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for the symmetric case (in which it is actually by a factor e smaller) and in
Section 4.5 for the asymmetric case.
As has been discussed in Chapter 2 already, bicriterial approximate
equilibria are transient. Being at a bicriterial approximate equilibrium, a
minority of agents utilising low latency paths may grow to a volume of
more than e · r at a later time, and it may take an arbitrarily long time un-
til this event happens if the initial flow on these paths is arbitrarily small.
Furthermore, due to the lack of innovation of the replication policy, a pop-
ulation converges to a Wardrop equilibrium only if all paths are initially
used.
For symmetric instances, both of these shortcomings are resolved by
changing the sampling mechanism. Instead of sampling another agent at
random, we can also sample another path uniformly at random. Thus, we
obtain a non-zero lower bound on the flow of any path with below average
latency after a single round already. The uniform sampling rule, however,
comes with another two, even more significant disadvantages. First, since
under this policy the growth rates are not relative to the prevailing flow,
the activation rate must be chosen proportionally to the reciprocal of the
maximum slope `′max, which is exactly what we want to avoid. Second,
the probability to sample a particular path is only 1/|Pi|, a number which
may be exponentially small in the number of edges. Altogether, the uni-
form sampling rule alone yields only poor upper bounds on the time of
convergence. For this reason, we combine both sampling rules preserv-
ing the good properties of both. Our hybrid exploration-replication policy
uses uniform sampling with small probability to explore the strategy space
and to guarantee a minimum flow on all paths with below average latency
and uses proportional sampling to boost these paths thereafter. Due to the
exponential growth caused by the proportional sampling rule, the terms
|Pi| and `′max caused by the uniform sampling rule appear only logarithmi-
cally in our time bounds. Altogether, this enables us to obtain polynomial
bounds on the time of convergence towards approximations of the War-
drop equilibrium in terms of the Beckmann-McGuire-Winsten potential in
the single-commodity case. More precisely, the time to reach a flow with
potential at most (1+ e)Φ∗ is bounded from above by
poly
(
d · D
e
)
· polylog
(
|E| · `
′
max
`min
)
· log
(
Φ( f0)
Φ∗
)
where `′max is an upper bound on the maximum slope of the latency func-
tions and `min is the minimum latency of an edge. This bound, which is
proven in Section 4.4.2, is polynomial in the representation length of the
instance Γ if, e. g., the latency functions are positive polynomials of arbi-
trary degree in coefficient representation. Thus, the exploration-replication
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policy behaves like a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPAS).
In the technical part of this chapter, both of the above bounds will be
slightly refined. First, `′max needs to be an upper bound on the maximum
slope in a region close to 0 only. Second, a relative approximation of Φ∗
is only possible if Φ∗ > 0. Furthermore, our time bounds are finite only
if Φ∗ > 0 and `min > 0. In the case that Φ∗ = 0 or `min = 0, we can
still approximate Φ∗ up to a small additive constant α which appears only
logarithmically in the time bounds.
The two take home message of this chapter are that first, proportional
sampling can significantly improve convergence time and second, the crit-
ical parameter that limits the convergence speed is the elasticity of the la-
tency functions. This is confirmed by two lower bounds, which we present
in Section 4.6.
For our first lower bound we consider non-oscillating policies that en-
sure monotonicity with respect to the potential over a basic class of latency
functions with elasticity at most d. We show that any rerouting policy of
this kind needs time Ω(d/e) to approximate the optimal potential within a
factor of 1+ e. The network underlying this analysis consists of two paral-
lel links only.
Finally, we show that proportional sampling is actually necessary. To
that end, we consider policies using fixed sampling properties that do not
rely on any pre-knowledge about the latency functions. We show that for
any such policy there exists an instance with exponentially many paths
such that the time of convergence is proportional to the number of paths
and therefore exponential in the network size.
4.1.2 Related Work
The problem of overshooting is also known in convex optimisation. Var-
ious heuristics like the distributed algorithm presented by Bertsekas and
Tsitsiklis [13] for the non-linear multi-commodity flow problem proceed by
shifting certain amounts of flow from one path to another. This amount of
flow depends in a linear fashion on the reciprocal of the second derivative
of the latency functions. Using marginal cost latency functions, this algo-
rithm can also be applied to compute Wardrop equilibria in a distributed
way. In this case, the slowdown is again linear in the first derivative. Re-
cently, Awerbuch et al. [7] presented an efficient distributed algorithm for
multi-commodity flow problemswhich is restricted to instances with linear
latency functions.
The approach of no-regret routing addresses our problem from the per-
spective of on-line learning. The regret is defined as the difference between
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an agent’s average latency over time and the latency of the best path in
hindsight (see, e. g., [8, 9, 15, 27]). The goal is to minimise the regret over
time. The bounds obtained here also depend in a pseudopolynomial fash-
ion on network parameters.
Going to discrete models, analyses become more involved since prob-
abilistic effects have to be considered that can be neglected in fluid limit
models. Consequently, results obtained for discrete models are more re-
strictive in other aspects, e. g., by limiting the strategy space to parallel
links. Even-Dar and Mansour [28] study distributed and concurrent re-
routing policies in such a model. They consider parallel links with speeds.
Upper bounds are presented for the case of agents with identical weights.
Their algorithms use static sampling rules that explicitly take into account
the speeds of the individual links. Berenbrink et al. [12] present an efficient
distributed protocol for balancing identical jobs on identical machines.
In Section 1.3.4 we have presented several approaches for computing
equilibria in discrete and continuous congestion games. In contrast to our
work, these are centralised algorithms whereas we analyse how agents can
compute or learn an equilibrium in a distributed fashion.
It is known that systems with an infinite number of agents are very
powerful. For example, in [5, 58] quadratic dynamic systems are consid-
ered in which individuals are mated at random to produce two individuals
as offspring. Systems of this kind are able to solve PSPACE-complete prob-
lems. In particular, they can compute Wardrop equilibria. This approach
however, does not yield a distributed algorithm, since individuals do not
have a natural interpretation as participants in a network routing game.
In evolutionary game theory one also considers dynamics which resem-
ble the replicator dynamics but also use a small amount of random muta-
tion [38]. This has an effect similar to the one introduced by our uniform
sampling component.
4.1.3 Preliminaries
We consider the Wardrop model introduced in Section 1.3. Again, we nor-
malise the total flow demand r = 1 for simplicity.
4.1.3.1 Elasticity
We have argued that a rerouting policy cannot guarantee convergence to
Wardrop equilibria if the latency functions make arbitrarily large leaps due
to minor shifts of the flow. To restrict the number of agents migrating si-
multaneously, it must have some information about the sensitivity of the
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latency functions to small shifts of traffic. Our analysis shows that the fol-
lowing parameter is relevant.
Definition 4.1 (elasticity). For any positive differentiable function ` : D 7→ R,
the elasticity of `(·) at x ∈ D is defined as
d(x) =
x · `′(x)
`(x)
.
We say that a function `(·) has elasticity d if d(x) ≤ d for every x ∈ D and a
class of functions L has elasticity d if every ` ∈ L has elasticity d.
Intuitively, elasticity can be interpreted as follows. As a very coarse es-
timate of the slope of a positive continuous function f (·) at x we can use
the slope of the secant through the origin and the point (x, f (x)). Then, the
elasticity of f (·) at x is the factor by which this estimate is wrong. The elas-
ticity of a function at x describes the proportional growth of the function
value as a result of a proportional growth of its argument. In economics,
this parameter can be used to describe characteristic properties of a market,
e. g., the price elasticity of demand or supply.
As an example, the polynomial function f (x) = a xd has elasticity d
over the entire range. The exponential function f (x) = a · exp(λ x) has
elasticity at most λ for x ∈ [0, 1] reaching its maximum λ at x = 1. Delay
functions that arise in the theory ofM/M/1 queues [54] like `1(x) = 1/(1−
x) and `2(x) = x/(1− x) do not have bounded elasticity since they have
a singularity at 1. The elasticities of `1 and `2 are given by d1(x) = x/(1−
x) and d2(x) = 1/(1− x), respectively. If x is separated from 1 by some
amount, the elasticity is finite. Figure 4.1 shows the value of the elasticity
of both functions. We see that as long as the load is at most 90% of the
capacity, the elasticity of both functions is still at most 10.
The following fact which will be used frequently shows that for latency
functions with bounded elasticity small relative changes of the flow cause
only small changes of the latency.
Fact 4.1. For any non-negative, non-decreasing function ` with elasticity d it
holds that for any δ ∈ [0, 1/(2 d)], that
`((1+ δ) · x) ≤ (1+ 2 d δ) · `(x) .
Proof. Let 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/(2 d). The derivative `′(y) of the function ` at any
point y ∈ [x, (1+ δ)x] is at most d · `(y)/y ≤ d · `((1+ δ)x)/x. This yields
`((1+ δ) x) = `(x) +
∫ (1+δ)x
x
`′(u) du
≤ `(x) + δ x d · `((1+ δ) x)
x
.
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Figure 4.1: The elasticity of two latency functions `1(x) = 1/(1− x) and
`2(x) = x/(1− x) which arise in queueing theory.
Hence, `((1 + δ)x) ≤ 11−δ d · `(x), and for δ ≤ 1/(2 d) we have `((1 +
δ) x) ≤ (1+ 2 δ d) · `(x).
Let us remark that we can easily generalise the definition of elasticity
to functions that are not differentiable by requiring `(x(1 + δ)) ≤ (1 +
O (d δ)) `(x) for x ∈ [0, 1] and δ = O (1/d) in the first place.
Moreover, for functions with bounded elasticity, we can bound poten-
tial and average latency in terms of each other as the following fact shows.
Fact 4.2. Let d ≥ 1 denote an upper bound on the elasticity of the latency func-
tions. Then, for every flow f , L( f )/(d+ 1) ≤ Φ( f ) ≤ L( f ).
This can be proved by comparing the contributions of the individual
edges to the average and the potential termwise. For any edge e ∈ E, the
upper bound follows from the fact that
∫ fe
0 `e(u) du ≤ `e( fe) · fe by mono-
tonicity of `e. For the lower bound note that the ratio
`e( fe) · fe∫ fe
0 `e(u) du
is maximised if `e has elasticity over the entire interval [0, 1], i. e., `′e(x) =
d · `e(x)/x for all x ∈ [0, 1]. This functional equation is solved by functions
of the form `e(x) = a · xd for some a > 0. For any such a, the above ratio is
precisely d+ 1 which is our desired bound. A formal proof can be found in
the appendix.
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4.1.3.2 α-Shifted Potential
Our goal is the design of distributed rerouting policies that approximate a
Wardrop equilibrium. Since Wardrop equilibria minimise the Beckmann-
McGuire-Winsten potential [11]
Φ( f ) = ∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
`(u) du ,
a natural measure for the quality of approximation, is the ratio between the
potential achieved after a certain amount of time and the minimal potential
Φ∗. Furthermore, our proofs of the convergence time proceed by showing
that the potentialΦ decreases by a factor in every round. Consequently our
time bounds are logarithmic in the ratio Φ( f0)/Φ∗. Note, however, that for
the given instance it might be that Φ∗ = 0. In this case, none of the above is
meaningful, and we suggest to shift the potential by some positive additive
term. In general, we consider an α-shifted potential of the form Φ+ α where
α ≥ 0 can be chosen arbitrarily in such a way that, for the given instance,
Φ∗ + α is strictly positive. The shift of the potential can be interpreted as
appending a virtual resource with constant latency α to every path, thus
increasing the latency observed by the agents by α.
Definition 4.2 (Γ+α). For any instance Γwith potential functionΦ let Γ+α denote
an instance obtained from Γ by appending a new resource eP to every strategy P ∈
P with constant latency function `eP(x) = α and let Φ+α denote the respective
potential function.
Our policies make use of the parameter α by adding this virtual latency
offset to every path. This will be made precise by Fact 4.3 below.
4.2 The Exploration-Replication Policy
In the following, we formally introduce our rerouting policy for any class of
latency functions for which the elasticity is bounded by d ≥ 1. We consider
the policy in a round-based version of the Wardrop model resembling the
bulletin board model. Whereas in Chapter 3 we have assumed that migra-
tion happens throughout an entire update period based on the information
posted on the bulletin board, we now assume for simplicity, that agents act
in a round based fashion, i. e., within a round they make a single decision
only. Thus, we normalise the update period length to be T = 1.
Apart from the elasticity d, our policy depends on two parameters α
and β. In every round, an agent is activated with constant probability λ/d
where λ = 1/32. It then performs the following two steps. Consider an
agent in commodity i ∈ [k] currently utilising path P ∈ Pi.
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1. Sampling: With probability (1− β) perform step 1(a) and with proba-
bility β perform step 1(b).
(a) Proportional sampling: Sample a path Q ∈ Pi with probability
fQ/ri.
(b) Uniform sampling: Sample a path Q ∈ Pi with probability 1/|Pi|.
2. Migration: If `Q < `P, migrate to path Q with probability
`P−`Q
`P+α
.
The activation probability λ/d slows down the policy proportionally
to the reciprocal of the elasticity of the latency functions. The migration
probability (`P − `Q)/(`P + α) is precisely the relative latency improve-
ment (w. r. t. latency functions with a virtual offset α) when migrating from
path P to path Q. Whereas the parameter α ≥ 0 can be chosen arbitrarily,
the parameter βmust be chosen subject to the constraint
β ≤ minP∈P `P(0) + α
D ·maxe∈Emaxx∈[0,β] `′e(x)
. (4.1)
This is the ratio between minimum path latency and the maximum deriva-
tive of the path latency for close to zero flow values. In the following, we
always assume that this constraint is satisfied. We now define our policy
formally in terms of the amount of flow that is shifted between any pair of
paths within one round.
Definition 4.3 (exploration-replication policy). For an instance Γ let d ≥ 1 be
an upper bound on the elasticity of the latency functions and let β be chosen as in
Equation (4.1). Consider a round starting with flow f . For every commodity i ∈
[k] and every path P,Q ∈ Pi with `Q ≤ `P, the (α, β)-exploration-replication
policy shifts a flow volume of
ρPQ( f ) = λ · 1d · fP ·
(
(1− β) · fQ
ri
+ β · 1|Pi|
)
`P − `Q
`P + α
(4.2)
agents from path P to path Q, where λ = 132 .
Given an initial population f0 ∈ FΓ, the sequence of flow vectors gen-
erated by the (α,β)-exploration-replication policy is given by
f (0) = f0
fP(t+ 1) = fP(t)− ∑
Q∈PiP
ρPQ( f (t)) + ∑
Q∈PiP
ρQP( f (t)) .
In our proofs we will simulate the (α, β)-exploration-replication policy
by applying the (0, β)-exploration-replication policy to a modified instance
with additional offsets α added to the path latencies. The following fact
asserts that this is equivalent.
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Fact 4.3. For some α ≥ 0 consider an instance Γ and the instance Γ+α as defined
in Definition 4.2.
1. The (α, β)-exploration-replication policy behaves on Γ precisely as the (0, β)-
exploration-replication policy does on Γ+α, i. e., the resulting migration rates
ρPQ are identical.
2. If Φ+α( f ) ≤ (1+ e) (Φ+α)∗, then Φ( f ) ≤ (1+ e)Φ∗ + e α.
Proof. For the first statement, just observe that Equation (4.2) is equivalent
to Equation (4.2) with α = 0 and the latency functions `P and `Q substituted
by `P + α and `Q + α, respectively. For the second statement, observe that
Φ( f ) = Φ+α( f )− α
≤ (1+ e) (Φ+α)∗ − α
= (1+ e) (Φ∗ + α)− α
= (1+ e)Φ∗ + e α .
4.3 Convergence
Observe that the (α-β)-exploration-replication policy does not satisfy the
smoothness condition required in Chapter 3. The migration probability
µ(`P, `Q) = (`P − `Q)/`P can exceed `P − `Q by any factor if the denom-
inator `P is sufficiently small. Thus, to prove convergence, we have to
extend the proof of Lemma 3.3 to our dynamics. Again, the proof pro-
ceeds by showing that for consecutive flows f and f ′ the true potential
gain Φ( f ′)− Φ( f ) is at least half of the virtual potential gain V( f , f ′). To
that end, we give bounds on the error terms Ue by which the true poten-
tial gain differs from the virtual potential gain. The proof makes use of the
fact that latency functions have elasticity d to bound the error terms caused
by proportional sampling. The contribution to the error terms caused by
uniform sampling can be bounded since β is chosen according to Equa-
tion (4.1). Recall the definition of VPQ,Ue, and V from Equations (3.5), (3.6),
and (3.7).
Lemma 4.4. Consider an instance Γ, a flow vector f ∈ FΓ, and a flow vector f ′ ∈
FΓ generated by the (α, β)-exploration-replication policy from f in one round.
Then,
∆Φ = Φ( f ′)−Φ( f ) ≤ 1
2 ∑P,Q∈P
ρPQ (`Q − `P) = 12 · V( f , f
′) .
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Proof. By Lemma 3.2,
Φ( f ′)−Φ( f ) = ∑
P,Q∈P
VPQ +∑
e∈E
Ue , (4.3)
where VPQ = ρPQ (`Q− `P) is the virtual potential gain of the agents migrat-
ing from P toQ andUe =
∫ f ′e
fe
(`e(u)− `e( fe)) du is the error term caused by a
latency increase or decrease of resource e. To prove the claim, we distribute
the virtual potential gain terms VPQ among all resources e ∈ P ∪ Q. More
precisely, for e ∈ P and e′ ∈ Q, we define
VePQ = ρPQ ·
((
1
8
(`Q − `P) · `e`P
)
+
(
1
8
(`Q − `P) · 1|P|
))
(4.4)
and
Ve
′
PQ = ρPQ ·
((
1
8
(`Q − `P) · `e′`Q
)
+
(
1
8
(`Q − `P) · 1|Q|
))
.
Note that
∑
e∈P,e∈Q
VePQ =
ρPQ · (`P − `Q)
8
·
(
∑
e∈P
(
`e
`P
+
1
|P|
)
+ ∑
e∈Q
(
`e
`Q
+
1
|Q|
))
=
ρPQ · (`P − `Q)
8
·
(
`P
`P
+
|P|
|P| +
`Q
`Q
+
|Q|
|Q|
)
=
VPQ
2
,
i. e., these terms consume precisely half of the virtual potential gain. Sub-
stituting this into Equation (4.3),
∆Φ =
1
2 ∑P,Q∈P
VPQ +∑
e∈E
(
Ue + ∑
P,Q3e
VePQ
)
. (4.5)
We now compare the terms VePQ to the error terms Ue. We show that each
term of the second sum is non-positive which concludes the proof of the
lemma.
Consider an arbitrary resource e with f ′e > fe. We consider the pairs of
paths (Pj,Qj) with e ∈ Qj in ascending order of (`Pj − `Qj)/(`Pj + α) with
j ∈ {1, . . . , p} where p ≤ |P|2 it the number of pairs of paths. Let
f 0e = fe and f
j
e = f
j−1
e + ρPjQj for j > 0 ,
i. e., f je is the flow on edge e counting the original flow and the contribution
of the first jmigrations only. By induction on n we show that∫ f ne
fe
(`e(u)− `e( fe)) du ≤ −
n
∑
j=1
VePjQj ,
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which, for n = p, implies Ue + ∑PQ VePQ ≤ 0 and hence the second sum
in Equation (4.5) is non-positive concluding the proof of the lemma. The
statement certainly holds for n = 0, and, by induction hypothesis,
∫ f ne
fe
(`e(u)− `e( fe)) du ≤ −
n−1
∑
j=1
VePjQj +
∫ f ne
f n−1e
(`e(u)− `e( fe)) du .
Hence, it remains to show that∫ f ne
f n−1e
(`e(u)− `e( fe)) du ≤ −VePnQn . (4.6)
There are two cases.
Case 1. fe ≥ β, i. e., the migration towards e is dominated by proportional
sampling. Denote the flow on edge e belonging to commodity i by fe,i
and consider the total volume of agents sampling a path containing
edge e. This volume is bounded from above by
∑
i∈[k]
ri ·
(
β+ (1− β) · fe,i
ri
)
= β+ (1− β) · fe ≤ 2 fe .
Multiplying this with the activation and migration probability, which
is, for the first n path pairs, bounded by λ/d · (`Pn − `Qn)/(`Pn + α), we
obtain
f ne − fe ≤
2 fe
32 d
· `Pn( f )− `Qn( f )
`Pn( f ) + α
. (4.7)
We use that `e has elasticity d and apply Fact 4.1 to obtain
`e( f ne )− `e( fe) ≤ 2 d ·
f ne − fe
fe
· `e( fe) .
Substituting Equation (4.7) into this and using α ≥ 0 yields
`e( f ne )− `e( fe) ≤ d ·
`e( fe)
fe
· 1
8 d
· fe · `Pn( f )− `Qn( f )
`Pn( f )
and hence
ρPnQn · (`e( f ne )− `e( fe)) ≤ ρPnQn ·
1
8
· `e( fe)
`Pn( f )
· (`Pn( f )− `Qn( f ))
≤ −VePnQn
which proves Equation (4.6).
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Case 2. fe < β, i. e., the migration towards e is dominated by uniform sam-
pling. This time, the volume of agents sampling a path containing e is
at most
β+ (1− β) · fe ≤ 2 β .
Multiplying this with the migration probability, the increase of flow due
to the first n paths is at most
f ne − fe ≤ β ·
2
32 d
· `Pn( f )− `Qn( f )
`Pn( f ) + α
.
By choice of β according to Equation (4.1), the maximum derivative of
`e in the range [0, β] is at most (`Pn(0) + α)/(D β) and since f ne ≤ β+
2β/(32 d) = β(1+ 1/(16 d)), the derivative in the range [0, f ne ] is at most
twice as large. Altogether,
`e( f ne )− `e( fe) ≤ ( f ne − fe) ·
2 (`Pn(0) + α)
D β
≤ 1
8 d
· `Pn( f )− `Qn( f )|Pn| · (`Pn( f ) + α)
· (`Pn(0) + α)
≤ 1
8
· `Pn( f )− `Qn( f )|Pn| .
Therefore,
ρPnQn · (`e( f ne )− `e( fe)) ≤ ρPnQn ·
1
8
· `Pn( f )− `Qn( f )|Pn|
≤ −VePnQn
which, again, proves Equation (4.6).
As in the proof of Lemma 3.3, resources with f ′e < fe can be treated simi-
larly with the roles of P and Q exchanged. Here, we need to consider only
Case 1 since the rate at which agents leave a path is always proportional to
its current flow. Consequently, Equation (4.7) holds (with reversed inequal-
ity) irrespective of whether fe ≤ β or fe > β.
From this lemma, convergence follows as in Corollary 3.4.
Corollary 4.5. For any initial population f0 ∈ FΓ and β > 0 satisfying Equa-
tion (4.1), the (α, β)-exploration-replication policy converges towards the set of
Wardrop equilibria.
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4.4 Convergence Time for Single-Commodity
Instances
In this section, we consider the case of symmetric instances, i. e., the num-
ber of commodities is k = 1. We will first derive upper bounds for the
time of convergence towards approximate equilibria in a bicriterial sense
and proceed by giving upper bounds for the number of rounds until the
potential is close to the optimum potential.
4.4.1 Bicriteria Approximation
In this section we will use the following bicriterial definition of approxi-
mate equilibria.
Definition 4.4 ((δ,e)-equilibrium). For a symmetric instance Γ and a flow vector
f ∈ FΓ let P+(δ) = {P ∈ P | `P( f ) ≥ (1+ δ) L( f )} denote the set of δ-
expensive paths and let P−(δ) = {P ∈ P | `P( f ) ≤ (1− δ) L( f )} denote the
set of δ-cheap paths. The population f is at a (δ,e)-equilibrium iff
∑
P∈P+(δ)∪P−(δ)
fP ≤ e .
We write P+ and P− if δ is clear from the context. Approximate equi-
libria in this sense are again transient for the (α,β)-exploration-replication
policy. Hence, we bound the total number of rounds that are not at an
approximate equilibrium.
Theorem 4.6. Consider a symmetric instance Γ, an initial flow vector f0 ∈ FΓ
and constants α, β ≥ 0. For the (α, β)-exploration-replication policy, the num-
ber of rounds in which the population is not at a (δ,e)-equilibrium w. r. t. Γ+α
(Definition 4.2) is bounded from above by
O
(
d
e δ2
ln
(
Φ( f0) + α
Φ∗ + α
))
.
In particular, this bound holds for α = β = 0 (and hence Γ+α = Γ).
Proof. It is sufficient to consider the case α = 0 (and Φ∗ > 0). To see this,
assume that the theorem is valid for α = 0 and consider an instance Γˆ and
some αˆ > 0. By Fact 4.3, applying the lemma to Γ = Γˆ+αˆ and α = 0 yields
the assertion of the lemma applied to Γˆ and αˆ.
We estimate the virtual potential gain of a round that starts with a pop-
ulation that is not at a (δ,e)-equilibrium. Recall that the virtual potential
gain is the difference between the potential of two consecutive rounds as-
suming that the latency functions were fixed at the beginning of the first
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Figure 4.2: The figure depicts the distribution of the agents’ latencies. The
shaded areas are of the same size. Since the left area represents the condi-
tional expectation of the difference between L and the latency of an agent
with latency in the range [0, L], this expectation has a value of at least δ x L.
round. By Lemma 4.4, the true potential gain is at least half of the virtual
potential gain. As long as we are not at a (δ,e)-equilibrium, at least one of
the following cases holds.
Case 1. At least a volume of e/2 agents utilises δ-expensive paths.
Case 1a. At least a volume of x ≥ 1/2 agents utilises δ-expensive paths.
Let y > 0 denote the volume of agents utilising paths with latency at
most L. Consider a random agent that is sampled by proportional sam-
pling and let Y denote the random variable that represents its current
latency. Let ∆ = E [L−Y | Y ≤ L] denote the conditional expectation
of the difference between Y and L. For an illustration see Figure 4.2. We
have
∆ = L− 1
y
(
∑
P:`P≤L
fP `P
)
. (4.8)
Furthermore, by definition of x,
∑
P:`P>(1+δ)L
fP `P ≥ δ x L+ x L . (4.9)
Finally, clearly
∑
P:L<`P≤(1+δ)L
fP `P ≥ (1− x− y) · L . (4.10)
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Substituting Equations (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10) into the definition of L,
L = ∑
P:`P≤L
fP `P + ∑
P:L<`P≤(1+δ)L
fP `P + ∑
P:`P>(1+δ)L
fP `P
≥ y · (L− ∆) + (1− x− y) · L+ δ x L+ x L
= L− y∆+ δ x L
implying ∆ ≥ (δ x/y) L. All agents with latency at least (1+ δ) L that
sample a path with latency at most L migrate to the sampled path with
probability at least λ · δ/(d (1+ δ)). The probability to sample such a
path is at least (1− β) y. Their expected latency gain which is equivalent
to their infinitesimal contribution to the virtual potential gain is at least
∆. In total there is a volume of x ≥ 1/2 such agents. Altogether, the
virtual potential gain is
V ≤ −x · λ (1− β) y δ
d (1+ δ)
· ∆ ≤ −λ (1− β) x
2 δ2
d (1+ δ)
L ≤ −λ δ
2
8 d
L .
Case 1b. At least a volume of e/2 but at most a volume of 1/2 agents
utilises δ-expensive paths. Then, the virtual potential gain of the agents
leaving δ-expensive paths is
V ≤ − ∑
P∈P+
fP ∑
Q/∈P+
ρPQ(`P − `Q)
≤ −λ
d ∑P∈P+
fP ∑
Q/∈P+
(
(1− β) fQ + β|P|
)
(`P − `Q)2
`P
.
Omitting the term β/|P|, substituting `P ≥ (1+ δ) L and (1− β)/(1+
δ) ≥ 1/2, and applying Jensen’s inequality to the last sum yields
V ≤ − λ
2 d L ∑P∈P+
fP
(
∑
Q/∈P+
fQ(L+ δL− `Q)
)2
· 1
∑Q/∈P+ fQ
≤ − λ
2 d L ∑P∈P+
fP
(
L ∑
Q/∈P+
fQ + δ L ∑
Q/∈P+
fQ − ∑
Q/∈P+
fQ `Q
)2
.
Note that ∑Q/∈P+ fQ`Q ≤ L∑Q/∈P+ fQ since the sum omits the terms of
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the expensive paths Q ∈ P+. Hence,
V ≤ − λ
2 d L ∑P∈P+
fP
(
δ L ∑
Q/∈P+
fQ
)2
≤ −λ δ
2 L2
2 d L ∑P∈P+
fP
(
∑
Q/∈P+
fQ
)2
≤ −λ (e/2)(1/2)
2 δ2
2 d
L
= −λ e δ
2
16 d
L .
In the last inequality we used our assumptions that ∑Q/∈P+ fQ ≥ 1/2
and ∑P∈P+ ≥ e/2.
Case 2. At least a volume of e/2 agents utilises δ-cheap paths.
Case 2a. At least a volume of x ≥ 1/2 agents utilises δ-cheap paths. Let
y > 0 denote the volume of agents utilising paths with latency at least
L. Consider a random agent that is activated in this round and let Y
denote the random variable that represents its current latency. Let ∆ =
E [Y− L | Y ≥ L] denote the conditional expectation of the difference
by which Y exceeds L. Using similar arguments as in case 1a, we obtain
∆ =
1
y
(
∑
P:`P≥L
fP `P
)
− L ,
∑
P:`P<(1−δ)L
fP `P ≤ x L− δ x L , and
∑
P:(1−δ)≤`P<L
fP `P ≤ (1− x− y) · L .
This yields
L ≤ y · (∆+ L) + (1− x− y) · L+ x L− δ x L
= L+ ∆ y− δ x L ,
again implying ∆ ≥ (δ x/y) · L. An agent with latency at least L that
samples a path with latency at most (1− δ) Lmigrates to this path with
probability at least λ δ/d. The probability to sample such a path is at
least (1− β) x, and there is a volume of y such agents. Their expected
latency gain is ∆. Hence, their virtual potential gain is
V ≤ −y · λ (1− β) x δ
d
· ∆ ≤ −λ δ
2
8 d
L .
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Case 2b. At least e/2 but at most 1/2 agents utilise δ-cheap paths. We
can treat the virtual potential gain of agents moving towards δ-cheap
paths in a way similar to case 1b.
V ≤ − ∑
Q/∈P−
fQ ∑
P∈P−
ρQP(`Q − `P)
≤ −λ
d ∑P∈P−
(
(1− β) fP + β|P|
)
∑
Q/∈P−
fQ `Q
(
`Q − `P
`Q
)2
.
Now, we use that `P ≤ L− δ L and apply Jensen’s inequality:
V ≤ − λ
2 d ∑P∈P−
fP
(
∑
Q/∈P−
fQ `Q
`Q − `P
`Q
)2
1
∑Q/∈P− fQ `Q
≤ − λ
2 d L ∑P∈P−
fP
(
∑
Q/∈P−
fQ(`Q − L+ δ L)
)2
≤ − λ
2 d L ∑P∈P−
fP
(
∑
Q/∈P−
fQ`Q − L ∑
Q/∈P−
fQ + δ L ∑
Q/∈P−
fQ
)2
Note that ∑Q/∈P− fQ`Q ≥ L∑Q/∈P− fQ since the sum omits the terms of
the paths Q ∈ P− with small latency. Hence,
V ≤ − λ
2 d L ∑P∈P−
fP
(
δ L · ∑
Q/∈P−
fQ
)2
≤ −λ δ
2 L2
2 d L ∑P∈P−
fP
(
∑
Q/∈P−
fQ
)2
≤ −λ (e/2)(1/2)
2 δ2
2 d
L
≤ −λ e δ
2
16 d
L .
In all four cases we have V ≤ −λ e δ2L16 d . Due to Lemma 4.4 and Fact 4.2,
the true potential gain is
∆Φ ≤ V
2
≤ −λ e δ
2
32 d
Φ.
Let Φ(t) denote the potential in the t-th round that is not at a (δ,e)-equilib-
rium. Then,
Φ(t) ≤ Φ( f0) ·
(
1− λ e δ
2
32 d
)t
.
Since Φ is lower bounded by Φ∗ we obtain the desired upper bound on the
number of unbalanced phases.
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4.4.2 Approximation of the Potential
Since (δ,e)-equilibria are transient, we propose an alternative definition of
approximate equilibria in this section. We derive bounds on the time to
reach a flow which approximates the optimal potential Φ∗ up to a factor
of at most (1+ e). Clearly, approximate equilibria in this sense are persis-
tent. First note that if Φ∗ = 0, the potential cannot be approximated up to
a relative factor unless exactly optimised. We therefore allow an additional
deviation by an additive term e α, i. e., we want to reach a population f
with potential at most Φ( f ) ≤ (1+ e)Φ∗ + e α. We start with several lem-
mas that can be applied to symmetric games in general and proceed by
analysing the symmetric singleton case in which |P| = D = 1 for all P ∈ P
and the general symmetric case separately.
The first lemma shows that as long as we are at a (δ,e)-equilibrium, the
volume of agents moving within one round is small.
Lemma 4.7. For a flow f ∈ FΓ at (δ,e)-equilibrium, the total volume of flow
moved by the (α,β)-exploration-replication policy within one round is at most
∑
P,Q∈P
ρPQ( f ) ≤ λd · (2 e+ 2 δ+ β) .
Proof. We can write the above sum as
∑
P,Q∈P
ρPQ = ∑
P∈P+
∑
Q∈P
ρPQ + ∑
P/∈P+
∑
Q/∈P−
ρPQ + ∑
P/∈P+
∑
Q∈P−
ρPQ
≤ λ
d
(e+ 2 δ+ (e+ β)) .
The first estimate holds since at most a volume of e agents utilises paths
in P+, the second holds since the probability to migrate from a path with
latency at most (1+ δ) L to a path with latency at least (1− δ) L is at most
(1+ δ− (1− δ))/(1+ δ) ≤ 2 δ, and the third holds since the probability to
sample a path in P− is at most β+ (1− β) e.
Next we show that the value of the average latency L = ∑P∈P `p fP =
∑e∈E `e fe does not decrease much within one round unless the potential
also decreases significantly. To that end we show that the drift of the aver-
age latency and the drift of the potential are coupled. Every resource e ∈ E
contributes to both the potential Φ and the average L. The contribution to
Φ is the area under the graph of the latency function between 0 and fe, and
the contribution to the average is the area of the rectangle between the ori-
gin and the point ( fe, `e( fe)). When agents are removed from a resource,
the contribution of the resource to the latency average is reduced by an
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ℓ(x)
x
ℓ(x2)
ℓ(x1)
x1 x2
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v
Φ
L
Figure 4.3: This figure illustrates the contribution to the average L and the
potential Φ when the flow on a link changes from x1 to x2.
L-shaped area consisting of a horizontal and a (partially overlapping) ver-
tical rectangle, denoted h and v, respectively (see Figure 4.3). The following
lemma states that the horizontal bar is at most d times greater than the ver-
tical bar.
Lemma 4.8. Consider a function `(·) with elasticity d and x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1] with
x1 < x2. Let v = (x2 − x1) `(x2) and h = (`(x2)− `(x1)) x2. Then, h ≤ d v.
Proof. Since ` has elasticity d, we know that the slope of ` at x2 is at most
m ≤ (`(x2)/x2) d. Consequently, `(x1) ≥ `(x2)−m (x2 − x1). Substituting
both expressions into the definition of v shows that
h = (`(x2)− `(x1)) x2
≤ (`(x2)− `(x2) +m (x2 − x1)) · x2
≤ `(x2)
x2
· d · (x2 − x1) · x2
= d · v .
Lemma 4.9. Consider a symmetric instance Γ, a flow f ∈ Γ at (δ,e)-equilibrium,
and a flow f ′ generated from f by the (α,β)-exploration-replication policy within
one round. If L( f ′) ≤ L( f )−∆ with ∆ > 10λ · (2 e+ 2 δ+ β) L, then Φ( f ′) ≤
Φ( f )− ∆/(10 (d+ 1)).
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Proof. First consider the contribution of agents leaving paths with latency
at most 3 L. Due to Lemma 4.7, their total volume is at most (λ/d) (2 e+
2 δ + β). Hence, the contribution to the potential decrease (the “vertical
bars”) caused by removing these agents and pessimistically ignoring the
fact that they are re-added to other paths sum up to at most 3 (λ/d) · (2 e+
2 δ + β) L. Due to Lemma 4.8, the total decrease of the average latency
caused by these agents is at most ∆1 ≤ (d+ 1) · 3λ/d · (2 e+ β+ 2 δ)L ≤
6λ (2 e+ β+ 2 δ) L.
Now, consider the agents leaving paths with latency above 3 L. These
add an additional contribution of ∆2 to the decrease of the average. Since
f is at a (δ,e)-equilibrium, the probability to sample a path P with `P ≤
(1 + δ) L is at least (1 − β) · (1 − e). The migration probability for such
a path is greater than the migration probability for a path with higher la-
tency, independent of the agent’s origin path. Therefore, the conditional
probability that a migrating agent coming from a path P with `P > 3 L mi-
grates to a path Q with `Q ≤ (1+ δ) L is at least (1− e − β). Hence, an
agent coming from such a path P has an expected latency gain of at least
(1− e− β) (`P − (1+ δ) L) ≥ `P/2. This latency gain equals the agent’s in-
finitesimal contribution to the virtual potential gain. Again, by Lemma 4.8,
its infinitesimal contribution to the decrease of the average latency is at
most `P · (d+ 1). Therefore, the contribution ∆2 to the decrease of the av-
erage is separated from the virtual potential gain by no more than a factor
of 2 · (d+ 1) and consequently the virtual potential gain of these agents is
at least ∆2/(2 (d + 1)). By Lemma 4.4, the true potential gain is at least
∆2/(4 (d+ 1)).
Now, consider the total decrease of the average latency ∆ = ∆1 + ∆2.
There are two cases.
Case 1. ∆2 ≤ 4λ(2 e + 2 δ + β) L. Then, ∆ = ∆1 + ∆2 ≤ 10λ(2 e + 2 δ +
β) L, our claim.
Case 2. ∆2 > 4λ(2 e+ 2 δ+ β) L. Then, since ∆2 ≥ ∆ · 4/10,
Φ( f ′)−Φ( f ) ≤ − ∆2
4 (d+ 1)
≤ − ∆
10 (d+ 1)
.
Again, this is the assertion of the lemma.
Our analysis of the time of convergence proceeds by constructing a flow
vector in which the latencies of the cheapest path and the most expensive
used path are close to the average latency and consequently close to each
other. The following lemma shows that such a configuration in which all
paths deviate by nomore than a fixed fraction of L from the average latency
of their commodity, are also approximations of the optimal potential.
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Definition 4.5 (δ-bounded). A flow vector f ∈ FΓ is δ-bounded if for every
commodity i ∈ [k] and for every P ∈ Pi it holds that `P( f ) ≥ Li − δ L and, in
addition, if fP > 0, `P( f ) ≤ Li + δ L.
Lemma 4.10. For every instance and δ-bounded flow vector f ∈ FΓ,
Φ( f )
Φ∗
≤ 1+O (δ d) .
Proof. Consider the δ-bounded flow f for the instance Γ. For every i ∈ [k]
let `imax( f ) = maxP∈Pi , fP>0 `P( f ). We extend every strategy P ∈ Pi with
`P( f ) ≤ `imax by a new resourcewith constant latency δP = `imax( f )− `P( f ).
Since f is δ-bounded, we can be sure that δP ≤ 2 δ L. Let Γ′ denote the thus
obtained instance. Since in Γ′ the latencies of all used paths are minimal, f
is at a Wardrop equilibrium for Γ′ with ΦΓ′( f ) ≥ ΦΓ( f ).
Now, consider the minimal potential in Γ, denoted by Φ∗Γ. We have to
show that ΦΓ′( f ) ≤ Φ∗Γ + 2 δ L since this and Fact 4.2 imply that ΦΓ( f ) ≤
Φ∗Γ + 2 δ (d + 1)ΦΓ( f ) which is the assertion of our theorem. To see the
claim, note that for every f˜ it holds that ΦΓ′( f˜ ) ≤ ΦΓ( f˜ ) + 2 δ L. Also, the
constraints for f˜ under which ΦΓ′ and ΦΓ are to be minimised are identical,
i. e., every f˜ feasible for Γ is also feasible for Γ′ and vice versa. By opti-
mality of f in Γ′, we have ΦΓ′( f ) ≤ ΦΓ′( f˜ ) ≤ ΦΓ( f˜ ) + 2 δ L for any f˜ and
specifically for an f˜ that satisfies ΦΓ( f˜ ) = Φ∗Γ.
Let us remark that our policy will not reach a δ-bounded state, since the
population on high-latency paths will not vanish completely. However, our
policy will reach a state at which the population on such paths is so small
that removing them will result in a δ-bounded flow without changing the
potential significantly.
Finally, the following lemma guarantees that the optimal potential does
not increase significantly if the total flow demand of an instance is in-
creased slightly.
Lemma 4.11. For any x ∈ [0, 1/(4 d)], let Γ = (G, {(s, t, 1)}, (`)e∈E) and Γ˜ =
(G, {(s, t, 1+ x)}, (`)e∈E) be symmetric instances, and letΦ∗ and Φ˜∗ denote their
respective minimal potential values. Then, Φ˜∗ ≤ (1+ 3 d x)Φ∗.
Proof. Let f ∈ FΓ denote a flow with Φ( f ) = Φ∗ and let f˜ = (1+ x) · f .
Note that f˜ is feasible for Γ˜. Then we have f˜e = (1 + x) fe and `e( f˜ ) ≤
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(1+ 2 x d) · `e( fe). Thus,
Φ( f˜ )−Φ( f ) ≤ ∑
e∈E
∫ (1+x) fe
fe
`e(u)du
≤ ∑
e∈E
(1+ 2 x d) `e( fe) fe x
≤ (1+ 2 x d) x L( f )
≤ 3 d xΦ( f )
by Fact 4.2. Hence, Φ˜∗ ≤ Φ( f˜ ) ≤ (1+ 3 d x)Φ∗.
4.4.2.1 Symmetric Singleton Games
For the case in which every path utilises only one resource, i. e., for all
P ∈ P , |P| = D = 1, we can now show convergence towards potential
approximations.
Lemma 4.12. Consider a symmetric singleton instance Γ and the (0, β)-explora-
tion-replication policy for 0 < β ≤ e2/(d3 · ln(|P| d/e)). For every e > 0 define
the following constants:
δ =
c e
d
, δ′ = e′ = c′
δ2
d ln(δ |P|/β) , and T =
5 d
λ δ
ln
(
3 e′ d |P|
δ β
)
,
where c and c′ are positive constants independent of e, β, and d to be defined in the
proof. Then, in every phase consisting of T rounds starting with a flow vector f 0
at least one of the following events occurs:
(1) At least once in the phase the flow is not at a (δ′,e′)-equilibrium.
(2) At the end of the phase, Φ( f ) ≤ Φ( f 0)−Ω
(
δ′
d
)
L( f 0).
(3) Φ( f 0) ≤ (1+ e)Φ∗.
Proof. Consider a phase consisting of T rounds. Let us write L0 = L( f 0).
We show that if events (1) and (2) do not occur, then event (3) must occur.
Given that event (1) does not occur, Lemma 4.9 implies that the average
L( f (t)) may decrease by at most a factor of (1− O (δ′ + e′ + β)) = (1−
O (δ′)) per round or the potential decreases by at least Ω (L · δ′/d) which
means that event (2) occurs. Consequently, if neither event (1) nor event (2)
occur, the average L is at least(
1−O (δ′))T · L0 = (1−O (T · δ′)) · L0
=
(
1−O
(
c′ · δ2 · d · ln(e′ d |P|/(δ β))
d · δ · ln(δ |P|/β)
))
· L0
=
(
1−O (c′ · δ)) · L0 .
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throughout the phase. In particular, L( f (t)) ≥ (1− δ/4) L0 throughout the
phase if c′ is chosen small enough. Furthermore, at any time at least 1− e′
agents utilise paths with latency at least (1− δ′)(1− δ/4) L0 ≥ (1− δ/2) L0.
Consider a path P with latency below (1− δ) L0 and flow fP. By our
considerations above, at least λ fP δ/(3 d) agents migrate to this path in one
round due to proportional sampling whereas at most λ fP (e′+ β)/d agents
may leave this path since the probability to sample a path with smaller
latency is at most e′ + β. Hence, the flow on such a path grows by at least
fP λ
δ
3 d
− fP λe
′ + β
d
≥ fP λ δ4 d
for small values of δ since e′, β = o(δ). Hence, the population on every such
path grows by a factor of at least 1+ λ δ/(4 d) per round. Moreover, in the
first round, the population grows to at least λ δ β/(3 d |P|) due to uniform
sampling. Hence, provided that the latency of P stays below (1− δ) L0, at
the end of the phase the population on such a path is at least
λ δ β
3 d |P|
(
1+
λ δ
4 d
)T
=
λ δ β
3 d |P|
(
1+
λ δ
4 d
) 5 d
λ δ ln
(
3 e′ d |P|
λ δ β
)
>
λ δ β
3 d |P| exp
(
ln
(
3 e′ d |P|
λ δ β
))
= e′ .
Here, we have used that (1 − 1/X)X·5/4 > exp(1) for X ≥ 2 with X =
4 d/(λ δ). This implies that at this point of time, either the population is
no longer at an (δ′,e′)-equilibrium implying that event (1) occurs, or the
latency of P has become at least (1− δ)L0. Hence, the latency of every path
P with `P( f 0) < (1− δ)L0 must grow to (1− δ)L0 at least once within the
phase. Furthermore, by Lemma 4.7, the total amount of flow that is moved
within the entire phase is at most v = T · λ (2 e′ + 2 δ′ + β)/d. Note that
the arguments used so far do neither rely on the assumption that Γ is a
singleton instance nor on the definition of δ.
Now, consider a flow vector f ′ obtained from f 0 by reducing the flow
on any edge e ∈ E with `e( f 0) > (1+ δ′)L0 until either `e( f ′e) = (1+ δ′) L0
or f ′e = 0. Then,
Φ( f 0)−Φ( f ′) ≤ ∑
e:`e≥(1+δ′)L0
∫ f 0e
0
`e(u) du
≤ ∑
e:`e≥(1+δ′)L0
`e( f 0e ) · f 0e
= L0 − ∑
e:`e<(1+δ′)L0
`e( f 0e ) · f 0e
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Since f 0 is at a (δ′, e′)-equilibrium,
Φ( f 0)−Φ( f ′) ≤ L0 − (1− δ′)(1− e′)L0
≤ (e′ + δ′) L0
≤ 2 d (e′ + δ′)Φ( f 0) . (4.11)
Since at most a total flow of v was moved within the phase and every edge
had latency at least (1− δ) L0 at least once within the phase, there exists a
flow vector (γe)e∈E of total volume at most vwhich can be added to f ′ such
that the latency on every edge is at least (1− δ) L0. This flow vector only
uses edges with `e( f0) ≤ (1− δ) L0. For this flow f ′′ = f ′ + γ, clearly
Φ( f ′) ≤ Φ( f ′′) . (4.12)
The total flow volume of f ′′ is 1+ v. Lemma 4.11 asserts, that the optimal
potential Φ˜∗ for this flow demand is at most (1+ 3 d v)Φ∗. Since by con-
struction for all edges e ∈ E, `e( f ′′e ) ≥ (1 − δ)L0 and for all edges with
f ′′e > 0, `e( f ′′e ) ≤ (1+ δ′)L0, Lemma 4.10 asserts that
Φ( f ′′) ≤ (1+O (d δ)) Φ˜∗ ≤ (1+O (d δ)) (1+ 3 d v)Φ∗ . (4.13)
Using Equations (4.11), (4.12), and (4.13),
Φ( f 0) · (1− 2 d (e′ + δ′)) ≤ Φ( f ′)
≤ Φ( f ′′)
≤ (1+O (d δ+ d v))Φ∗ .
Since v = O (e/d2), this implies that, if c in the definition of δ = c e/d
is chosen sufficiently small, f0 is a (1 + e)-approximation of the optimal
potential and event (3) occurs.
Theorem 4.13. Consider a symmetric singleton instance Γ and an initial flow
vector f0. If 0 < β ≤ e2/(d3 · ln(|P| d/e)), the (α,β)-exploration-replication
policy reaches a configuration f with potential Φ( f ) ≤ (1 + e)Φ∗ + e α in at
most
O
(
d12
e7
· ln4
( |E|
β
)
· ln
(
Φ( f0) + α
Φ∗ + α
))
rounds.
Proof. Again, by Fact 4.3, it is sufficient to prove the theorem for the case
α = 0 (see the first paragraph of the proof of Theorem 4.6). Consider a
phase of length T as defined in Lemma 4.12. By Lemma 4.12, the phase
terminates with one of the following events after at most T rounds:
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(1) The population is no longer at a (δ′,e′)-equilibrium. By Theorem 4.6,
this can happen at most
T1 = O
(
d
e′δ′2
· ln
(
Φ( f 0)
Φ∗
))
times.
(2) The potential decreases by at least Ω (δ′/(d+ 1)) · L0. This decreases
the potential by a factor of at least (1− Ω (δ′/(d+ 1))). Therefore,
this can happen at most
T2 = O
(
d
δ′
· ln
(
Φ( f 0)
Φ∗
))
times.
(3) The policy has reached a (1+ e)-approximation of the potential.
Hence, after at most T · (T1 + T2) rounds, event (3) must occur.
4.4.2.2 General Symmetric Games
We now consider the general symmetric case, i. e., D ≥ 2. A lemma similar
to Lemma 4.12 holds with modified definitions of δ, e′, δ′, and T.
Lemma 4.14. Consider a single-commodity instance Γ and the (0, β)-exploration-
replication policy for 0 < β ≤ e4/(D6 d5 ln(|P|D d/e)). For every e > 0 define
the following constants:
δ =
c e2
D3 d2
, δ′ = e′ = c′
δ2
d ln(δ |P|/β) , and T =
5 d
λ δ
ln
(
3 e′ d |P|
λ δ β
)
,
where c and c′ are positive constants independent of e, β, and d to be defined in the
proof. Then, in every phase consisting of T rounds starting with a flow vector f 0
at least one of the following events occurs:
(1) At least once in the phase the flow is not at a (δ′,e′)-equilibrium.
(2) At the end of the phase, Φ( f ) ≤ Φ( f 0)−Ω
(
δ′
d
)
L( f 0).
(3) Φ( f 0) ≤ (1+ e)Φ∗.
Proof. Consider a phase of length T. Throughout the proof, we write L0 =
L( f 0). As in the proof of Lemma 4.12, assuming that events (1) and (2) do
not occur, Lemma 4.9 guarantees that the average does not become smaller
than (1− δ/4) L0 if c′ is chosen small enough. Again, the total amount of
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flow moved within the phase is at most v = T · λ (2 e′ + 2 δ′ + β)/d, and
each path has latency (1− δ)L0 at least once within the phase. Due to the
modified definition of δ, this time v = O (e2/(D3d3)).
Hence, there exists a flow vector with total volume v that can be added
to the initial flow f 0 such that every path P with initial latency `P( f 0) ≤
(1− δ) L0 has latency at least (1− δ) L0. Unfortunately, we do not know
which paths are used by this flow, but since every path may contribute
to at most D edges, there exists a flow vector (γP)P∈P with total volume
V = D v that only uses paths P with `P( f 0) ≤ (1− δ) L0 and increases the
latency of no edge to above (1− δ) L0 to achieve the same goal. We fix such
a flow vector γ and prove the following claim to establish the lemma.
Claim 4.15. For the modified flow vector f˜ = f 0 + γ it holds that
Φ( f˜ ) ≤ (1+ e/2) Φ˜∗
where Φ˜∗ is defined as in Lemma 4.11.
The claim implies that
Φ( f 0) ≤ Φ( f˜ ) (monotonicity)
≤ (1+ e/2) Φ˜∗ (Claim 4.15)
≤ (1+ e/2) (1+ 3 dV)Φ∗ (Lemma 4.11)
≤ (1+ e)Φ∗ , (definition of V)
which means that event (3) occurs.
Proof of Claim 4.15. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that a
significant increase of latency due to the additional flow affects only few
agents. Then, we construct an instance in which the maximum latency of
used paths is close to the minimum latency without changing the potential
significantly and apply Lemma 4.10.
Consider the additional flow γ. Adding this flow may increase the la-
tency of some paths significantly. Since, however, the flow on a resource
will not be increased as soon as its latency has reached the value (1− δ)L0,
we can be sure that we will increase the latency of no path to more than
D L0. In the following we will give a bound on the volume of agents util-
ising paths whose latencies are increased significantly. For any e ∈ E, let
γe = ∑P3e γP and define C =
√
D3 δ/d = O (e/d2). For every resource e
there are two cases.
Case 1. γe ≤ C fe. Then, f˜e = fe + γe ≤ fe (1+C) implying that the latency
on this resource does not increase by a factor of more than 1+ 2 d C.
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Case 2. γe > C fe. Since f˜e = fe + γe ≤ (1+ 1/C)γe and each path used
by γ contributes to at most D edges, the total volume of agents utilising
edges of this kind is at most
D ·
(
1+
1
C
)
∑
P∈P
γP ≤ 2V DC = O
( e
D d
)
.
In order for the latency of a path to grow from at most `P( f 0) to above
(1+ 2 d C) `P( f 0), it must contain at least one resource whose latency in-
creases by a factor of at least (1+ 2 d C), i. e., a resource in case 2. Therefore,
the total volume of agents utilising paths whose latencies are increased to
above (1+ 2 d C) `P( f 0) (but by at most L0 D) is bounded from above by
2V D/C.
We modify the instance Γ to obtain an instance Γ′ that reduces the la-
tencies again down to their original values. First consider the paths
P1 = {P ∈ P | `P( f˜ ) > (1+ 2 d C) `P( f 0)} .
To every path P ∈ P1 we append a new resource with constant negative la-
tency `P( f 0)− `P( f˜ ) ≥ −D L0. Denote the resulting path latency functions
by `′P and note that `
′
P( f˜ ) = `P( f
0) for all P ∈ P1 and `′P( f˜ ) = `P( f˜ ) for all
P /∈ P1. Due to our above considerations,
Φ′( f˜ ) ≥ Φ( f˜ )− L0 D · 2V DC . (4.14)
Now consider the paths
P2 = {P ∈ P | `′P( f˜ ) ≥ (1+ 3 d C) L0} .
First, for any path P ∈ P2 ∩ P1, `P( f 0) = `′P( f˜ ) ≥ (1+ 3 d C) L0. Second,
for any path P ∈ P2 \ P1 we know that
(1+ 3 d C) L0 ≤ `′P( f˜ ) = `P( f˜ ) ≤ (1+ 2 d C) `P( f 0)
implying `P( f 0) ≥ (1+ d C) L0. In both cases `P( f 0) > (1+ δ′) L0. This
implies that first, γP = 0, so f˜P = f 0P and second, ∑P∈P2 f˜P ≤ e′ since f 0 is
at a (δ′,e′)-equilibrium. We transform Γ′ once more into an instance Γ′′ by
appending a resource to any path P ∈ P2 with constant negative latency
L0 − `′P( f˜ ). Then,
Φ′( f˜ )−Φ′′( f˜ ) ≤ ∑
P∈P2
`′P( f˜ ) · f˜P
≤ ∑
P∈P2
(`P( f0) + D L0) · f 0P
≤ e′ D L0 + ∑
P∈P2
`P( f0) · f 0P
= e′ D L0 + L0 − ∑
P/∈P2
`P( f0) · f 0P .
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Since f 0 is at a (δ′,e′)-equilibrium,
Φ′( f˜ )−Φ′′( f˜ ) ≤ e′ D L0 + L0 − (1− e′)(1− δ′) L0
≤ e′ D L0 + (e′ + δ′)L0
≤ 2 e′ D L0 (4.15)
since D ≥ 2. We now have an instance Γ′′ and a modified flow f˜ with the
property that the minimum latency is (1− δ)L0 and the maximum latency
of used paths is (1+ 3 d C)L0. Since δ ≤ 3 d C, Lemma 4.10 states, that f˜
is a
(
1+O (d2 C))-approximation of the optimal potential of Γ′′. Conse-
quently,
Φ′′∗ +O (d2 C) Φ′′∗ ≥ Φ′′( f˜ )
≥ Φ′( f˜ )− 2 e′ D L0 (Eq. (4.15))
≥ Φ( f˜ )− 2 e′ D L0 − 2V D2C L0 (Eq. (4.14))
≥ Φ( f˜ )− 3V D2C L( f˜ ) (L( f˜ ) ≥ L0)
≥ Φ( f˜ )
(
1− 6 dV D2C
)
. (Fact 4.2)
Hence, we have
Φ( f˜ ) ≤ Φ′′∗
(
1+O
(
d2 C+ dV D
2
C
))
≤ Φ′′∗ (1+ e/2) (Def. of V and C)
if the constant c in the definition of δ is chosen sufficiently small.
The proof of the claim completes the proof of the lemma.
Theorem 4.16. Consider a symmetric instance Γ and an initial flow vector f0.
If 0 < β ≤ e4/(D6 d5 ln(|P|D d/e)), the (α,β)-exploration-replication policy
generates a configuration with potential Φ ≤ (1+ e)Φ∗ + e α in at most
poly
(
d,
1
e
,D
)
ln4
( |E|
β
)
ln
(
Φ( f0) + α
Φ∗ + α
)
rounds.
The proof is identical with the proof of Theorem 4.13 with the modified
definitions of δ, e′, δ′, and T. In addition, we use that |P| = O (|E|D).
Substituting our bound on β as specified by Equation (4.1), this yields the
bound as presented in Section 4.1.1.
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4.5 Convergence Time for Multi-Commodity
Instances
For the asymmetric, or multi-commodity, case, we generalise the bicriteria
definition of approximate equilibria in the following manner.
Definition 4.6 ((δ,e)-equilibrium). For a flow vector f ∈ FΓ and commodity
i ∈ [k], let P+i (δ) = {P ∈ Pi | `P( f ) ≥ Li( f ) + δL( f )} denote the set of
δ-expensive paths and let P−i (δ) = {P ∈ Pi | `P( f ) ≤ Li( f )− δL( f )} denote
the set of δ-cheap paths. The population f is at a (δ,e)-equilibrium iff
∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈P+i (δ)∪P−i (δ)
fP ≤ e .
The analysis of the time of convergence is slightly more involved than
in the symmetric case.
Theorem 4.17. Consider an asymmetric instance Γ and an initial flow vector f0 ∈
FΓ. For the (α,β)-exploration-replication policy, the number of rounds in which
the population vector is not at a (δ,e)-equilibrium w. r. t. Γ+α (Definition 4.2) is
bounded from above by
O
(
d
e2 δ2
log
(
Φ( f0) + α
Φ∗ + α
))
.
In particular, this bound holds for α = β = 0 (and hence Γ+α = Γ).
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4.6, it is sufficient to consider the case α =
0. Again, we estimate the virtual potential gain V . Consider a commodity
i ∈ [k]. There are two cases.
Case 1. Li > L · 2/e. By Markov’s inequality, at most a volume of e/2
agents may belong to commodities of this type. We ignore the potential
gain of these agents.
Case 2. Li ≤ L · 2/e. The remaining 1− e/2 agents belong to commodities
of this type. As long as we are not at a (δ,e)-equilibrium, there must
be at least a volume of e agents utilising δ-expensive or δ-cheap paths.
Since at most e/2 of them are in case 1, at least e/2 of them are in this
case.
Throughout the proof we only consider agents of the second case. For
these agents, the proof is an extension of the proof of Theorem 4.6. Intu-
itively, for the proof of Theorem 4.17 we have to adapt only a single ar-
gument: In the single-commodity case, an expensive path is by δL more
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expensive than the average, and agents on expensive paths that sample an
average latency path migrate to this path with a probability of almost δ. In
the multi-commodity case, however, the average latency of a commodity
may be larger than the overall average latency, but for the commodities we
consider, Li ≤ L · 2/e. Hence, a deviation from Li by δ L still implies a mi-
gration probability of almost δ e/2. This is by a factor of e/2 smaller than
the migration probabilities in the proof of Theorem 4.6.
Fix a commodity i ∈ [k] and let xi denote the volume of agents utilising
δ-cheap or δ-expensive paths, whichever is larger.
Case 1. The volume of agents in commodity i utilising δ-expensive paths
is larger than the volume of agents utilising δ-cheap paths, i. e., xi is the
volume of agents utilising δ-expensive paths.
Case 1a. In commodity i, at least a volume of xi ≥ ri/2 agents utilises δ-
expensive paths. Let y > 0 denote the volume of agents utilising paths
with latency at most Li. Consider a random agent that is sampled by
proportional sampling and let the random variable Y denote its current
latency. Let ∆ = E [Li −Y | Y ≤ Li] denote the conditional expectation
of the difference between Y and Li. We have
∆ = Li − riy
(
∑
P∈Pi :`P≤Li
fP
ri
`P
)
.
Furthermore, by definition of xi,
∑
P∈Pi :`P>Li+δL
fP
ri
`P ≥ δ xiri L+
xi
ri
Li .
Finally, clearly
∑
P∈Pi :L<`P≤Li+δL
fP
ri
`P ≥ ri − xi − yri · Li .
Substituting the last three equations into the definition of Li yields
Li = ∑
P∈Pi :`P≤Li
fP
ri
`P + ∑
P∈Pi :Li<`P≤Li+δL
fP
ri
`P + ∑
P∈Pi :`P>Li+δL
fP
ri
`P
≥ y · (Li − ∆) + (ri − xi − y) · Li + δ xi L+ xi Li
ri
=
ri Li − y∆+ δ xi L
ri
implying ∆ ≥ (δ xi/y) L. All agents with latency at least Li + δ L that
sample a path with latency at most Li migrate to the new path with
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probability at least δ e/(2 d (1+ δ)) as discussed above. The probability
to sample such a path is at least (1 − β) y/ri. Their expected latency
gain which is equivalent to their infinitesimal contribution to the virtual
potential gain is at least ∆. In total there are xi ≥ ri/2 such agents.
Altogether, the virtual potential gain of commodity i is
Vi ≤ −xi · λ (1− β) y δ e2 d ri (1+ δ) · ∆ ≤ −
λ (1− β) x2i δ2 e
2 d ri (1+ δ)
L ≤ −ri λ δ
2 e
16 d
L .
Case 1b. The volume of agents in commodity i utilising δ-expensive
paths in commodity i is xi ≤ ri/2. Then, for this commodity, the virtual
potential gain of the agents leaving δ-expensive paths is at least
Vi ≤ −λd ∑
P∈P+i
fP ∑
Q/∈P+i
(
(1− β) fQ
ri
+
β
|Pi|
)
(`P − `Q)2
`P
.
Omitting the term β/|Pi|, substituting `P ≥ Li + δL and (1− β) ≥ 1/2
and applying Jensen’s inequality to the last sum yields
Vi ≤ − λ2 d (Li + δ L) ∑P∈P+i
fP
 ∑
Q/∈P+i
fQ
ri
(Li + δL− `Q)
2 1
∑Q/∈P+i fQ/ri
≤ − λ
2 d (Li + δ L)
∑
P∈P+i
fP
(Li + δL) ∑
Q/∈P+i
fQ
ri
− ∑
Q/∈P+i
fQ
ri
`Q
2 .
Note that ∑Q/∈P+i ( fQ/ri)`Q ≤ Li ∑Q/∈P+i ( fQ/ri) since the sum omits the
terms of the expensive paths Q ∈ P+i . Using our assumption Li ≤
2 · L/e,
Vi ≤ − λ2 d (2/e+ δ) L ∑
P∈P+i
fP
δ L ∑
Q/∈P+i
fQ
ri
2
≤ − λ δ
2 L2
2 d (2/e+ δ) L ∑
P∈P+i
fP
 ∑
Q/∈P+i
fQ
ri
2
≤ −xi λ e δ
2
24 d
L .
In the last inequality we used our assumption that ∑Q/∈P+i fQ ≥ ri/2.
Case 2. The volume of agents in commodity i utilising δ-cheap paths is
larger than the volume of agents utilising δ-expensive paths, i. e., xi is
the volume of agents utilising δ-cheap paths.
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Case 2a. In commodity i, at least a volume of xi ≥ ri/2 utilises δ-cheap
paths. Let y > 0 denote the volume of agents utilising paths with la-
tency at least Li. Consider a random agent and let the random variable
Y denote its current latency. Let ∆ = E [Li −Y | Y ≥ Li] denote the con-
ditional expectation of the difference between Li and Y. Then,
∆ =
ri
y
(
∑
P∈Pi :`P≥Li
fP
ri
`P
)
− Li ,
∑
P∈Pi :`P<Li−δL
fP
ri
`P ≤ δ xiri L−
xi
ri
Li , and
∑
P∈Pi :L−δL≤`P<Li
fP
ri
`P ≤ ri − xi − yri · Li .
Substituting this into the definition of Li,
Li ≤ y · (Li + ∆) + (ri − xi − y) · Li − δ xi L+ xi Liri
=
ri Li + y∆− δ xi L
ri
implying ∆ ≥ (δ xi/y) L. All agents with latency at least Li that sam-
ple a path with latency at most Li − δ L migrate to the new path with
probability at least δ e/(2 d). The probability to sample such a path is
at least (1− β) xi/ri. Their expected latency gain which is equivalent
to their infinitesimal contribution to the virtual potential gain is at least
∆. In total there are y such agents. Again, the virtual potential gain of
commodity i is
Vi ≤ −y · λ (1− β) xi δ e2 d ri · ∆ ≤ −ri
λ δ2 e
16 d
L .
Case 2b. In commodity i, at most a volume of ri/2 agents utilise δ-cheap
paths. We can treat the virtual potential gain of agents moving towards
δ-cheap paths in a way similar to case 1b.
Vi ≤ −λd ∑
P∈P−i
(
(1− β) fP
ri
+
β
|Pi|
)
∑
Q/∈P−i
fQ
(`Q − `P)2
`Q
≤ −λ
d ∑
P∈P−i
((1− β) fP) ∑
Q/∈P−i
fQ
ri
`Q
(
`Q − `P
`Q
)2
.
Now, we use that `P ≤ Li − δL and Li ≤ 2 L/e and apply Jensen’s
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inequality.
V ≤ − λ
3 d ∑
P∈P−i
fP
 ∑
Q/∈P−i
fQ
ri
`Q
`Q − `P
`Q
2 1
∑Q/∈P−i ( fQ/ri)`Q
≤ − λ
3 d Li
∑
P∈P−i
fP
 ∑
Q/∈P−i
fQ
ri
(`Q − Li + δL)
2
≤ − λ e
3 d L ∑
P∈P−i
fP
 ∑
Q/∈P−i
fQ
ri
`Q + (δL− Li) ∑
Q/∈P−i
fQ
ri
2 .
Note that ∑Q/∈P−i ( fQ/ri) `Q ≥ Li ∑Q/∈P−i ( fQ/ri) since the sum omits the
terms of the paths Q ∈ P−i with low latency. Hence,
V ≤ − λ e
3 d L ∑
P∈P−i
fP
δ L ∑
Q/∈P−i
fQ
ri
2
≤ −λ e δ
2 L2
3 d L ∑
P∈P−i
fP
 ∑
Q/∈P−i
fQ
ri
2
≤ −xi · λ e (1− 1/2)
2 δ2
3 d
L .
Finally, summing up over all commodities, the virtual potential gain is
V ≤ − ∑
i∈[k]
Vi
≤ − ∑
i∈[k]
min
{
ri
λ δ2 e L
16 d
, xi
λ e δ2 L
24 d
}
≤ −λ e δ
2 L
24 d ∑i∈[k]
xi
≤ −λ e
2 δ2 L
96 d
.
Here, the minimum is over the two subcases (a) and (b), and the last in-
equality uses that ∑i∈[k] xi ≥ e/4. By Lemma 4.4 the potential decreases
by at least half of this in one round. Given this rate at which the potential
decreases, we obtain the desired bound as in the proof of Theorem 4.6.
102
4.6. Lower Bounds
4.6 Lower Bounds
The results obtained in the preceding sections rely on bounded elasticity
of the latency functions and using proportional sampling. In the following,
we present two lower bounds showing that adaptive sampling is necessary
to obtain polynomial time bounds and that the dependence on elasticity
cannot be avoided.
4.6.1 Elasticity is Necessary
In this section we show that elasticity is the relevant parameter in our anal-
ysis. To that end, we consider arbitrary rerouting policies that avoid oscilla-
tion for a given class of latency functions L. We formalise this by requiring
that for any feasible population, the policy may not increase the potential.
Definition 4.7 (L-monotone). Fix a network G = (V, E) and a set of commodi-
ties C. For any class of latency functions L, a rerouting policy is L-monotone if
for all instances Γ = (G, C, (`e)e∈E) with (`e) ∈ LE and all flow vectors f ∈ FΓ
it holds that for the flow f ′ ∈ FΓ generated by the policy from f , Φ( f ′) ≤ Φ( f ).
Lemma 4.4 ensures that the (α,β)-exploration-replication policy is L-
monotone if L has elasticity d. We provide a lower bound showing that for
a class L of latency functions the elasticity d of L is a lower bound for the
time of convergence towards approximate equilibria if the rerouting policy
is L-monotone.
Theorem 4.18. For every d, there exists a class L of latency functions with elas-
ticity d together with an initial flow vector f0, such that anyL-monotone rerouting
policy requires Ω(d/e) rounds in order to obtain a (1+ e) approximation of the
optimum potential.
Proof. We choose positive constants a, b > 0 and an arbitrary latency func-
tion ` : [0, 1] 7→ R≥0 that has elasticity d in the interval [a, b]. (As an ex-
ample, simply choose `(x) = xd, a = 1/2, and b = 1.) We now define
a set L of latency functions which have elasticity at most d. For a param-
eter u ∈ [0, b − a], we define the function `u(x) = min{`(x + u), `(b)}
obtained from ` by shifting it to the left after cutting it off at b. Note that
`0 = ` has elasticity d and for u > 0, the elasticity of `u is less than d. Fur-
thermore, we define the constant latency functions `1(x) = `1 = `(b) and
`2(x) = `2 = `(b)/(1+ e/a). The class of latency functions we consider is
L := {`u | u ∈ [0, b− a]} ∪ {`1, `2} .
We define an instance consisting of two parallel links with the constant
latency functions `1 and `2, respectively. We denote the flows on the re-
spective resources by f1 and f2 = 1− f1. Note that the optimal potential
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is Φ∗ = `2 and for an approximate equilibrium with Φ( f ) ≤ (1+ e)Φ∗ we
must have f1 ≤ a.
Now consider any L-monotone rerouting policy and let f (t)t∈N denote
the sequence of flow vectors generated by this policy. As a starting config-
uration we choose f1(0) = b and f2(0) = 1− b. Given this sequence, let
L(0) = L and for t > 0 let
L(t) = {` ∈ L(t− 1) | `( f1(t− 1)) = `1} .
These are the latency functions that are compatible with the flows and la-
tencies observed on resource 1 by the policy in the first t rounds. Note that
the monotonicity of the policy ensures that f1(t) does not increases with
t. Furthermore, for any u ∈ [0, b− a] and x ≥ b− u we have `u(x) = `1.
In particular, `u( f1(t)) = `1 for all u ∈ [b − f1(t), b − a] implying that `u
is (and was in previous rounds) compatible with the observed latencies on
resource 1 and hence `u ∈ L(t).
At time t, the rerouting policy must guarantee that it does not increase
the potential for all possible latency functions in L(t). In particular, this
must hold for the case that the latency function of the first resource is
`b− f1(t). More precisely, the policy must ensure that
`b− f1(t)( f1(t+ 1)) ≥ `2 · (1− 3 · e/a) .
How much flow can be shifted from resource 1 to resource 2 without vio-
lating this inequality? Note that the left derivative of `u at b− u equals the
derivative of ` at b and since ` has elasticity d on [a, b], it is at least d · `1/b.
In particular, `′b− f1(t)( f1(t)− δ) ≥ d · `1/(2 b) for small δ as an implication
of Fact 4.1. Hence, in order to be sure that the potential does not increase,
the policy must ensure that for the amount ρ of flow shifted from the first
to the second path it holds that
ρ · d · `1
2 · b ≤
3 · `2 · e
a
,
or, equivalently, ρ ≤ 6 e/d · (b/a). Since b and a are constants, this implies,
that
f1(t+ 1) ≥ f1(t)−O (e/d) ≥ f1(0)−O (t e/d) .
This implies that f1(t) ≥ a as long as t ≤ c · d/e for a suitable constant
c > 0, our desired bound.
Let us remark, that the instance presented in the proof can be used to
show that the same bound holds for the time to reach a bicriterial (δ, c)-
equilibrium with δ = Ω (e) and constant c > 0.
104
4.6. Lower Bounds
Furthermore, note that this theorem does not require the policy to be
Markovian. Furthermore, the proof shows that the theorem actually holds
for any set of latency functions L containing at least one function ` that
has elasticity d on an interval of constant width plus all functions obtained
from this function by shifting it to the left and cutting it off at a particular
value. Such a left-shift has an intuitive motivation. We can interpret it as a
base load on the given edge.
4.6.2 Sampling with Static Probabilities is Slow
The following theorem shows that every rerouting policy that samples with
static probabilities that are independent of the latency functions needs at
least Ω(|P|) rounds to approach a Wardrop equilibrium. We will formalise
the notion of static sampling probabilities in the following way. If path P is
sampled with static probability σP, at most (1− fP) σP agents may migrate
towards P in one round since (1− fP) agents utilise other paths. We say
that a rerouting policy has static sampling probabilities (for a set of paths P)
denoted by (σP)P∈P with ∑P∈Pi σP = 1 for all i ∈ [k], if for every feasible
flow vector f ∈ FΓ, every commodity i ∈ [k], and every path P ∈ Pi it
holds that the total volume of flow that the policy shifts to path P in one
round is bounded from above by σP(ri − fP).
Theorem 4.19. For every m, there exist a graph with |E| = m edges and |P| =
2m/4 paths such that for every rerouting policy with static sampling probabilities
forP there exist a symmetric instance on G with constant latency functions and an
initial flow vector f0 such that the rerouting policy needs at leastΩ(|P| log(1/e))
rounds to reach a (1+ e)-approximation of the optimal potential.
Proof. Consider a network G = (V, E) with vertices
V = {s, t, v1,w1, . . . , vn,wn}
and an edge set consisting of the edges (s, v1), (s,w1), (vn, t), (wn, t), and,
for 1 ≤ i < n, (vi, vi+1), (vi,wi+1), (wi, vi+1), and (wi,wi+1). This network
has m = 4 n resources and |P| = 2n = 2m/4 paths.
Let (σP)P∈P be the vector of sampling probabilities chosen by the rerou-
ting policy for G and let P˜ be the path that minimises σP. Then, σP˜ ≤ 1/|P|.
We now define constant latency functions on G. First, we define `e = 0
for any e ∈ {(s, v1), (s,w1), (vn, t), (wn, t)}. For every resource e ∈ P˜ with
s, t /∈ e, let `e = 1. For all other resources e′ /∈ P˜, let `e′ = n. Hence, path
P˜ is the unique optimal path with constant latency n− 1, and Φ∗ = n− 1.
All other paths have latency at least 2 n − 2. In order to reach a (1 + e)
approximation of Φ∗, we must have
fP˜ · (n− 1) + (1− fP˜) · (2 n− 2) ≤ (1+ e)Φ∗ ,
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or, equivalently, fP˜ ≥ 1− e. By our choice of P˜, we have
fP˜(t+ 1) ≤ fP˜(t) + (1− fP˜(t))σP˜ ≤ fP˜(t) +
1− fP˜(t)
|P|
or, writing f¯P˜ = 1− fP˜,
f¯P˜(t+ 1) ≥ f¯P˜(t)−
f¯P˜(t)
|P| = f¯P˜(t)
(
1− 1|P|
)
.
Therefore, f¯P˜(t) ≥ f¯P˜(0) · (1− 1/|P|)t implying that it takes at leastΩ(|P| ·
log(1/e)) rounds until f¯P˜(t) < e and hence fP˜ ≥ 1− e if we choose fP˜(0) >
0 constant.
4.7 Summary
We have introduced the (α,β)-exploration-replication policy which uses a
hybrid sampling rule. It carefully explores the strategy space by using uni-
form sampling and boosts good strategies by proportional sampling. We
have shown that this policy converges quickly towards Wardrop equilib-
ria in a round-based model which takes into account possible oscillation
effects due to the staleness of information. We have identified the elastic-
ity of the latency functions as the crucial parameter limiting the speed of
convergence. All of our bounds on the time of convergence towards ap-
proximate equilibria depend polynomially on this parameter. In particular,
our bounds are polynomial in the encoding length of an instance if, e. g.,
latency functions are given as positive polynomials of arbitrary degree in
coefficient representation. We consider this a significant improvement over
earlier results regarding relatedmodels and objectives that rely on the max-
imum slope of the latency functions as the limiting parameter, thus having
a pseudopolynomial flavour.
We have considered two different definitions of approximate equilibria.
First, we have shown that the (α,β)-exploration-replication policy reaches
a bicriterial approximate equilibrium in which almost all agents deviate by
no more than a constant fraction of the overall average latency from the
average latency of their commodity within a time that is polynomial in the
approximation parameters but is almost independent of the network size.
Since approximate equilibria in this bicriterial sense are transient, we have
considered a second definition of approximate equilibria. For the symmet-
ric case we have shown that our dynamics reaches a population which de-
viates by no more than a factor of (1 + e) from the optimal potential in
polynomial time. In this sense, our exploration-replication policy behaves
like an FPAS.
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Our analysis has shown that the elasticity and the proportional sam-
pling rule are tightly coupled. Overshooting effects can be bounded in
terms of the elasticity merely by the fact that we use proportional sam-
pling which causes proportional growth rates of the edge flows. Two lower
bounds show that an adaptive sampling rule is actually necessary to ob-
tain polynomial time bounds and that any oscillation avoiding policy needs
convergence time Ω (d).
The main question left open by this chapter is certainly whether a sim-
ilar polynomial time bound can be obtained for the time to reach (1+ e)-
approximation of the optimal potential in the asymmetric case. It is not
entirely obvious whether or not this is possible, since computing equilib-
ria for the corresponding discrete congestion games is known to be PLS-
complete [1, 29] in the asymmetric case.
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CHAPTER 5
REPLEX – Dynamic
Traffic Engineering
The positive results of the preceding chapters on load-adaptive rerouting
policies encourage the design of dynamic traffic engineering protocols that
are applicable in practise. Whereas our theoretical model encompasses
one of the key problems arising in practise, namely the issue of stale in-
formation, real-world applications face several other problems. Traffic de-
mands may be subject to unpredictable changes, traffic is bursty, and la-
tency cannot be simply “observed” as assumed so far, but must be mea-
sured reliably. In view of these obstacles, today’s traffic engineering proto-
cols operate mainly off-line on the time scale of several hours or days and
thus cannot react timely to effects like flash crowds or sudden changes of
the network topology, e. g., due to link failures or BGP reroutes. We pro-
pose a dynamic traffic engineering protocol, REPLEX, based on the (α, β)-
exploration-replication policy introduced in Chapter 4. Our protocol splits
traffic that is bound for the same destination at intermediate routers and
readjusts the splitting ratios at intervals of a few seconds. We perform sim-
ulations employing realistic workload generators on artificial topologies
to inspect characteristic convergence properties and on a real topology to
study its benefits on the overall performance. It turns out that our pro-
tocol converges within few minutes and improves the overall throughput
significantly.
5.1 Introduction
We consider an autonomous system (AS) from the point of view of an Inter-
net service provider (ISP) striving to maximise the benefit of its network.
Whereas the topology of the network is fixed, the routing within the AS
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should be optimised for the traffic requirements between pairs of routers
located at the border of the AS, so-called ingress and egress nodes. Typical
optimisation goals are maximising the throughput of the network or min-
imising the maximum link load. In general, this task is referred to as traffic
engineering (TE).
We present a dynamic traffic engineering protocol, REPLEX, operated
by routers whichmay ormay not coordinate their actions. It assignsweights
to routes (i. e., to outgoing edges) and continuously readjusts them in a
fashion similar to the replication-exploration policy. Packets are then dis-
tributed evenly according to these weights. To that end, we need to as-
sume that, for any given destination, a router may select between several
next-hop routers. These alternative paths can be provided by any under-
lying routing protocol, e. g., by OSPF or MPLS multipaths. One advan-
tage of our protocol is the fact that it is independent of the protocol which
provides these alternatives. It can operate even across AS boundaries us-
ing BGP/MIRO multipaths [85]. Routers that apply our protocol may ex-
change traffic information at regular intervals. Since we aggregate infor-
mation about several routes and transfer this information only to adjacent
routers, the communication overhead generated by our protocol is very
moderate.
How the weights are actually adjusted throughout the process depends
on the optimisation goal pursued. Different applications pose different re-
quirements on the performance of the connections. Typical requirements
are low latency, high bit rate, low error rate, low packet loss, or a com-
bination of these. Whereas our theoretical results focused on latency as a
measure of performance, the protocol presented in this chapter is generic
with respect to the measure of performance. We merely assume that the
performance of a path can be recursively expressed as a function of the
performance of the first link and the performance of the remaining path
section. Tomention two examples, latency can be summed up along a path,
and the bit rate of a path can be computed by taking the minimum bit rate
over all edges.
We evaluate our protocol using artificial topologies as well as a real
topology from the Rocketfuel [3, 76] dataset. Since traffic engineering pro-
tocols may induce feedback to underlying protocols like TCP andmay thus
influence the traffic demands themselves, a realistic simulation must in-
clude a realistic workload generator. We incorporate such a generator [81]
based on realistic statistical properties of Web traffic into our simulation
framework. Our simulations are performed at packet level and include a
full TCP implementation. Simulations show that our protocol converges
within less than three minutes only and significantly increases the perfor-
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mance of the network within this time. A less significant improvement can
still be observed if the communication between the routers is disabled.
Let us remark that our protocol aims at balancing the performance of
different routes rather than optimising the overall performance. For cer-
tain performance measures like link utilisation, this is also a natural goal
pursued by an ISP.
5.1.1 Related Work
The first approaches of on-line traffic engineering protocols date back to
the times of the early ARPANET [47]. These protocols, however, tend to
exhibit oscillating behaviour due to several reasons. First, routing decisions
of individual routers may interact with each other and, second, decisions
of the traffic engineering protocol may feed back to the traffic demands
themselves: The TCP protocol which accounts for the largest fraction of
today’s Internet trafficlimits congestion by adjusting the injection rate at
end hosts whenever a packet is dropped or packets are reordered, possibly
as a result of a rerouting decision made by the TE protocol.
For these reasons, traffic engineering protocols applied in practise to-
day are mainly off-line protocols. These collect traffic measurements over
a certain period of time, centrally compute new routing parameters, and
update routing tables based on these parameters. Typically, this process is
re-run every few hours or days. One natural approach for controlling the
routing paths is by readjusting OSPF weights [36, 37, 79]. The OSPF rout-
ing protocol determines routing paths by performing a weighted shortest
path first computation. In [39] it is even proposed to adapt these weights
dynamically. Any change of OSPF weights, however, requires the intrado-
main routing protocol to converge. Whereas traffic engineering extensions
to OSPF have also been proposed [45], these merely describe how routers
can add performance information relevant to a TE protocol to the transmit-
ted messages. It does not address the question of how this information can
actually be used for traffic engineering.
To a certain extent, off-line protocols can take into account events like
link failures and compute alternatives off-line [4, 37]. These approaches
cannot take into account any unforeseen events. Furthermore, preparing
the routing for worst-case traffic demands may degrade performance on
average [86]. Routing protocols can also take into account the result of
traffic matrix estimations, on which there exists a variety of literature [64,
78, 86, 87].
Though off-line approaches offer good performance gains, they obvi-
ously cannot react to unforeseen short-term changes of traffic demands
that may be caused by flash crowds, link failures, interdomain reroutes,
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etc. This necessitates the deployment of dynamic traffic engineering ap-
proaches. With MATE [25] and TeXCP [44] two systems were presented
that work similar to our approach. Traffic is split among alternative paths
and the splitting ratio is permanently being adjusted to the current traffic
situation. For setting up path alternatives, the authors propose to useMPLS
tunnels. Since every path has to be represented explicitly, this generates a
communication overhead that does not scale well, since it is quadratic in
the number of edge routers. Using implicit representations of paths and
aggregate information about their performance, our algorithm can handle
larger sets of alternatives more easily. Furthermore, these systems have
not been evaluated under realistic conditions, including TCP feedback and
bursty traffic.
Another approach similar to ours is the PSTARA protocol [59, 60, 75].
Here, the focus is on small mobile networks. Realistic traffic workload and
TCP issues are not considered. Liu and Reddy analyse a similar adaptive
mechanism in a multihoming scenario [51].
5.1.2 Notation
Throughout this chapter, we use the following notation. For any router
node r and any destination t, the set N(r, t) denotes the next-hop routers in
the routing table of r admissible for destination t. Here, a destination tmay
denote a single node or an entire subnet. For the routing graph induced
by the successor relation N(·, t) for any fixed destination t, we denote a
(directed) edge from v to w by v→ w, and by v wwe denote a (directed)
path of arbitrary length between node v and node w. We assume that the
routing graph is acyclic which is generally the case for routing protocols
and properly configured routing tables.
As mentioned above, our protocol is generic with respect to the mea-
sure of performance used. For the sake of coherence with the preceding
chapters, we will still use the symbol ` to denote the performance value
with the convention that this value is to be minimised.
5.2 The REPLEX Protocol
Although the (α, β)-exploration-replication policy serves as an inspiration
and eponym for our protocol, it cannot be translated into a traffic engi-
neering protocol immediately, and we will deviate from it in a number of
aspects. The Wardrop model which was used for our theoretic analysis
made assumptions that are not met for the scenario of Internet routing.
First, it assumes that the agents are capable of selecting an entire path for
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the packets they insert into the network. In networking terminology, this
is referred to as source routing, which is available in specialised networks
like certain overlay architectures, but not in pure IP networks. Second,
what was phrased as “observing the latency of a path” in our theoretical
descriptions of rerouting policies actually comprises a non-negligible ef-
fort of measuring and aggregating performance values in practise. Finally,
the assumption of an infinite number of agents reduces to the assumption
that traffic may be split arbitrarily at every node. Whereas this effect can
be achieved by forwarding packets via probabilistically chosen next-hop
routers, this may result in undesirable packet reorderings at the destina-
tion node. In the following sections, we will elaborate on the three above-
mentioned problems and finally introduce our traffic engineering protocol
formally.
5.2.1 Delegation of Routing Decisions
As opposed to the assumptions made in our theoretical model, we can now
no longer assume that end users have full control over the path a packet
takes on the way to its destination. Usually, end users are located at the
periphery of the network and are connected via a single link only, e. g., us-
ing Ethernet or DSL. Consequently, end hosts do not have any influence
on the routing. In regular IP routing not even the routers themselves can
select a path as a whole. Unless using specialised protocols like MPLS tun-
nels, routers may forward packets only a single hop to bring them closer to
their final destination. Thus, each router r narrows down the set of paths a
packet can possibly take.
Consider a router r on a path connecting a source node s and a des-
tination t. For every next hop router vi ∈ N(r, t), r maintains a weight
w(r, t, vi), and we normalise ∑v∈N(r,t) w(r, t, v) = 1. Given these weights,
the router then aims at partitioning the traffic towards t such that the frac-
tion going over vi ∈ N(r, t) is as close as possible to w(r, t, vi). The weights
will be adapted over time depending on the performance of paths r → vi  
t.
In order for router r to be able to assign reasonable weights on behalf
of the end host s some performance information is required. Actually, the
weight assigned to a path should depend on the performance of the entire
path s  r → vi  t. However, once a packet has reached router r, the
user’s preference relation merely depends on the performance of the path
section r → vi  t and is independent of the section s  r. Since r cannot
select a particular path r t as a whole, but can merely determine the next
hop, r’s decision should furthermore depend on aggregate performance
information about the set of paths r → vi  t only rather than on the
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performance of individual paths from this set.
5.2.2 Collaborative Performance Evaluation
How does the router r obtain this aggregate performance of path sections
r → vi  t? Let us denote this aggregate performance by L(r, t, vi). The
value of L(r, t, vi) is composed of two components: The performance of the
edge r → vi, denoted `rvi , and the overall performance of the set of paths
vi  t, denoted A(vi, t). The first component, `rvi , can be measured di-
rectly at the router r. The second component, A(vi, t), however, must be
measured and aggregated at vi, and then transmitted to r. This may in-
volve a recursive aggregation step at vi. Finally, r may compute the overall
performance L(r, t, vi).
How the aggregation is done exactly, depends on the type of perfor-
mance measure we use. In general, we use a binary operator ⊕ to compute
L(r, t, vi) = `rvi ⊕ A(vi, t)
and define A(vi, t) as theweighted average performance of alternative paths
at vi, i. e.,
A(vi, t) = ∑
u∈N(vi ,t)
w(vi, t, u) · L(vi, t, u) .
Thus, the value of L(·) can be computed directly for routers in distance
one from the destination and can then be propagated and aggregated back-
wards along the path.
For the case of using latency as our performance measure, we can use
regular addition for the ⊕ operator since latency is additive along a path.
It is intuitive and easy to check by induction on the path length that in this
case, L(r, t, vi) is actually the weighted average latency (or the expected
latency of a random packet) of all paths r → vi  t where the weight of a
path is the product of the weights of its edges. Let us remark that for the
case that x⊕ y = max{x, y}, L(·) does not yield the expected maximum of
the performance values along a path. In fact, it is not possible to compute
this value easily without increasing the amount of information transmitted
between the routers. Still, we will see that even in this case traffic can be
balanced based on the value of L(·).
What is the communication overhead incurred by our algorithm? Each
router r transmits the value of all A(r, t) for all destinations t in its routing
table to its neighbours at regular intervals. Each entry of this message con-
sists of an identifier of t, typically a IPv4 prefix (32+ 5 bits) or a IPv6 prefix
(128+ 7 bits), as well as the value of A(r, t). If we choose a resolution of 11
bits for this value, the total length of an entry is 6 bytes for IPv4 and less
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than 19 bytes for IPv6. Even if information about as many as 200 000 IPv6
prefixes is exchanged once in every two seconds, the communication over-
head is only 1.8MBytes/s which is less than 0.15% of today’s link capacities
of 10Gbit/s. This can be further reduced by grouping subnet prefixes that
are reachable via the same edge router.
Let us remark that though communication between the routers may be
beneficial (see Section 5.4.4), the protocol can also be implemented without
communication if this is not possible or desired.
5.2.3 Measuring Performance
The protocol described in the previous section is largely independent of the
actual measure of performance used. We can measure or monitor various
parameters with acceptable computational effort: the number of packets
sent and dropped, the number of bytes sent and dropped, and the average
queue length. From this information we can compute several performance
measures:
1. The latency of an edge can be computed as the static propagation de-
lay of a link plus the variable queueing delay. Along a path, latency
is additive.
2. The bit rate of an edge is the number of bits sent divided by the length
of the measurement period. The bit rate of a path is the minimum bit
rate of its edges.
3. The link utilisation can be computed similarly. Let b denote the bit rate
of an interface, let T denote the length of the measurement interval,
and let n denote the number of bytes sent within this interval. Then,
the link utilisation is 8 n/(T b). We define the utilisation of a path to
be the maximum utilisation of a link in the path.
Which of these parameters we choose to optimise depends on the type
of application we want to support. Voice over IP requires low latency, ac-
cessing large files requires high throughput, and a typical goal of an Inter-
net service provider is to minimise themaximumutilisation of a linkwithin
its AS. For our simulations we use link utilisation as our measure of perfor-
mance. Consequently, we assume that the optimisation goal is to minimise
the performance parameter.
Measuring the above values during short time periods will not yield
satisfactory results since Internet traffic is known to be very bursty [57]. To
this end, instead of using the measured values directly, we use an expo-
nential moving average (EMA). More precisely, every router r maintains a
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variable ˜`(r, v) for every neighbour v, measures its current value `rv over a
certain time period and updates
˜`(r, v)← η · `rv + (1− η) · ˜`(r, v) ,
where η ∈ (0, 1) is a weighting parameter.
5.2.4 Randomisation vs. Hashing
Suppose we are given weights w(r, t, v) for any destination t and any next-
hop node v ∈ N(r, t). How can we distribute traffic evenly to match these
weights? A simple and natural answer to this question is to simply forward
packets in a probabilistic fashion where the probability to choose a partic-
ular outgoing edge equals this edge’s weight. However, in probabilistic
routing it may happen that packets bound for the same destination over-
take each other causing packet reorderings at the destination node. The
TCP protocol treats such reorderings in the sameway it treats packet losses,
by decreasing the injection rate. Hence, the probabilistic approach may se-
riously harm performance [50].
This process can be derandomised by using a standard hashing tech-
nique [18]. Let V denote the set of identifiers of connection endpoints and
consider a hash function h : V ×V 7→ [0, 1] mapping each packet based on
its source and destination to some value in the interval [0, 1]. For a fixed
destination t, we partition the interval [0, 1] into segments of size w(r, t, vi),
vi ∈ N(r, t) and label each interval with the corresponding node vi. A
packet from source s for destination t is forwarded via the next-hop node
associated with the interval containing h(s, t). Note that each connection
is not only characterised by the IP addresses of source and destination, but
also by the corresponding port numbers. Thus, diversity can be enhanced
significantly by using a combination of IP address and port number as the
argument of the hash function.
Using this technique, we can ensure that no packet reordering occurs
as long as the weights (and thus the intervals) do not change. Weight
shifts cause a fraction of the traffic to be rerouted, and thus packets may
be dropped. Hence, the time interval at which weight shifts occur should
be larger than the amount of time it takes for TCP to recover from packet
losses.
Whereas hashing is a good approximation of the probabilistic approach
if the number of connections is large, hash values may be distributed un-
evenly if the number of connections is small. This may cause a next-hop
node to receive more packets than intended. However, we get a solution
to this problem for free since our algorithm will react to this effect by re-
ducing the weight assigned to this unintentionally overloaded node. The
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effect that the number of end hosts has on the quality of the hashing will be
examined in Section 5.4.3.
5.2.5 Adapting Weights
The actual adaption of the weights w(r, t, v) depending on the performance
values L(r, t, v) resembles the (α, β)-exploration-replication policy (Equa-
tion (4.2)). However, in order to avoid weight shifts due to performance
differences that are not significant, we introduce an additional threshold
parameter e. Fix a router r and a destination t. For any pair of next-hop
routers v1 and v2, we shift weight from w(r, t, v1) to w(r, t, v2) if L(r, t, v1) >
L(r, t, v2) + e. Corresponding to Equation (4.2), where we replace flow by
weight, the amount of weight shifted from node v1 to node v2 is given by
λ · w(r, t, v1) ·
(
(1− β) · w(r, t, v2) + β|N(r, t)|
)
· L(r, t, v1)− L(r, t, v2)
L(r, t, v1) + α
.
The migration speed can be controlled by the parameter λ and the ratio
between exploration and replication is controlled by β.
5.2.6 Summary of the Protocol and its Parameters
Algorithm 5.1Main loop of the REPLEX-algorithm
1: for every neighbour v ∈ ⋃t N(r, t) do
2: measure performance `rv
3: // calculate exponential moving average with weight η:
4: ˜`(r, v)← η · `rv + (1− η) ˜`(r, v)
5: end for
6: initialise an empty message M
7: for every destination t in the routing table do
8: for every next-hop node v ∈ N(r, t) do
9: L(r, t, v)← ˜`rv ⊕ A(v, t).
10: end for
11: avg← ∑v∈N(r,t) w(r, t, v) · L(r, t, v)
12: Append (t, avg) to M
13: end for
14: send M to all neighbours v; these store it in A(r, ·)
15: call procedure ADAPTWEIGHTS (Algorithm 5.2)
Combiningwhat has been presented in the preceding sections, the over-
all algorithm is summarised in Algorithms 5.1 and 5.2. Every router rmain-
tains four arrays:
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Algorithm 5.2 Procedure ADAPTWEIGHTS
1: for every destination t in the routing table do
2: w′(r, t)← w(r, t).
3: for every pair of next-hop routers v1, v2 ∈ N(r, t) do
4: if L(r, t, v1) > L(r, t, v2) + e then
5: δ← λ ·w(r, t, v1) ·
(
(1− β) · w(r, t, v2) + β|N(r,t)|
)
· L(r,t,v1)−L(r,t,v2)L(r,t,v1)+α
6: w′(r, t, v1)← w′(r, t, v1)− δ
7: w′(r, t, v2)← w′(r, t, v2) + δ
8: end if
9: end for
10: set w(r, t)← w′(r, t).
11: end for
˜`(r, v): The exponential moving average of themeasurements for link (r, v)
for all neighbours of r.
L(r, t, v): The performance value for destination t given that the next hop
node is v ∈ N(r, t).
A(v, t): The average measurement value that next hop router v has an-
nounced for destination t. This array is updated whenever update
messages from neighbouring routers are received. It is initialised
with values that are neutral w. r. t. ⊕, e. g., with zero for latency or
link utilisation.
w(r, t, v): Current weight of route r → v t for destination t. Initially, we
choose uniform weights w(r, t, v) = 1/|N(r, t)| for all v ∈ N(r, t).
Observe that the memory requirement for this data is linear in the size of
the routing table.
The router’s main loop which is executed once in T seconds is given in
Algorithm 5.1. In this loop, the performance `rv is measured for all neigh-
bours v and the entries of L(r, ·, ·) are updated accordingly. Then, for all
destinations the weighted average performance over all next hop routers is
computed and transmitted to adjacent routers which in turn update their
table A(r, ·). Finally, as is specified by Algorithm 5.2, all weights are up-
dated.
Our algorithm can be parametrised in a number of ways. We sum-
marise these parameters here and describe their influence on the behaviour
of the protocol.
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update period length T: The length of the interval at which the main loop
is executed. This has a direct influence on howmuch traffic is rerouted
within a time interval of a given length.
damping factor λ: This parameter determines the amount of weight shifted
in one round. The ratio λ/T controls the convergence speed of the al-
gorithm. Possible overshooting and oscillation effects limit the maxi-
mum convergence speed we can achieve.
EMA weight η: Decreasing the weight of the exponential moving aver-
age makes the algorithm less sensitive to the effects of bursty traffic
whereas choosing it too small increases the time until the algorithm
realises the effects of its rerouting decisions.
virtual performance offset α: This virtual offset is added to all path laten-
cies L(r, t, v) making the algorithm less sensitive to small differences
when the performance value is close to 0. (For a detailed discussion,
see Sections 4.1.3.2 and 4.2.) If α is too small, the algorithm shifts too
much weight to paths that had not been used so far (e. g. when a
link was down and is brought up again) which can cause oscillation.
Choosing α too large makes performance differences less significant
and reduces the speed of convergence. Note that the dimension of α
is the dimension of the performance parameter `.
improvement threshold e: The parameter e is used to avoid weight shifts
between routes with insignificant performance difference. If this dif-
ference is below e, no weight shift is performed. Thus, we can ensure
that weights are only shifted if the change is substantial. Choosing e
too large limits the approximation quality we can achieve. Choosing
it too small, the algorithm may tend to exhibit trembling behaviour.
As with α, the dimension of e is the dimension of the performance
parameter `.
exploration ratio β: This parameter determines the ratio between explora-
tion and replication. If β is too small, currently unused paths may not
be detected by our algorithm. On the other hand, β should not be too
large since this can result in excessive growth of a flow if it is close to
zero and no reliable performance information is available yet. (For a
detailed discussion, see Section 4.2.)
Among the six parameters listed here, only three have substantial influ-
ence on the convergence behaviour of our protocol. The parameters α and
e are very similar. We have found that e = α = 0.1 is a reasonable choice,
but other values in the same order of magnitude do not change our results
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significantly. The role of the parameter β is less important in practise than
it is in our theoretical analysis since, typically, weights do not become ex-
tremely small. In the following, we set β = 0.1.
The parameters λ, T, and η are more interesting since they determine
the speed of convergence and the strength of oscillation effects. We explore
the parameter space systematically in Section 5.4.
5.3 Simulation Setup
Our protocol was implemented and simulated within the SSFNet simu-
lation framework [61]. In SSFNet, network traffic is simulated at packet
level with a complete TCP implementation. Furthermore, it features sev-
eral routing protocols including OSPF, MPLS, and BGP.
The purpose of our simulations is twofold. On the one hand, we want
to find a good set of parameters as described in the previous section. To that
end, we have used simple scenarios consisting of a few routers only. These
scenarios were designed to observe specific effects. On the other hand, we
want to understand the behaviour of our protocol in complex real-world
scenarios. To that end, we have used complex AS topologies provided by
the Rocketfuel [3, 76] dataset. The specific topologies are discussed within
the respective sections. The workload used is the same for all topologies
and is described below.
All topologies consist of a set of routers, some of which are connected
to so-called workload clouds consisting of Web clients and Web servers that
generate the actual traffic demands.
5.3.1 Realistic Web Workload and Traffic Demands
One of the key aspects in which our simulations differ from earlier results
is the fact that we use a realistic workload generator taking into account
the bursty nature of traffic on the Internet [57]. We believe that standard
approaches like replaying a pre-recorded trace do not suffice, as they do
not account for interacting feedback loops: Our traffic engineering protocol
and other control loops, foremost TCP, interact with each other andmay in-
fluence the traffic demands themselves. It is crucial to take feedback loops
of this kind into consideration for the evaluation.
To generate realistic HTTP traffic, we use the Web workload generators
of [81] and [61] which simulate the behaviour of HTTP clients. The statis-
tical properties of the workload model are based on measurements of real
Internet traffic [30] and are similar to the one imposed by SURGE [10] or
NSWeb [82]. To increase burstiness, we disable the use of persistent HTTP
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connections [48].
Both generators simulate Web users that request a Web page, then are
idle for some time before reading another Web page, etc. Both the timeouts
and the simulated file sizes are heavy-tailed and thus yield many short
flows, as well as a significant number of long-lasting flows. The Web pages
chosen by the users for download are chosen uniformly at random from
any Web server. Hence, the workload demands are uniformly distributed
and reflect the traffic matrix model of Zhang et al. [87].
5.3.2 Initialisation
Each simulation starts with an initialisation phase of 500 seconds. This
phase is used to wait for the underlying routing protocol to converge (if
such a protocol is used, as is done in Section 5.5). This happens within
seconds. After the routing is established, the workload generating clients
described above wake up at random points of time to avoid synchronisa-
tion effects. After the initialisation phase, the evaluation phase starts. In all
figures presented below, the time axis starts at the beginning of the evalua-
tion phase.
5.4 Exploring the Parameter Space using Artificial
Topologies
In this Section, we use artificial topologies consisting of a few routers only.
No underlying routing protocol is used and routing paths are set up man-
ually as will be described in the respective sections.
5.4.1 Convergence Speed vs. Oscillation
Both our theoretical analyses in the previous chapters and practical expe-
rience indicate that there is a tradeoff between the speed of convergence
we can achieve and the strength of oscillation effects. Convergence can be
accelerated by increasing the frequency 1/T at which weights are adapted
and by increasing the parameter λwhich determines themaximum amount
of flow shifted per round. Increased convergence speed comes at the cost
of an increased liability to oscillation. The role of the weight parameter η of
the exponential moving average plays an ambivalent role in this context. If
we chose η too large, our protocol will overreact to accidental traffic fluc-
tuations. If we chose it too large, a systematic change of performance will
take too long to have an effect. Hence, both extremes may lead to oscilla-
tion.
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Figure 5.1: A set of HTTP servers is connected to a set of HTTP clients
via two routes s → v1 → t and s → v2 → t with bandwidths S1 and S2,
respectively.
We chose a simple topology depicted in Figure 5.1 to find suitable pa-
rameters T, λ, and η. The network consists of four routers s, v1, v2, and
t, where s acts as a source being connected to 40 HTTP servers and t acts
as a sink being connected to 40 HTTP clients. From s, t can be reached
via two paths s → v1 → t and s → v2 → t. Both links of one path have
equal bandwidth, and we denote the bandwidths of the paths by S1 and
S2, respectively. Consequently, in order to balance link utilisation, the traf-
fic should be split according to the ratios S1/(S1 + S2) and S2/(S1 + S2).
For our evaluation we use unbalanced bandwidths S1 = 10Mbit/s and
S2 = 100Mbit/s. For these bandwidths, the optimal weights that balance
the link utilisation are w(s, t, v1) ≈ 0.09 and w(s, t, v2) ≈ 0.91. We have con-
figured the propagation delays to be 10ms, but the results presented here
are largely independent of this quantity. Experiments were also conducted
with propagation delays ranging from 0.1ms to 100ms, but the behaviour
of our protocol was unaffected by this.
Figure 5.2 shows the results of our simulations for various values of λ,
T, and η. We plot the weights of both routes over an interval of 1, 500 s.
Note that w(s, t, v1) + w(s, t, v2) = 1, so the information given in the plots
is partially redundant. As expected, the critical parameter is λ˜ = λ/T.
As λ˜ increases, the speed of convergence improves at the cost of stronger
oscillation effects.
In the first plot of Figure 5.2 we have λ = 0.05 and T = 8s, so λ˜ =
0.00625 s−1. We see that convergence is very smooth for all values of η, but
takes 750 s to approach its final value. Increasing λ˜ by a factor of 6 to 0.4 s−1
(T = 1 s, λ = 0.4), the last plot shows the other extreme. Here, the weight
of the first route oscillates rapidly between 0 and 0.4 for all values of η.
However, even in this extreme case, the time average of the weights is still
close to the optimal values.
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Figure 5.2: The above plots show how weights are adapted for various
values of λ, T, and η over a time period of 1, 500 s in the network depicted
in Figure 5.1 with S1 = 10Mbit/s and S2 = 100Mbit/s. For every choice of
parameters, we have two plots of weights, one for each route. As the ratio
λ˜ = λ/T increases, we observe a speed-up in convergence at the cost of
stronger oscillation. 123
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Figure 5.2: (Continued)
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We observe good behaviour of the system for the case that λ˜ = 0.025 s−1.
In Figure 5.2 we have depicted the cases T = 2 s, λ = 0.05 and T = 8 s,
λ = 0.2. For these parameter values, we have relatively fast convergence
while at the same time keeping oscillation at an acceptable level. Consider-
ing the two sets of parameters with λ˜ = 0.025 s−1 we can observe that for
longer measurement intervals T and larger values of λ, the amplitude of
the oscillation increases slightly. Hence, we should choose T as the mini-
mum amount of time such that measurements are still reasonable and then
choose λ accordingly to reduce oscillation. Note, however, that reducing T
increases the communication overhead of our protocol. Since this overhead
is negligible (see Section 5.2.2), the improvement in oscillation avoidance
weighs out the additional communication overhead.
Our simulations also reveal the impact of the weight η of the exponen-
tial moving average. Small values of η smooth out peaks and thus stabilise
our protocol. However, if η is chosen too small, the protocol becomes inert
since it takes a longer time to realise significant performance changes.
Summarising our observations, we find that T = 2 s, λ = 0.05, and
η ∈ (0.1, 0.5) is a good parameter set. These parameter settings achieve
convergence within 200 s and reduce oscillation to an acceptable amount.
We use these parameters (T = 2 s, λ = 0.05, η = 0.1) in the simulations
presented below.
5.4.2 Quality of the Solution
In the preceding section we have used alternative routes with a rather large
discrepancy between the bandwidths of the links. Using the parameters
determined above, we now use the simple topology depicted in Figure 5.1
again, but vary the bandwidths of the links. We fix S1 = 100Mbit/s and
vary S2 to be 10Mbit/s, 34Mbit/s, and 100Mbit/s. Consequently, in or-
der to balance link utilisation, optimal weights for both routes are approx-
imately 0.91/0.09, 0.75/0.25, and 0.5/0.5. Figure 5.3 shows that our algo-
rithm actually converges towards these sets of weights (upper plot), and
that link utilisation becomes actually balanced (lower plot). The total flow
demand was chosen to be approximately 10% of the total bandwidth avail-
able. Due to our careful choice of parameters, oscillation can be avoided.
5.4.3 Necessary Number of End Hosts
In Section 5.2.4 we have pointed out that our hashing technique for de-
randomisation is a good approximation of probabilistic routing only if the
input range of the hash function is large, i. e., if there exist a sufficient num-
ber of connections. How many connections do we need?
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Figure 5.3: The plots show the weight and the link utilisation in the net-
work depicted in Figure 5.1 over an interval of 1, 500 s. The bandwidth
of one path was fixed to S1 = 100Mbit/s while the other was set to
S2 = 10Mbit/s, 34Mbit/s, and 100Mbit/s. We see that in all cases the
link utilisation becomes balanced over time. Thin lines indicate the opti-
mal weights.
126
5.4. Exploring the Parameter Space using Artificial Topologies
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500
ro
ut
e
w
ei
gh
ts
simulation time [s]
Convergence depending on number of hosts
1
2
5
10
20
30
40
Figure 5.4: The protocols ability to find optimal weights depends on the
number of end hosts n, since these determine the number of distinct con-
nections that are inputs to the hash function.
To answer this question, we use the simple topology depicted in Fig-
ure 5.1 again, setting the bandwidths to S1 = 10Mbit/s and S2 = 100Mbit/s.
We vary the number n of servers and clients connected to the routers s and
t. Note that for n end hosts there exists a total number of Θ(n2) possible
connections.
Using the parameter set determined above, Figure 5.4 shows how our
algorithm adapts weights over time. We see that for n ∈ {1, 2, 5}, the algo-
rithm does not exhibit good convergence behaviour. Increasing the number
of end hosts to n ≥ 10, however, we see that the optimal weights 0.09 and
0.91 are approached and oscillation vanishes as n is increased.
5.4.4 Communication Helps
In the simple topology we have used so far, the utilisation of the two links
s→ v1 and v1 → t of the first path is approximately equal. The same holds
for the links of the second path. Hence, any information available at v1 and
v2 is also available at s, implying that s cannot gain any additional benefit
from performance messages transmitted by the neighbouring routers. To
examine a topology in which communication between the routers is actu-
ally necessary, we consider the topology depicted in Figure 5.5. The router
s under study is now connected to two destination routers t1 and t2 each of
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which is connected to a different set of 40 end hosts. Both destinations can
be reached via intermediate routers v1 and v2. The bandwidth of links ad-
jacent to s (s → v1 and s → v2) is S1 = 100Mbit/s. The destination routers
are connected to their respective intermediate routers via 100Mbit/s links,
too (v1 → t1 and v2 → t2). The cross links v1 → t2 and v2 → t1 are bottle-
neck links with bandwidth S2 ∈ {10Mbit/s, 34Mbit/s, 100Mbit/s}. From
the perspective of s, the bottleneck links are one hop away, and for t1 and t2
bottlenecks are behind different first hops. Hence, s needs to rely on perfor-
mance information transmitted by v1 and v2. Again, optimal weights are
S1/(S1 + S2) and S2/(S1 + S2), but for the different destinations t1 and t2,
the intermediate routers v1 and v2 take opposing roles.
Figure 5.5: Servers at router s are connected to two sets of clients connected
to t1 and t2. Each target router is reachable via two alternative routes. Bot-
tleneck edges are red and dashed.
In this setting, the router s has to maintain four weights since there
are two routes for each destination (w(s, t1, v1), w(s, t1, v2), w(s, t2, v1), and
w(s, t2, v2)). Figure 5.6 shows how these weights are adapted over time.
For every value of S2, we see that our algorithm approaches the optimal
weights S1/(S1 + S2) and S2/(S1 + S2) quickly. Let us remark that, if com-
munication between the routers is deactivated, our protocol cannot find
good weights. In that case, all weights remain close to 0.5 throughout the
simulation.
5.4.5 Drifting Demands
Though in the scenarios simulated so far, the traffic actually generated was
bursty, the traffic demands themselves were static. Whereas static traffic
demands can be optimised for using off-line algorithms, a traffic engineer-
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Figure 5.6: Adaption of weights for two destinations with bottlenecks that
are not directly observable (Figure 5.5).
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ing protocol should be able to react to changing traffic demands on-line. To
simulate such a scenario, we use the topology depicted in Figure 5.7. Again,
router s can connect to destination t via paths s → v1 → t and s → v2 → t.
All links have a bandwidth of 100Mbit/s. This topology differs from the
simple one used earlier in that there is a second set of clients connected
to the intermediate router v2. During a startup phase of T1 = 500 s, these
clients are inactive. Only at time T1 do they start to wake up and also con-
nect to the servers via s. The wake-up time of a client is chosen uniformly
at random from the interval [T1, T2] where the parameter T2 > T1 is varied.
This increases the load on link s → v2 which should in turn lead to a de-
crease of the corresponding weight w(s, t, v2). Note, that s does not have
routing alternatives for destination v2.
Figure 5.7: A set of D servers is connected to router s and can reach the
target router t connected to the clients via intermediate routers v1 and v2.
At time T1 = 500 s, a second set of D/k servers connected to router v2 starts
to wake up.
Denote the number of hosts connected to t by n, and denote the number
of hosts connected to v2 bym. Furthermore, assume that the traffic demand
is proportional to the number of clients. Letw = w(s, v1, t). Then, the traffic
demand on link s → v1 is proportional to n · w, and the traffic demand on
link s → v2 is proportional to n · (1− w) + m. Consequently, the flow is
balanced if
n · (1− w) +m = n · w ,
or, equivalently, if w = min{(m+ n)/(2 n), 1}.
Figure 5.8 shows the results of the simulation for n = 40 andm = 10, 20,
and 40, i. e., the optimal value of w after all clients have woken up is 0.62,
0.75, and 1, respectively. The lengths of the wake-up periods were chosen
to be T2− T1 = 10 s, 100 s, and 500 s. We see that for long wake-up periods,
e. g., T2 − T1 = 500 s, weights follow the changing demands smoothly. If
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demands change abruptly, the algorithm takes its regular convergence time
to adapt to this change.
5.5 Simulation in a Real-World Topology
To evaluate the performance of the REPLEX protocol in a real-world net-
work we chose the EBONE network from the Rocketfuel [3, 76] topology
dataset (AS1755). This topology consists of 172 routers connected by 367
links. Out of the 172 routers, 61 are access and border routers. The topology
is depicted partially in Figure 5.9. Due to its good connectivity, there exist
various paths with equal hop count between pairs of routers, and our TE
protocol can take advantage of this diversity. Altogether, we connect 5,400
clients and 417 servers to the routers. Our simulation setup is described in
more detail in the following sections.
5.5.1 Network Topology and Client and Server Location
The Rocketfuel topologies contain only information about the routers of an
AS. At every border and access router we install workload clouds consist-
ing of a set of clients and servers. It is reasonable to assume that routers
that are well-connected to the AS are also connected to many end hosts
and thus are responsible for a large amount of traffic. Therefore, we chose
the number of end hosts connected to a router proportional to its degree.
More precisely, we install 30 clients and three servers for each link into the
AS.
The Rocketfuel data set provides information about topology and esti-
mated latencies of the links. Bandwidth information, however, is not pro-
vided. We use the propagation delays obtained from the Rocketfuel data set
and configure the bandwidth of intra-AS links manually. In order to simu-
late an under-provisioned network which necessitates traffic engineering,
we choose the bandwidth of such links to be small, namely 10Mbit/s. End
hosts are connected to the access routers by faster links with a bandwidth
of 40Mbit/s. Hence, bottlenecks are located within the AS and not at the
periphery. The link delays of end hosts are randomised to add variability to
the experienced round trip time [30]. They are chosen uniformly at random
from the interval [0, 60]ms for clients and [0, 25]ms for servers.
5.5.2 Routing
Our traffic engineering protocol can operate on top of any routing protocol
that can provide multiple paths for one destination. Whereas these paths
could be configured manually for our simple artificial topologies, we use
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Figure 5.8: Weights generated by our algorithm for drifting traffic de-
mands. A set of m clients at v2 (see Figure 5.7) wake up between T1 and
T2. The additional traffic demand is given as ratio 1 : 1, 1 : 2, and 1 : 4
relative to the number of clients at t.
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Figure 5.9: The Rocketfuel topology for EBONE (AS 1755, .r0 map) con-
sists of 172 routers. In total we connect 5,400 Web clients and 417 Web
servers to the border and access routers.
the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol with uniform link weights
for the Rocketfuel topology. Thus, hop count is our distance metrics, and
all paths with equal distance from the destination form a set of admissible
routes. This provides large flexibility for the traffic engineering protocol.
5.5.3 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of our protocol using the parameters λ = 0.3,
T = 2.5 s, η = 0.15, and we perform simulations with communication be-
tween the routers enabled and disabled. We are interested in two proper-
ties: How fast does the algorithm converge, and how does it improve the
throughput of the network?
To answer the first question, we consider the aggregate change of all
weights w(·, ·, ·) at all routers. We sum up these changes over intervals
of five seconds and normalise such that the largest value is 1. Figure 5.10
shows that this value decreases quickly over time. We see that significant
weight changes occur only during the first two minutes, and the minimum
is reached after three minutes. Note that due to the burstiness of the traffic
weight fluctuations do not vanish completely. Observe that for the case of
disabled communication, these fluctuations are greater than with commu-
nication enabled.
From the point of view of the end users, convergence of the routing
protocol is not necessarily the primary issue. A traffic engineering pro-
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Figure 5.10: Aggregate weight changes in AS1755.
tocol presents a benefit to end users only if it improves the performance
experienced by them. We measure this performance in terms of bandwidth
per transferred Web object. We measure TCP throughput (in Byte/s) and
consider the average and median over intervals of 20 seconds length. The
results are depicted in Figure 5.11.
First observe that, due to the burstiness of Web traffic, mean and me-
dian throughput differ significantly. Whereas after our startup period of
500 s, median throughput is 23.5 kByte/s, the average throughput is al-
most 42 kByte/s. Even with communication disabled, median and mean
throughput grow by 29% to 30.5 kByte/s and by 14% to 48 kByte/s. With
communication enabled, the benefit is even larger. Median throughput in-
creases by 59% to 37.5 kByte/s and average throughput increases by 34%
to 56 kByte/s. The latter values have been calculated as time averages over
the time interval [2000 s, 3500 s], i. e., over an interval at which the algo-
rithm has converged. As is indicated by the decrease of weight shifts, a
significant throughput gain is achieved already within the first three min-
utes, but the throughput keeps increasing slightly even afterwards.
5.6 Summary
We have introduced REPLEX, a dynamic traffic engineering protocol that
balances network traffic on-line. Simulations have shown that our proto-
col is able to cope with the risk of oscillations, one of the major obstacles
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Figure 5.11: Throughput gain in AS1755.
that prevents dynamic traffic engineering protocols from being deployed
in practise. Via simulations on artificial topologies we have determined a
suitable parameter set which enables the protocol to converge within few
minutes. On a real topology taken from the Rocketfuel data set with real-
istic workload, convergence comes with a significant improvement of the
overall network performance measured in terms of throughput.
One of the advantages of our protocols is that it is easy to deploy on top
of virtually any routing protocol, be it OSPF, MPLS, or even BGP, as long
as this protocol can provide multipaths. The underlying routing structure
does not have to be changed or entirely replaced as is necessary for many
TE protocols. We have chosen OSPF since it is easily possible to obtain a
diverse set of paths using this protocol. This permits also a compact repre-
sentation of these paths and it is not necessary to store them explicitly, e. g.,
as MPLS tunnels. A second advantage of our protocol is that it can be easily
adapted to the optimisation goal of the network operator by choosing an
appropriate performance measure.
We consider the protocol as it is presented here rather a framework
than a detailed implementation. This framework leaves room for improve-
ments, such as the design of strategies to coordinate weight shifts in a way
that minimise the number of reroutings that the individual connections are
subject to. The fact that our protocol performs well already at this rather
coarse level of implementation shows that dynamic traffic engineering is
possible and is a good indicator that it is worth investigating protocols of
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this flavour in more detail.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and
Open Problems
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have considered load-adaptive rerouting policies in var-
ious models which enable a population of selfish agents to approach War-
drop equilibria. What can we learn from the results of this work? There are
two take homemessages. The first is structural, and the second is technical:
Wardrop equilibria require only mild assumptions. The classical, static
motivation of Nash equilibria in strategic games requires strong assump-
tions: complete and accurate knowledge of the payoff function, common
knowledge of unbounded rationality, and unbounded reasoning capabili-
ties. Our dynamical analyses show that these assumptions are not neces-
sary for selfish routing games in the Wardrop model.
We have seen that a population of selfish agents can attain a Wardrop
equilibrium in the long run by following simple selfish rules. This merely
requires that the latency functions truly reflect the preferences of the agents
and that agents have the capability to observe the latency and flow values
induced by the population as well as to perform very simple sampling and
comparison steps. However, this dynamic population model still assumes
perfect information in that any action of the agents can be observed imme-
diately.
Subsequently, we have seen that the assumption of perfect information
can be abandoned as well. Observations may be made with a delay as long
as the adaption policy is not too greedy. From our analysis it also follows
that the flow values may even be observed with a certain error or uncer-
tainty. E. g., as long as the flow values observed by the agents are within
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constant factors of their true value, our analyses of convergence and con-
vergence time still hold up to constant factors. Our general framework of
α-smooth adaption policies requires the migration rates to be bounded by
the reciprocal of the maximum slope of the latency functions and the max-
imum age of the information. This slows down the convergence process
significantly. In order for the population to approach an approximate War-
drop equilibrium we need to assume that network parameters and flow
demands themselves change slowly, if at all. Thus, we have traded the
assumption of perfect information for the assumption of inertness of the
underlying network.
To show that not even this assumption is necessary, we have considered
a specific adaption policy, the exploration-replication policy. We have seen
that due to a clever sampling technique, this policy reaches approximate
equilibria very quickly. In particular, the time to reach a state in which at
most a small fraction of the agents deviates by more than a small fraction of
the average latency from the average latency of their commodity is almost
independent of the network size.
These results strengthen the concept of Wardrop equilibria showing
that they can be motivated using very mild assumptions only.
Agent sampling is powerful. The main technique that allows for our
polynomial bounds on the convergence time of the exploration-replication
policy is the fact that the policy utilises flow proportional sampling. This
has two advantages: First, it avoids the possibly exponentially large factor
Ω (|P|) which would occur for all static sampling probabilities. Second,
it allows us to use the elasticity as the crucial parameter of our analysis.
This is possible only since elasticity measures the relative growth of a func-
tion value due to a relative growth of the argument. The growth of a flow,
however, is relative only if we apply flow proportional sampling.
6.2 Open Problems
The theoretical part of this work leaves open one major question. Whereas
we have shown in Chapter 4 that (1+ e)-approximations of Wardrop equi-
libria can be attained by the exploration-replication policy in polynomial
time for symmetric instances, it is not clear whether this is possible for
asymmetric instances. Technically, the argument which fails for the asym-
metric case in our proof is the fact that the average latency cannot change
significantly without decreasing the potential (Lemma 4.9). For instances
with several commodities (and therefore also several averages), this argu-
ment clearly fails. However, there is also a structural reason which indi-
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cates that processes similar to the one considered here may take long to
approximate Wardrop equilibria in this sense. For discrete asymmetric net-
work congestion games it has been shown that computing a pure Nash
equilibrium is PLS-complete [1, 29]. Furthermore, it is known that any se-
quence of selfish steps may be exponentially long. Therefore, it is unclear
whether the continuous Wardrop model allows for a polynomial conver-
gence time in the asymmetric case.
A second open question is whether our policy can be applied algorith-
mically. This is problematic for two reasons. First, our model involves an
infinite number of agents, and second, our policy requires to sample from a
possibly exponentially large set of paths. Thus, simulating the exploration-
replication policy in a naive way would require to maintain an exponential
number of variables ( fP)P∈P . A way to circumvent this has been exposed
lately in [?]. Therein, we consider a distributed algorithm executed by a
finite number of agents, one for each commodity. Each agent may split its
flow demand and strives to balance the latency of paths of its own com-
modity. This algorithm represents path flows only implicitly, namely as a
natural decomposition of an edge flow vector in a DAG. This way, flow
updates can be computed in polynomial time. The algorithm proceeds by
sampling a path with a probability distribution given by the implicit path
flows. If this path has above average latency, a large fraction of its bottle-
neck flow is redistributed among the other paths. Thus, we can achieve
convergence results towards bicriterial equilibria that are similar to the
ones presented in Chapter 4.
Finally, a challenging open question is whether convergence results of
a similar kind can be obtained in the case of discrete agents. For net-
works of parallel links some convergence results have been presented, e. g.,
in [12, 28], but these analyses are restricted to linear or even identical la-
tency functions. Whereas our model takes into account concurrency, it ne-
glects probabilistic effects. Whereas the fluid limit model allowed us to
identify random variables (like the fraction of agents utilising a particular
path) with their expectations, this is not possible if the number of agents is
finite. Furthermore, the various discrete processes that have been used to
motivate the replicator dynamics and its refinements behave differently if
the number of agents is finite.
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APPENDIX A
Omitted Proof
Proof of Fact 4.2. We compare L and Φ termwise. For the upper bound con-
sider a resource e and note that the contribution to the average is `e( fe) · fe
whereas the contribution to the potential is
∫ fe
0 `e(u) du ≤ `e( fe) · fe by
monotonicity of `e.
For the lower bound, first note that both the ratio L/Φ and the elastic-
ity are invariant under scaling of any type. More precisely, if the function
f (x) has elasticity d and f (1)/
∫ 1
0 f (u) du = ρ, then the function f˜ (x) =
a · f (b · x) for any a, b > 0, has elasticity d and f˜ (1/b)/ ∫ 1/b0 f˜ (u) du = ρ,
too. Consequently, we can simplify the analysis by considering only those
functions with f (1) = 1. We construct a family of piecewise linear func-
tions ( fd,n) for n > d, n ∈ N with fd,n(1) = 1 that satisfies the following
two properties:
1. Let ` be any function with elasticity d and `(1) = 1. Then `(x) ≥
fd,n(x) for any x ∈ [0, 1].
2.
∫ 1
0 fd,n(u) du ≥ 1/(d + 1) · (1− o(1)) where the o(1) is with respect
to n.
Since the two claims hold for any n, they imply the lower bound also on `,
i. e.,
∫ 1
0 `(u) du ≥ 1/(d+ 1) which is our claim. For n > d, we define the
piecewise linear function fd,n by specifying the value fd,n(x) only for the
points xi = i/n, i = 0, . . . , n:
fd,n(xi) =

1 if i = n
fd,n(xi+1) ·
(
1− di+1
)
if d ≤ i < n
0 if i < d .
For an illustration of fd,n see Figure A.1. The construction implies that
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Figure A.1: The function `(x) = x2 and the piecewise approximation f2,n.
for any x ∈ [0, 1], fn,d(x) < `(x) for any function ` with elasticity d and
`(1) = 1. To see this, note that between xi and xi+1, fd,n has slope
d · f (xi+1)
xi+1
,
so the slope of fd,n is as least as large as the slope of any function with
elasticity d, and property 1 follows by induction on i.
It remains to prove that fd,n satisfies property 2. For i ≥ d we can also
write
fd,n(xi) =
n
∏
j=i+1
(
1− d
j
)
.
We see that this value is strictly positive since for i ≥ d every factor is
strictly positive. We prove that, for any i = d, . . . , n,
∫ xi
0
fd,n(u) du ≥
(
1
d+ 1
− d
i
)
· xi · fd,n(xi) = xi · fd,n(xi)d+ 1 ·
(
1− d(d+ 1)
i
)
·
Since this statement holds also for i = n, we obtain∫ 1
0
fd,n(u) du ≥ fd,n(1)d+ 1 (1− o(1)) ,
as desired. The proof is by induction on i. Clearly, the statement holds for
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i = d. Now assume that the statement holds for i = j. Then,∫ xj+1
0
fd,n(u) du ≥
∫ xj
0
fd,n(u) du+
1
n
· fd,n(xj)
≥
(
1
d+ 1
− d
j
)
· xj · fd,n(xj) + 1n · fd,n(xj)
=
xj+1 · fd,n(xj+1)
d+ 1
·
(
1− (j+ 1) · d(d+ 1)− d
3
(j+ 1)2
)
≥ xj+1 · fd,n(xj+1)
d+ 1
·
(
1− d(d+ 1)
j+ 1
)
.
The first inequality is the definition of fd,n, and the second is the induction
hypothesis. The equality uses the definition of xj = j/n and fd,n(xj+1). This
concludes the inductive argument.
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